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Frederick the Great and his Generals.
After an Engraving by John Frederick Clemens (1749-1808).
Original Painting by Edmund Francis Cunningham
(1741-1795).

HISTORY

OF THE

GERMAN PEOPLE

FROM THE FIRST AUTHENTIC
ANNALS TO THE PRESENT TIME

With an Introduction by
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VOLUME ELEVEN

MODERN GERMANY

The Rise of Prussia
Construction Work of Frederick the Great
1740-1786

Edited by
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and
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THE RISE OF PRUSSIA

CHAPTER I

NEW TASKS

THE legacy of the first Prussian king to his successors assumed reality. Amid a magnificent display of power the hybrid nature of kingdom and electorate was suddenly transformed and settled. King Frederick was not warranted in declaring that the House of Brandenburg could regard the acquisition of Silesia as the epoch of its greatness. But great men not only accomplish the tasks of historical development, they also create such tasks; the young state now felt the tremendous obligation of maintaining on a meager basis the quickly attained position of a power among the old powers. Generation after generation struggled for more than a century to solve this new problem of Prussian history.

The armed rising of 1744 did not lack in consistency, inasmuch as the road selected could not be followed to the end, and the coveted

world position could be definitely secured only by new acquisitions. The attempt had been unsuccessful. Realizing now the precise extent of the means at his command, King Frederick vowed during the war: "Once this storm is weathered, we will remain quiet in the harbor, which we shall not leave again."

Soon after the conclusion of peace, in 1764, he referred occasionally to his "present system," which he communicated to Minister Podewils, saying that in accordance with his new policy he would no longer interfere with anything, but would allow matters to proceed as they could and would, hoping by this means to get along best and to go farthest.

This scheme of forbearance held a contradiction, inasmuch as the state's imperative requirements of further rounding out and new extensions had not been satisfied. The king of Prussia tried everywhere to obtain international guarantees for the peace treaty of Dresden and the possession of Silesia, as Charles VI previously hunted security for the Pragmatic Sanction; the difference was that Frederick carefully avoided paying too much for the letters of protection for Silesia, and always remembered that he had to be backed by stronger securities than such papers.

During these years of peace, he said, in a

poetical vein to his Prussians: "Favorite children of Mars, be careful that laziness, conceit and feebleness do not spoil your morals; you heroes, whose bold deeds elevated this kingdom, maintain your work and do not permit your glory to fade; he who stands still when near the summit will easily slide back."

While formulating the system of peace the king did not really mean that his state should stop when halfway up the hill. It was not announced as a permanent valid law, but was due simply to prevailing practical considerations.

During his own life, the founder of Prussia's greatness believed his system all-sufficient; to his successors he disclosed further aims. While still crown prince, Frederick's vivid imagination was busy with an improvement of the Prussian map, and as king he still liked to indulge in political dreaming over Prussia's future. That was the term he used in his testament of accepted ideas concerning the work of a policy of enlargement, which was to raise the Prussian state, the artificially produced power, to the level of a really great power.

He was convinced that the great monarchies could make their way automatically, in spite of habitual abuses, and continue to exist by virtue of their own weight and strength, while small states would quickly be crushed unless strength,

nerve and fresh life were everywhere around them. At that time, when Prussia was still small, the lack of natural weight, in the sense of the ancient view of statesmanship, was fully compensated for by the young strength of a thoroughly healthy state system, which a strict disciplinarian had reclaimed from indolence, but, above all, by the youthful ruler's activity, determination and mental power.

After the Second Silesian War Francis I told a Dutch diplomat that the king of Prussia's hobby was: "Frederick is unique." The emperor claimed to know that Frederick declared he would give one of his hands for the privilege of retaining Silesia as long as he lived, and if the queen of Hungary regained it after his death it could be said that he alone was capable of defending it. In 1772, in the same sense and not less prejudiced than his father, Joseph II agreed with the assertion that the king of Prussia's favorite saying was: "After us the deluge." Such was one of the innumerable slanderous remarks made about the magnanimous king who, in 1752, in his political testament, warned posterity: "To secure the state's destiny it is necessary that its welfare should not depend upon the good or bad qualities of one man, but it should maintain itself through itself."

When issuing this warning Frederick esti-

mated his personal ability at less than its real value. That Prussia could maintain herself while fighting the three great continental powers simultaneously he did not consider possible until experience taught him the fact. This was proved by his explanations about all imaginable cases of political-military party grouping. It is certain that, without the ruler's heroism and genius, the Prussia of Frederick the Great would never have shown its inherent strength or brought the proof that, with her own resources, she could maintain her independence as a state against superior numbers.

The inhabitants of Berlin had lost their courage, but when news came of the victory near Kesselsdorf, and the conquest of Saxony's capital, the feeling of confidence was restored. The population of the suburbs had moved into the city proper but now ventured outside of the gates again, while the wealthy classes, after deciding that they would be safer at their country places, now came back through those same gates.

Such holiday rejoicings as were witnessed when the king entered the city, and again on the day a herald solemnly announced that peace had been restored, were never before known on the streets of Berlin. Nevertheless, while in the presence of the astonished crowds the brilliantly

illuminated gates of a hastily constructed temple were being closed, the king was already beset with doubts as to whether there would be peace or a new war when the following spring arrived. It almost seemed as if the fear expressed by him one day during his last campaign, that the coming peace would be only a brief truce, would be realized. Almost a year passed before the breaking of the clouds that had darkened the political sky of the victor over Austria and Saxony.

Since 1745 the problem of Prussian politics had become much more involved from the fact that to Austria's old opposition was added the new and fully warranted difference with Russia; the czarina had called a sharp halt to Frederick's invasion of Saxony, and he must now expect a Russian declaration of war.

To offset the ill will of the two imperial courts, he strove to protect himself by establishing friendly relations with the two western powers which, still at war with each other, were equally interested in being on good terms with Prussia. Taking this view the king, after having resumed negotiations with England during the preceding summer, expressed the hope that in future he would have two allies in France, instead of one.

At first it looked as if the old friends were in very sour humor, and the new ones were not yet reconciled by any means.

In London King Frederick's success hinged upon the question whether in the ministry the true English sentiment represented by the Pelhams and Stanhopes would maintain itself, or whether the Hanoverian king would regain the controlling influence over Great Britain's foreign politics which he exercised in the days of Walpole and Carteret.

After concluding the Hanoverian convention, which was very distasteful to him, George II denounced his own ministers to the Vienna court as ill disposed, and "the prisoner on the throne," as he called himself while gnashing his teeth, believed in February, 1746, that the moment had arrived for freeing himself from slavery and for recalling into his counsel Lord Firebrand, Carteret-Granville.

After two days Granville's new splendor collapsed pitifully; the unanimous refusal of the whig aristocracy, which was all powerful in parliament, to recall the ban pronounced against its one-time leader, made it impossible for him to form a cabinet. The old ministers triumphantly resumed their portfolios,—the two Pelhams, Sir Henry and his brother Newcastle, the two Stanhopes, Harrington and Chesterfield, and the entire group. The king of Prussia, through the mouth of his ambassador, Andrie, congratulated the two secretaries of state of the exterior upon

their victory over the dynasty; he informed them that he would be a good Englishman as long as they remained in power and as long as Hanover did not rule over London.

Andrie also received a special message for William Pitt, the man whom the British king hated above all others and for whom on that account his friends could not procure a seat in the cabinet. Andrie had to impress upon him how much King Frederick desired Pitt's views to become general, in order that England and Prussia could always remain in the closest harmony. Frederick, however, did not leave any doubt in the Englishmen's minds of the fact that in their fight against France they could not count on his active support.

This was a painful blow to the visionary British politicians, who would gladly have made him governor of the Netherlands and owner of Flanders and Brabant, so that he might protect those endangered territories against France and conquer them for the House of Austria as an equivalent for Belgium, Alsace and Lorraine.

The ambassador whom King Frederick sent to the Saxon court in January, for the purpose of resuming diplomatic relations, was instructed to be less reserved toward Sir Thomas Villiers, England's representative at Dresden, than toward the Frenchman Vaulgrenant. Nothing un-

usual was observable in the fact that he was more intimate with the diplomat who had co-operated as a mediator in the peace negotiations, than with the one who had been the tool of the French-Austrian attempts at a compromise. Those instructions, however, were not the expression of a fixed political system, but merely a symptom of the then present sentiment.

As in almost all cases where allies separate, there were mutual accusations, first at Berlin and Versailles, until gradually a *modus vivendi* was found that applied to the changed conditions. The king of France was disposed to see in the Prussian separate peace a personal offense from a king whom he had deemed worthy of a confidential correspondence. Furthermore, the ill-advised sarcasm in his last letter had drawn a reply in a proud, outspoken tone which the heir of Louis XIV did not like at all.

Most of all, he was vexed by a remark made by Frederick to Darget, Valory's secretary at Dresden, that he would keep out of the war even if Charles of Lorraine were before the gates of Paris. The king of Prussia always had strong opponents among those surrounding Louis. The Prussian ambassador had a hard task; he wrote that there were few who realized that, strictly speaking, France had kept

none of the promises made to her Prussian ally, and consequently had no right to complain of abandonment. Fortunately, among those who were unprejudiced in their views was Marquis d'Argenson, the minister of exterior affairs. He was by no means an admirer of Frederick, of whom he spoke frequently in strong terms; but he knew that so long as the war against Austria and England lasted it was not to the interest of France to show special susceptibility. He instructed Marquis Valory to be affable and even to congratulate the king of Prussia, who in France was commonly called the new Gustavus Adolphus, on the establishment of his peace. Wholly free from any malicious intent of punishing by political isolation the ruler who was exacting enough to go his own way, D'Argenson preferred to make the Prussian court the central point for all of France's negotiations in Germany and in the north of Europe.

This caused the French minister new disappointments. He proposed to the king of Prussia that, having laid down his arms, he might undertake a diplomatic campaign in the empire against Austria, but Frederick replied that he had absolutely no desire of starting a war of chicanery, which would again lead to open rupture. France then wished him to act as an armed mediator of peace, but he emphatically refused and of-

fered his services to the warring powers as a simple bearer of messages.

After Frederick's return from Saxony, during his first conversation with the French ambassador, he said: "My dear Valory, if you were as eloquent as a cherub, an archangel, or even the angel Gabriel, you could not persuade me to take a step which would lead me away from my purpose." The Frenchmen always found fault with the king's peace with Maria Theresa, because it recognized the election of an emperor on the 13th of September, 1745. Replying to this Frederick said that France would have to blame herself if the imperial crown should become hereditary in the new House of Austria. Gradually, however, he refrained from such references to French sins of omission, and on one occasion told Podewils sharply to discontinue his bitter remarks to Valory, a trick which he had learned from his master. "When these people show us their good will," said the monarch, "we must not offend them, and we must not, in that case, value our courteous words too high."

In one of his reports from Paris, old Chambrier said of Marquis d'Argenson that he was the one most devoted to Prussian interests, of all the ministers he had seen in office during the last twenty-six years. His position in this regard

was due to his recognition of the fact that the king of Prussia could render France good services even within the narrow, sharply drawn limits designated by him. The declaration of an imperial war with France, which since the emperor's election had been zealously urged at Vienna, was not effected, principally owing to Prussia's energetic efforts in favor of the empire's neutrality.

While King Frederick, with his usual brilliant skill, strove to keep to the " middle of the road " as between France and England, the two rivals who were still at war, his chief opponent did not discontinue her attempt to draw two powers hostile to each other simultaneously into her own interests. Maria Theresa still negotiated with Russia, and did not fully despair of reaching an understanding with France. Her aim then represented what ten years afterward was desired at Berlin as well as at Vienna. In fact, her efforts of 1746 reflected in their results the events of 1756. The policy of neutrality, which the king of Prussia found successful at the start, failed at the decisive moment when he tried to repeat it. To the empress-queen the future, after a first disappointment, brought the more complete success.

Austria had concluded a peace with Prussia at Dresden, but there was no reconciliation: the

comity was really due to an accident,—the delayed arrival of an express messenger carrying to Count Harrach the recall of his previous instructions and an order to complete an arrangement with France. It was not considered worth while to conceal the displeasure caused by the peace that had been concluded contrary to the original intention.

At Regensburg, to which city congress promptly returned from Frankfort, on the new emperor's orders, the imperial commissary added to his report about the agreement the venomous declaration that their majesties, in spite of their reluctance to expose themselves again to the danger of a peace with the court of Berlin, had readily disregarded all other considerations, contrary to the wish of the maritime powers. Maria Theresa, however, not only publicly but in confidential communications, gave expression to her intention of carrying out the peace treaty in the most sacred and faithful manner, "without following the opposite course which was repeated several times." The intention was immediately exposed to a severe test by an alluring proposal from Russia directly after the conclusion of peace.

On the day that such a treaty was signed at Dresden, the empress's ambassador, Freiherr von Pretlack, reached St. Petersburg. The war-

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like sentiment prevailing there surprised him most agreeably. The report that the king of Prussia had invaded Saxony in spite of her warning removed the czarina's last scruples. She ordered the chancellor to carry war preparations to such a point that Russia could deal alone with Prussia in case of need.

Then came the discouraging news of the battle near Kesselsdorf, the fall of the Saxon capital, and the peace negotiations. There was real danger of standing alone to receive the full shock of the Prussian war power, and the opponents of Bestuschew and his martial demonstrations gave warning that it was best to continue playing with the fire. From the Saxon court, however, came word that, trusting in Russia, there was no intention of feeling bound by a forced peace. This decided Bestuschew, who at a conference on the 4th of January, in the face of the peace party's opposition, carried his resolution that 100,000 men should take the field against Prussia as soon as Saxony resumed hostilities.

When finally a new discouraging message reported as an actual fact the peace which had been dreaded and hated, the state conference on the 18th of January repeated its resolution. Proud of his success, Bestuschew told the representative of Maria Theresa that during the coming spring 90,000 men, as reënforcements, would

march against Prussia, if either Austria or Saxony could find a pretext to break with Frederick, because "Russia, anyway, had already incurred heavy expenses." At all events she offered Austria an alliance for defense; if neither at Vienna nor at Dresden could a pretext be found for a new rupture with Prussia, Russia would furnish 30,000 men for continuation of the war against France, and would ask for these troops the privilege of marching through Prussian territory. Bestuschew assured Pretlack that, as might well be supposed, Prussia would not consent to a march through her country, and her refusal could be made the ground for a rupture. He repeatedly declared to the Austrian that the czarina's bitter hate of the king of Prussia intensified from day to day.

On the 22nd of January, Pretlack exultingly wrote to his court: "Personally I do not interfere with their pleasing devices, but rather, without committing myself in the least, try to encourage them, partly by talking secretly to the chancellor and partly through trustworthy third persons. It is impossible that all these schemes after the peace success should not give umbrage to Prussia, and they easily can get into difficulties with her."

That the court of Vienna did not entirely disregard the ideas recommended by the Russian

chancellor was proved toward the end of April by a conversation between Maria Theresa's court chancellor, Ulfeld, and the Saxon ambassador, Count Loss. With the French ministry's consent Saxony again, as during the preceding autumn, had offered at Vienna her mediation for a compromise with France. Count Ulfeld replied with the plain question whether France was ready to attack the king of Prussia without any preliminaries; he added that it would be impossible to believe in France's sincerity until she had declared her intention of abandoning the king of Prussia's interests, instead of making him the real dictator in the empire.

This reply caused Marquis d'Argenson to remark that nothing was more difficult than to talk of peace to the court of Vienna, because Austria could not as yet become reconciled to her loss of Silesia and its addition to Prussia's greatness, and because she suspected France of double dealing, while she herself was intriguing against the Dresden peace that had just been concluded.

The ground assumed by D'Argenson, and France's disinclination to take the king of Prussia unawares, facilitated the empress-queen's purpose of remaining true to the Dresden peace treaty and of repulsing the Russian tempter. Austria simply concluded the alliance of defense.

On the 2nd of June, 1746, the treaty was signed at St. Petersburg. Its importance was appreciated by the English ambassador, Lord Hyndford, who had Bestuschew's confidence and continued to feel very bitter toward King Frederick, as shown in the following words: "The ostensible part contains only a renewal of a previous alliance, but the final purpose is directed against the king of Prussia, to take Silesia again from him, and to put a future limit to the ambition of this dangerous ruler—a purpose expressed in the secret paragraphs of the treaty."

The pact derived its significance from the fourth secret paragraph, which stated that the empress-queen's renunciation of Silesia and Glatz should become void not only if the king of Prussia commenced hostilities against her, but also if Prussia attacked Russia or the republic of Poland; in either case the two allies would support each other, not with 30,000 men, as specified in the general treaty, but with double that number. The empress-queen vowed to her ally that in appreciation of the event she would pay her two million Rhenish florins "inside of one year from the time Silesia and Glatz would again be completely in her power."

How soon this was expected to occur may be learned from a communication dated the 5th of March, sent by the Vienna court to its repre-

sentative while negotiations were still progressing, in which it was stated that great efforts were being made to have Prussia attacked simultaneously by Russia and the Ottoman Porte; in such an event Austria offered prompt armed assistance in spite of the war against the House of Bourbon, which she still had on her hands.

With the alliance of St. Petersburg, the Russian policy after several years of vacillation took a course which it followed throughout the reign of Elizabeth. Less than three years had passed since the most dishonorable accusations were made against an Austrian ambassador and his court, but now the successor of the reviled Marchese Botta was the most preferred and influential member of the diplomatic corps at St. Petersburg.

Pretlack had not only gained the intimate friendship of the chancellor, whose most welcome assistant he was, but the chivalrous, still youthful lieutenant field marshal, who was one of Mollwitz's brave cavalry chiefs and in appearance resembled the brilliant marquis Chétardie, was ostentatiously honored by the czarina, though she was at first rather reserved toward him. Elizabeth would gladly have attached him to her own military service. Pretlack knew how to take advantage of his favorable position; more perhaps than anybody else he contributed to the

czarina's dislike of the king of Prussia, whom only a few years previously she had warmly admired. His avowed purpose was and always would be to open the czarina's eyes more clearly concerning that ruler's true character and the mischief of which he was capable unless constantly watched. He also planned to make Russians act so harshly that soon Frederick would have to give his entire attention to him.

First of all this marplot received for his treacherous work the reward of learning that at the end of the summer it had been decided to keep together the troops assembled in Livonia through the winter and the following summer. He recommended to his court the advisability of cleverly flattering on every occasion the czarina's ample stock of vanity, and not to omit a shipment of sweet Tokay wine, "to moisten the flattery." If this advice were followed he could almost vouch that the Russian army would be held in readiness at least throughout the following year.

These negotiations between the two imperial courts caused the worriment which disturbed the king of Prussia during the spring and summer of 1746. The finer connections and final aims of the diplomatic policy were hidden from him, and he was mistaken in believing Austria to be the pushing party, and Russia the one being pushed.

In September the Russian embassy informed Frederick officially of the alliance concluded three months before, but the fatal secret paragraphs were not mentioned. His political department of investigation had not as yet been organized; the unmasking of a Russian spy, who had been active in Berlin for some time, caused the king to consider the employment of such agents and not to be parsimonious with the blood money required. The embassy reports of his certified representatives showed for the most part only symptoms; the picture of the political situation, which his sagacity put together from weak, fragmentary indications, frequently changed from one mail to another; Frederick repeatedly complained that he could see only like somebody looking through a veil, and that things appeared to him as if in a dream.

The established facts of these political investigations were the Russian preparations for war and the movements of troops. Sufficiently informed on this subject, he closely watched occurrences on the boundary. The low estimate of his ambassador, Mardefeld, who spoke of Russians as very poor warriors, and of their generals' ability as still poorer, and who laughingly characterized all the war rumors as gasconade, was not shared by the shrewd Frederick. He claimed that figures should be considered first

of all, and that if 60,000 Austrians and 20,000 Saxons were joined by 40,000 Russians, he could oppose these 120,000 men with only 110,000 or 112,000, since it would be necessary to leave 20,000 in the fortresses.

Frederick also asked whether anybody could guarantee that Denmark and Hanover, lured by so strong a league, would not join it. The fortunes of war might favor him twice or three times but not forever. While he did not fear the Russian regular troops, he looked upon the Cossacks and Tartars as highly dangerous, because a week was sufficient for them to devastate an entire province.

The high cost of living at that time and the lack of provisions made it impossible to concentrate an army in eastern Prussia, and an attack upon Riga, as recommended by Mardefeld, looked easier than it really was, because a navy would be required, or at least a sufficient number of transports.

Even more serious than the enemy's strength was the unsettled condition at home; the army tents and many other necessities had not yet been replenished and resources were exhausted. Frederick believed that a year would suffice for successful preparations, but that the state would be in the gravest peril if the explosion should come at once.

Finally, tired of uncertainty, the king ordered his representative to ask the Russian chancellor officially "whether all these great war preparations on our borders are intended against us or not." Early in July, when Mardefeld submitted this question, the chancellor referred him to a special order of the empress prohibiting any information in important matters unless demanded in writing. The ambassador had no authority to put the question in that form, and at the end of the conference, when he asked what he should report to his king, he received the hypocritical and highly unsatisfactory reply: "Tell His Majesty that I shall do everything in my power to make the close relations between the two high heads exist forever."

It was known that Bestuschew could be bribed, and Mardefeld was instructed, if he became convinced that the chancellor seriously intended a rupture, to offer him 100,000 or 200,000 thalers. King Frederick, as he expressed it, preferred a purchase of peace from the malevolent minister to an expensive and ruinous war. Mardefeld did not deem it advisable to have recourse to bribery; neither did the chancellor, after the Dresden peace treaty was signed, receive the 100,000 thalers hinted at in case of good behavior, because Frederick took the view that such consideration was not deserved when

Russia assumed so hostile and threatening a position. In after years the king regretted this economy, convinced as he was that Bestuschew's disappointed greed was the real cause of the irreparable breach with Russia.

The chancellor had great influence and the king's principal reason for neglecting him so palpably was Mardefeld's optimism in holding out hope that Bestuschew would soon be replaced by the vice-chancellor, Woronzow, whom the Prussian ambassador regarded as a real friend of Prussia and France. During the preceding November Woronzow went to the south of France for the benefit of his health and, while stopping a short time at Berlin on the way thither, was received by the king with the greatest kindness. In July, 1746, on his return trip, he succeeded in removing, at Potsdam, the unfavorable impression caused by his reserve at the time of his first visit, and spoke without restraint of his rival, Bestuschew.

Mardefeld, D'Allion, the French ambassador, and the home opponents of Bestuschew, waited anxiously at St. Petersburg for the returning vice-chancellor, "like the Jews for the Messiah." It soon became evident, however, that Woronzow did not dare to take up the fight. Bestuschew's position was too strongly intrenched, and he was able to dispose of his opponents one by

one. Just then it was Mardefeld's turn. The chancellor had known for a long time that this clever, sharp, sarcastic diplomat, who had held his post for twenty years, was his most dangerous enemy; finally he succeeded in inducing the empress to demand the recall of the uncomfortable stranger, which was facilitated by a similar demand on the part of Prussia a few years before. After a delay of several months under various pretexts, Mardefeld started on his involuntary return trip early in October. The empress granted him a farewell audience, but her reception was painfully cold. This proved again that the personal attentions paid Elizabeth by the king of Prussia made very little impression.

In the meantime, Frederick had become fully convinced that a Russian attack was no longer to be feared, and that the powerful preparations in that quarter were meant only for Austria's protection. The young Russian officers regretted that there would be no war. At the time of Woronzow's visit, Lieutenant Ewald von Kleist wrote from Potsdam to his friend Gleim: "In our minds we are already vanquishing the Russians; I believe, however, that we shall remain inactive this year, although I do not desire that."

The king again became uneasy toward the

end of August, when the Vienna court assumed a specially unfriendly attitude and several sharp notes were exchanged during negotiations over the carrying out of several paragraphs mentioned in the peace treaty. At the same time a complaint was received from the ambassador, Count Podewils the younger, who went to Vienna in May, that it was no longer considered necessary there to suppress the natural haughtiness, and that during the preceding two months neither the emperor nor the empress had spoken a word to him.

An imperial ambassador had not yet been sent to Berlin. King Frederick, who knew that his correspondence with his ambassador was regularly examined at the post office in Vienna, added to one of the code messages a postscript, in his own handwriting, reminding the ambassador of an old saying by a former governor of Berlin: "Sergeant, if the citizen acts like a bull, do likewise; if he is polite, be the same."

Frederick did not really believe that the queen of Hungary desired an unwarranted break with him; he wrote: "Nevertheless, it is necessary to act as though Hannibal were knocking at the gates; it must be remembered that vigilance is the mother of safety. I am preparing as though I might be attacked tomorrow, and these people

will have to rise very early if they wish to catch me napping."

Two events finally dissipated his fears. On the 11th of October, near Rocoux in the bishopric of Liége, the marshal of Saxony vanquished the united Austrian and Dutch troops under Duke Charles of Lorraine (who became notorious through his hard luck) and Prince of Waldeck. This victory assured to France the possession of Brussels, which capital had fallen into her hands at the beginning of the campaign; at the same time, it balanced to a certain extent the defeats suffered by the Bourbon troops in Italy, where the Austrians, led by capable Prince Lichtenstein, had vanquished the French-Spanish army under Marshals Maillebois and Gages, near Piacenza, pushing the troops step by step back to the borders of Provence.

Simultaneously with this message Frederick received from London "something very cheerful,"—the document in which the English crown again guaranteed him Silesia and his other possessions, except East Friesland, over which Prussia and Hanover were in dispute. He considered this a new proof of Britain's honest intention to maintain friendly relations with him and not to aid the open or secret plans of revenge harbored by the two imperial courts. His view was: "As long as Russia is on good terms

with England and England with me, the court of Vienna will not attain its aim." With these words he had quieted the fears of his ambassador at Vienna several weeks previously. On the 22nd of October, just after receiving the document, he wrote from Potsdam to his brother, the prince of Prussia: "This guaranty, coupled with the battle near Liége, puts me in the best humor; Monday I shall have the joy of embracing you and, if it suits you, we will have a pleasant evening together during my stay at Berlin."

In such high spirits he completed a few days later, on the 2nd of November, the manuscript of the history of his second war, which he had commenced the previous spring. The last sentence reflected a confidence which the author had not generally felt in the course of that year: "If anybody benefited by this war, it was Prussia, whose troops were highly regarded throughout Europe, and if it is true that states rely on the reputation of their war strength and the honor of their arms, it may be flatteringly said that the peace now concluded will not easily be broken by those on whom Prussia forced it." In the preface he stated that from the safe port he looked back upon the stormy ocean where, in the breakers, staring rocks, bursting ships, and drifting wrecks appeared as sad monuments of ambitious strife. In modern history he saw an

impressive lesson in the examples of Charles VII and Augustus III, both of whom had to flee from their states; a warning was also in the exit of Charles XII and the reversal of the fortunes of war experienced even by Louis XIV.

Frederick, like them, had been on the edge of the abyss. During the days following the battle of Rocoux he wrote: "I made war under terrible dangers to the state; I have seen my reputation shaken and again restored; briefly, after passing through so many changes, I really enjoy short breathing spells. In Flanders the Austrians hurry from retreat to retreat, while in Italy they are chasing the Spaniards ahead of them; but their victories and their flights weaken them equally while we are gaining strength from day to day. Let them have the glory, which may be useful for the praises sung by newspaper reporters, and let us enjoy the blessings of peace which they do not know." On the 26th of June, after the first great battle of the year, he wrote: "At present I am busy planting trees; I am now a gardener and, comparing my occupation of this spring with that of last year, I find that in regard to rest I have gained considerably by the change, and I prefer to see Mr. Gages and Mr. Maillebois angry rather than myself."

Shortly afterward, in July, Frederick reviewed troops at Ruppin and his thoughts trav-

eled back to the period of his youth spent there. He wrote to his brother: "Upon returning to the spot where my boisterous amusements occurred, it seemed to me that I heard the old peasants whisper to each other, 'Really our good king is the biggest fool in his entire kingdom; we know him, and we can judge what he amounts to from head to foot; our windows can judge still better. Thank God, our panes of glass remain intact since this madman has left these parts and prefers to break the windows of the queen of Hungary.' Judge, please, how my self-esteem was humiliated by these fine panegyrics. I decided, however, to imitate the wise example of the poodle. I shook myself and went away, realizing that a prophet is nowhere appreciated less than in his own country."

With irony at his own expense he compared the first and second stormy days that were over. After racing through half a lifetime he desired to walk more slowly and deliberately, to divide the remaining years undisturbed between quiet enjoyment and even work. He made no secret of the fact that Cæsar's glory inflamed him to imitation, but from personal inclination he preferred the civic virtues of Aristides.

Believing that the demon in his breast had been tamed Frederick wrote: "I am entirely cured from ambition; the spell under which it

kept me is broken and now I only have the one desire of spending in peace the days which heaven may still grant me, to enjoy pleasures without abuse, to do as much good as may be in my power, and to leave errors, cunning and vanity to those who are willing to be ensnared."

He did not expect to live many more years. In 1752 he wrote in his *Political Testament:* "I believe that my days are over." While still crown prince he expressed the opinion that his father would survive him. The thought of the ills due to old age seemed to bother him. He remembered Vespasian's words, given by Suetonius, that an emperor ought to die standing up; he wrote in Latin that he, too, would like to die standing, and that he wished to be called away in the fullness of strength and activity.

The exertion and excitement of the campaigns had seriously injured his health. Late in May, 1746, at the springs of Pyrmont, where he had been a guest just before the last war, the first indications of the disease from which he frequently had to suffer afterward were noticed. He wrote from there on the 4th of June to Prince Wilhelm: "In spite of all that you may tell me, I had the gout; it is absolutely certain, because one of my feet is still swollen; it is unpleasant and premature, but true."

The swelling proved very stubborn and con-

tinued to trouble the king for weeks; nevertheless he made his journey to Silesia, but was seriously ill when he returned to Potsdam at the end of August. He was confined to his bed for almost two weeks and regained his health but slowly. The most disquieting occurrence, with its accompanying features, was an illness at the close of the following winter. During one of his frequent hemorrhoidal attacks he suddenly fainted, and a lameness developed in his right arm and foot. Sinking to the floor, he still was conscious enough to seize a glass of water from the table and drink it; he then ordered a severe bleeding, and for over four hours, till after midnight, had himself slowly led up and down his room. On the second day after this attack he tried to resume his work and favorite flute playing, but a high fever set in. After three days there was a relapse; while signing some documents he felt a stinging pain in his side and again was confined to his bed. His court physician, Lesser, blamed the trouble on the king's carelessness in reading that morning for two hours uninterruptedly immediately after rising.

The worst rumors were current in Berlin. Finally, as first harbingers of recovery, a few lines addressed to the prince of Prussia came from the king's hand: "With troops like ours

there need be no fear of an attack by Austria's entire fighting strength, but with a used-up body like mine it is not so easy to triumph over sickness."

His second report from the sick room, nine days after the first attack, read: "I am going along as best I can, sometimes feverish and sometimes in fair health. The knowing ones say that everything had to turn out this way for the benefit of my soul; I am willing to believe it, but I should gladly have gotten along without apoplexy and fever. For this time I believe I escaped Pluto's realm, but I went as far as the last station before the Styx, heard the barking of Cerberus, and recognized the old ferryman of Death with his momentous boat." A month later he wrote that he did not feel any bad after effects, but,—using a military comparison,—he complained about attacks on his body from so many directions that he was constantly obliged to fight those besieging him, sometimes the gout, then hemorrhoids and stone trouble; among so many enemies he did not consider his position comfortable.

In view of this last sickness he expressed to the prince of Prussia his intention of initiating him at the first opportunity into all details of state affairs, so that his successor, in case of an unexpected event, would not be entirely unac-

quainted with government matters and the system of the administration.

At the same time he continued to call to the prince's attention the horrible example of the average ruler, and on the other hand to extol the lofty duties of sovereigns. His favorite theme, which he constantly varied,—in speech and writing, in prose and poetry,—appeared particularly charming at this time in two poetical epistles entitled *Apology of Kings* and *Epistle to my Spirit,* in which he interviewed himself, after Boileau's model.

This monologue described the kings of the present day with stinging sarcasm. If he knew how to examine an account, to approve a proposition, and to sign a decree, could anything else be reasonably expected of him? "He can uphold the throne's majesty and live up to the greatness of which the splendor surrounds him; proud toward his neighbors and always condescending, he lives on incense just like the gods. Of what use is knowledge to him? Complete wisdom consists of thoroughly knowing the rules of etiquette. Yes, in the solemn stillness of the audience hall, whisper to an ambassador an unintelligible compliment, never put an end to the hunt, and remain anchored at the gambling table; above all learn to hear yourself praised without blushing; crowd into the church

and yawn in the theater; be morose at meal time, speak only in oracles and, to make more show of your grandeur, affect love,—that is a king's way to bore himself and his court, that is the trade he must learn." The indignant Frederick continued: "If I had thus to devote my entire life to nothing, the great task of the courts, I should rather give up greatness, scepter and kingdom, and turn my back on the entire fraternity of stiff kings."

Fortunately a monarch's true calling is not exhausted in such a disconsolate, empty circle. Indeed, his work is not easy, as is shown in the *Apology of Kings:* "If he desires to be a really clever ruler, he must not shirk hard work but look into the smallest details concerning his country. He must protect the goddess of justice when the ever reappearing Hydra, called chicane, raises her unholy brow; defend the people and pay the officials; distribute the burdens justly according to the unequal wealth of the individual; nobody desires to give, but all wish to receive; when the peasant complains that the village carries too heavy burdens, the courtier demands an increased salary. Of that which spindle and plow give to the state, a portion belongs to the state's heroic defenders, and that the glory may not fade new victories must be prepared, in the midst of peace; at the same time

it is necessary to hold with a strong arm the hot-headed warrior within the limits of duty; the lions raised for battle and set free by Bellona must be tamed by Themis. Furthermore, the state's safety depends on modern politics, which wrought evil into a scientific system. Each treaty assumes a cross-eyed sense and is interpreted in a trifling manner; deceit pressed a diadem on its own brow; crimes, for which the people are punished, become virtues when committed by kings; for that reason there is no friendship among rulers; one plans the other's downfall; the nearest neighbors are the bitterest enemies. It is necessary to observe and fathom them:

> 'To study closely the book of future events,
> To prevent the mischief upon which our life depends.'

"A ruler answering all these hard requirements and believing that he has done his duty toward his state cannot count on any thanks unless heaven works some wonders. He will always be a target for general criticism. One considers him too strict, the other too mild and a third too rash. If he goes to war, he is called the raving king whom heaven filled with ambition to punish us for our sins; if he maintains peace, he is called the monarch who is afraid of danger and timid in the face of glory. If he rules inde-

pendently, he is called jealous, stubborn and incalculable, following only his own notions; if he leaves the state's care to his ministers, he is accused of trusting intriguers. If he has favorites, his preference is called contemptible weakness, and if he lacks such, it proves that he is irresponsive to friendship; if economical, he is called stingy, and if liberal a spendthrift; but if gallant, he is surely a libertine."

King Frederick claimed to know that he, personally, was blamed for want of gravity while bearing the lofty burden of royalty,—he, the wit, the poet and the satirist. He warned himself to pay attention to his own faults more than Cato did, and frequently there was whispering of a question: "Well, friends, do we not have a very funny consul?" Frederick declared that he could easily justify himself by asking: "Did I ever, in the whirl of pleasure, neglect my duty or the state? Did I ever disappoint my people, delay lawsuits, disturb the state household, or forget negotiations, for the sake of indulging my literary taste? Was I ever among the last to appear on the fields of Mars? If in all these cases I did my duty and showed my zeal, how can anybody be cruel enough to begrudge my pleasures?"

What the author of these poems recited in gracious humor and pleasantry was supple-

mented by the full expression of earnestness and even sternness in several letters to his successor. In 1750, while congratulating him upon the study of financial science which he had just begun, Frederick wrote to his brother: "A prince who, like you, is destined to rule some day, must not remain unprepared; he must be posted about all details, so that he may be enabled to work independently." Apologizing for his lecture-like tone, he added: "It is absolutely necessary for you to consider these matters and to prepare yourself for the office for which God selected you; pleasure must never interfere with duty."

A few weeks later, when the king believed that he had cause to be dissatisfied, he pointedly blamed his brother by writing: "If my brothers set a good example to other people, that will be my greatest joy; but if that is not the case, I shall immediately forget all considerations of relationship and do my duty,—that is to say, to keep everything in good order so long as I live; after my death you may do as you please."

In his *Political Testament* of 1752, which was primarily intended for his brother, the king solemnly called the attention of his successors to the duty and necessity of ruling independently. "A well-arranged government," the document stated, "must have a safe system put as closely together as the building harboring a school of

philosophy. A king of Prussia must rule personally; as little as Newton could have discovered the law of gravitation if he had not made common cause with Leibnitz and Descartes, the fact remains that a political system must originate in one mind; it must come to light from the ruler's head like the armed Minerva issuing from the head of Jupiter. Greed for pleasure, laziness and stupidity are the causes which prevent rulers from attending to their noble calling of creating their people's happiness. Such rulers make themselves so contemptible that they are the laughingstock of their contemporaries and history only mentions their names for the sake of chronology. They simply exist on their throne, unworthy of their seat, thinking of nobody but themselves. Their neglect of duty toward their subjects is criminal.

"Not for the purpose of becoming weaklings are rulers elevated to their high positions and clad with mere power; not for the sake of fattening on the nation's marrow while the people are starving. The ruler is the state's first servant; he is well paid that he may maintain the dignity of his character, but he is expected to work actively for the state's welfare and to conduct carefully the most important matters at least. Without any doubt he needs assistants; to handle all details would be too much for him, but he

ought to listen to everybody's complaints and quickly obtain justice for those threatened with violence. A woman once tried to hand a petition to a king of Epirus, but he scolded her and told her to leave him alone; she replied: 'Why are you king if you do not wish to protect my rights?'" Frederick added that this was a good argument, which rulers always should remember.

King Frederick did not claim for himself the glory of having been the first prince among the rulers of his state who strove for an ideal. He simply regarded himself as continuing and imitating his father's efforts, whose art in governing he praised in eloquent, enthusiastic words while writing the memoirs of his House's history. To him his immediate predecessor was the really great ruler, who gauged all his actions in consonance with the entire plan of his policy and who, in trying to make some parts efficient to the highest degree, always did so for the purpose of improving the whole. He called that ruler a general benefactor whose government left in the state traces of wisdom which would endure as long as Prussia continued to exist as a national body. He was the philosopher on the throne, so different from those wise men who show their fruitless science by pondering over abstract matters which evidently are removed from our knowledge, like the stoic who had such

a high opinion of humanity that he supposed his subjects held a stoical mind like his own.

The condition of the state administration, as it came to him at the time of his predecessor's death, was always regarded by Frederick as an absolute trust; his own additional and constructive reforms were the foundation of the structure intact. In 1747 he took an extended trip of examination which covered all branches, such as the war department, construction of fortresses, administration, departments of justice, of taxes and of commerce. He explained his impressions as follows: "On the whole I have every reason to be satisfied; in detail there is always something to be criticised." To his successor he wrote: "If you deviate from the principles and system introduced in this country by our father, you will be the first to suffer for it."

No plainer words could have been used in expressing the conservative principle of the government which followed a great period of reform.

King Frederick did not exaggerate when he said that his father pressed the ministers, who under the first king were the masters, down to the position of subalterns. The following words of Frederick William I are well remembered: "I wish to be my own field marshal and my own minister of finance, and do not mean to be

treated like the emperor, who is not permitted to say more than his colleges desire; to such treatment I shall never consent, but I will show that I, personally, wish to rule."

In foreign countries little Prussia was ridiculed for employing more ministers than big France; nevertheless, the individual composition of the three central state departments formed by Frederick William I, which required a large number of Prussian ministers, caused a considerable diminishing of each minister's personal importance. The cabinet was composed of two or three diplomats; the department of justice consisted of three or four jurists, and in the general directorate five or more officials shared the management and responsibility. The positions of these one-quarter ministers could not compare with those of the secretary of state for foreign affairs, the chancellor, or the general control in France. When forming the general directorate, Frederick William I wisely made himself president of the department, which was his ministry of finance, while to each managing minister of the separate departments he granted only the title and position of vice president.

His successor explained this government system in the following words: "According to the institutions of our administration, the king does everything in the state, while of the other of-

ficials each, in his limited district, attends only to that which is under his jurisdiction." The activity of the individual royal government, which reduced the influence and responsibility of the ministers, became still more pronounced when King Frederick, after the death of the first minister of commerce, did not fill that position in the general directorate but personally assumed the management of the department of commerce, with the simple assistance of the leading counselors of that department.

Furthermore, there was no solidarity among the three groups of ministers in opposing the crown. There was a secret state council, also called the secret ministry of state, created by Elector Joachim Frederick and principally composed of leaders in the three central departments, but it was by no means a fixed conference of ministers, which would have offered the three departments a firm basis of common interest.

Gradually the regular meetings took place less frequently because each of the ministry colleges had independent powers in matters coming under its jurisdiction and did not have to rely on the full meeting of the ministry of state. The regular meetings of the latter body occurred each Monday, but as a rule only the ministers of justice appeared and attended to their own business, while the ministers of foreign affairs

and those of the general directorate held their separate meetings. In 1771, by private agreement between the leaders, it was decided to meet on the first Monday of each month, whenever there were transactions for which the presence of more than one of the three central departments was necessary or desirable.

The position of the ministers suffered from the fact that the king liked to communicate directly, over the head of the leading authorities, with those depending upon them. In this way he maintained with embassies a steadily increasing "direct correspondence," which gradually withdrew the most important negotiations, not only from the influence but even from the knowledge of the foreign department; in the interior department also, as his father did before him when straightening out important matters, he liked to take the short cut by applying to people familiar with local conditions, and in doing this he granted presidents of provincial authorities so much latitude that they stood on the same level with, or sometimes above, their superior ministers, who could only watch proceedings.

On the other hand, the personal tie which formerly closely connected the head of the state with the members of the central authorities was relaxed. At first Frederick William I really pre-

sided at the meetings of the general directorate and always kept near him one of his foreign ministers.

Frederick II did not believe in verbal consultations. Only during the later years of his government was it customary to call before him once a year the ministers of finance for the so-called review of ministers, when the state household was to receive its final form for the coming fiscal year. If for any other purpose the king desired verbal information, which was mostly required for foreign politics, he followed the principle of not assembling all the ministers before him at the same time, but of receiving one or several separate reports. He explained that in this manner jealousies could be avoided when he had to decide between diverging opinions.

Written reports, however, were the rule. The *Political Testament* contained the following about the forms and advantages of this mode of procedure: "The ministers of the general directorate, the department of justice and the department of the exterior, send each day to the sovereign their reports, with detailed memorandums about subjects requiring his decision; in disputed and difficult cases they state their reasons for and against, thus enabling the sovereign to decide at first glance, provided he takes the trouble of reading and thoroughly comprehend-

ing the details; a clear head easily recognizes the decisive point. This method of settling business matters is preferable to meetings of counselors such as are held elsewhere; good advice does not come from a large number of people; furthermore, ministers, through their mutual intrigues, are at odds; personalities, hatred and passion are carried into state affairs; verbal deliberations, frequently in excited conversation, obscure instead of elucidating the matter at issue, and finally, secrecy, which is the very soul of state business, is never preserved when so many people take part in it. I lock my secrets within myself, having only one secretary of whose loyalty I am convinced; unless I am bribed it will be impossible to guess my intentions."

This faithful secretary was the man of whom Valory's successor as ambassador to Berlin wrote to the court at Versailles that he was the only person knowing about all the state matters of the king of Prussia. Here is the letter: "Wherever the king is, Monsieur Hecle" (misspelling of Eichel's name) "always follows him and works with him every morning. He knows all that which the ministers do not know. From his office, which has to be regarded as the king's own, come all the orders for the interior of the kingdom and for the exterior. Few people ever

talked to Monsieur Hecle; in vain we make the greatest efforts to see him, but it is impossible; no mortal ever saw him. He lives completely isolated, but knows all that occurs."

An English diplomat said of this mysterious man that he was guarded like a prisoner of state, that his service was continuous, that during the entire year he did not have one half-hour of leisure, and that one could live at this court for seven years without seeing the unfortunate victim.

August Friedrich Eichel was taken over from the previous government. He came from Halberstadt and was in the subaltern service when Frederick William I took him into his cabinet as private secretary. Immediately after entering upon his new duties, in 1730, when thirty-five years old, he attended to the correspondence in connection with the investigation of the crown prince, who had been arrested. His first master employed him principally on military documents in the cabinet.

During the First Silesian War, in the momentous days of signing the French alliance, when Frederick desired to surround the matter with absolute secrecy, he advanced Eichel to the unique, political, confidential position in which he maintained himself to the day of his death. As mediator of written communications between

the king and the exterior department he began, outside of his service, a confidential correspondence with Count Podewils. The minister and the cabinet secretary knew that they agreed upon a peaceable political sentiment which sought to avoid complications at any price, and after a breach, to return to the safe harbor at any cost. Forced into roads which led far away from those followed until then by Prussian politics, the careful and somewhat pedantic cabinet secretary, trembling with fear, carried out the orders of his stormy but genial master. He was always expecting the worst when there was an unforeseen turn, glad not to bear any responsibility but still greatly worried about matters with which he was more familiar than anybody else and which he had to see without being able to touch, so to speak. He confided his distress to the congenial minister (unless absolute secrecy had been ordered even against him), when he resignedly sighed: "God may help us and pull us from the mire, which is up to our necks; God may charitably turn away from us all evil; God may guide the king's heart to all that is good and counsel him for his own and the country's welfare."

During the anxious weeks of Hohenfriedberg Eichel said, with partly conscious and partly involuntary humor: "If we could wish what we

like, I should desire death a thousand times—at least for one or two years—so as not to witness all the circumstances harmful to my country and people."

Gradually this remarkable secretary lost the skeptical reserve which was occasionally noticeable at first in his confidential utterance about "our young master." Servants as a rule are not inclined to believe in heroes, but Eichel proved his exceptional disposition by constantly adding to his admiration for the hero and his veneration for the man, in spite of uninterrupted daily contact with him. Soon Frederick had no defender more devoted to him than Eichel; perhaps nobody in his surroundings, except possibly Winterfeldt, was able so thoroughly to understand the king's position, to become reconciled so completely to the forbidding harshness of a difficult character, and so implicitly to trust in the splendor of his genius, as the simple, faithful, overburdened man who devoted himself entirely and consistently to the service of his royal master.

After Frederick's death it was correctly stated that he always regarded his cabinet secretary as a simple copyist; his official title was "Geheimer Kriegsrath," but under the succeeding government it was changed to "Geheimer Kabinetsrath," which indicated a promotion.

Several times Eichel had occasion to offer advice to his master which, according to his own words, was "graciously accepted"; he also claimed that he succeeded by "modest insinuations," made at the proper moment to produce a "milder temperament." The ministers and generals soon recognized this state of affairs and treated the indispensable man accordingly. Eichel kept strictly within the limits of ceremonial respect in his intercourse with them. He apologized to Podewils for the frequency with which the activity of the cabinet office intruded upon the ministry's territory, claiming that only obedience to "the master's absolute will" caused him to do work beyond his "routine and capacity." Nevertheless it was said of him after his death that while he could have become minister, he preferred to see the ministers humiliate themselves before him. It cannot be denied that his peculiar position finally became intolerable because it was unnatural for the highest officials of the state to be dependent upon a subaltern, who had no responsibility whatever but was personally upheld by the monarch.

The cabinet's system of self-government was based on the individuality of its founders. Its future, if such a system could continue to exist in view of the state's enlarged territory, depended principally on the broad aspect and fa-

cility of comprehension, thoroughness and resourcefulness of working power, and such love for work, as were admirably combined in the father and the son.

Self-government was bound to become a caricature if the basic guarantees of a purely personal nature disappeared. King Frederick recognized this weakness of the system; he was aware of the fact that the state would physically feel any shortcomings on the part of the ruler. While not considering what changes in the system might be possible and whether by practical arrangements, unity and strength of the state government could be preserved under a less able ruler, he realized that in certain circumstances a republican form of government would be preferable to a monarchic one. Modern philosophy had not yet begun to attack the monarchy on general principles. History seemed to teach him that republics make more rapid progress and remain at their height longer than monarchies. This he believed to be due to the fact that good kings are mortal while wise laws are immortal, that the successor never resembles the predecessor, that an ambitious man follows an idler, while a pious man relieves a warrior and a scholar succeeds a sensualist. None the less, he had a decided opinion as to his preference of a form of government. While considering a bad monarchy

the worst system, he regarded a king's well-regulated rule as undoubtedly the best solution of the problem. Plato claimed to see the state's most perfect condition under the reign of a young, powerful and able tyrant.

Gifts, courage of youth and a feeling of strength were happily and generously combined here. Those jealous of him called the young ruler a phaeton; his horses, however, did not upset him because his hand was too firm to drop the reins; light surrounded him, but it was not the consuming flame of narrow, blind, contradictory passions; his look freely and surely surveyed the whole. From the past he drew an entirely different picture for his journey, proud and splendidly colored: "All branches of the state government are closely connected; finances, politics and war system cannot be separated; it is not enough to look well after one of the departments; they all must be equally well managed and guided in a straight flight, heads together, like the four horses in the Olympic chariot race, running with equal strength and rapidity over the track, pulling the chariot to the mark and securing victory for the driver."

Certain of his victories, not only on the battlefield, but in the arena of competition and civil life, in the midst of his stupendous tasks due to

the hard-earned peace, Frederick believed that his government had only really begun, in the sense that true ruling means to promote the people's happiness and that real government can be done only while peace prevails.

CHAPTER II

IMPROVING THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE

NO other minister under Frederick the Great enjoyed so much liberty of action in his territory as Samuel von Cocceji, at the head of the department of justice. It took him a long time to obtain this preference and the permission to institute reforms which he had indicated for decades without being able to carry them out because his proposals and preliminary steps, under the previous government, were supported by only a half measure of confidence and consistency.

Cocceji's reform in curtailing legal proceedings and simplifying judicial methods was the advance halfway along a strenuous road. At the threshold of the century the first Prussian king would have liked very much to give the young kingdom a perfect constitution, but it required a century to secure that boon in the codification of the most difficult half of the judicial reform problem.

During the last years of Frederick I, when

Crown Prince Frederick William came to the front, all the administration departments were closely scrutinized. This revived the desire for reform in the department of justice, but Minister Ilgen, who was a careful man, warned against branding the existing defects too strongly, saying: "It would not be advisable to let all the world know how poorly our system of justice is observed after His Majesty's government of twenty-four years, when justice is not granted in this country but in heaven." Another long period passed without bringing any change.

This failure of action was not anticipated by young Frederick William when he ascended the throne and he soon afterward said to the highest officials in the department of justice: "Within a year the constitution for the entire country must be completed or Mr. Bartollius (Bartholdy), Mr. Sturm and I will have a rough disagreement." In 1714 it was first decided to obtain the assistance of the young university at Halle, which was conceded to be the best college in the country, that from the day of its foundation had offered its services for any reform work by collaborating in the purely scientific part of the great task.

At the time of the state's elevation to a kingdom the jurists' faculty of Frankfort warned against precipitation in codification and, in a

similar manner, the professors of Halle now raised many objections. Even Thomasius, who had been intrusted with the management of the national work and was the pronounced enemy of the "unreasonable mixture of foreign laws written in a foreign language," confessed that an improvement in the slow judicial system, while not impossible, was very difficult and ought to be handled with the utmost care.

Thirteen years later, in an academic treatise which described and praised the internal policy of the existing government, Ludewig, the chancellor of the university, calmly declared that if the plan of a single, general, consistent penal code was expected to result well, the time consumed "must not be considered too valuable or ill used." The memorandum sent to Halle by the royal cabinet, to serve as basis for the work to be done, was buried in the archives of the faculty.

In the meantime reform in a practical way met with some results. King Frederick William issued his Draconian edicts against lawyers, introduced an improved criminal code, the first Prussian law of prosecution with broad validity for all parts of the country, and in one at least of his provinces, in old Prussia, it did not much fall short of that which was desired. There Cocceji, who bore the title of "Geheimer Justiz-

rath" and who since 1714 had taken part in the reform work at Berlin, furnished the first proofs of his talents as an organizer. The king rewarded his success by making him president of the exchequer, and later, in 1727, minister. In an explanation concerning government, intended for the crown prince, the king named Cocceji in 1722 as the most competent man to head the department of justice in contrast to Minister Plotho, whom he considered "useless."

Two years afterward Frederick told the same Cocceji that he had the skin of a bear. Plotho remained Cocceji's assistant up to the time of his death, and did everything in his power to restrain the younger minister, as did his successor, Freiherr zum Broich. The courts of justice gave Cocceji little encouragement in his efforts.

Years passed, but brought no reform. Toward the end of 1735, when he felt his end approaching, the prostrated monarch scolded his ministers and blamed them for their "gross neglect." He did not realize that he personally was much to blame. Contrary to the principles announced at the beginning of his government, he frequently interfered sharply in matters of justice, withdrew lawsuits even from the highest courts, to turn them over to special commissions, overburdened Berlin judges by giving

them much extra work, and greatly injured them as well as other court officials by reducing or even completely withholding their salaries, which had already been lessened at the time the change of throne took place. Although Frederick William's royal decree forbade the filling of judges' positions, high or low, with laymen or insufficiently prepared people, it is known that the king had applicants for state service examined and then assigned a "good head" to the administration and a "stupid devil" to the department of justice.

Whatever Cocceji and his colleagues could say in justification, they did not succeed in allaying the king's ire. Finally he appointed two ministers of the foreign department and two of the general directorate, including Field Marshals Borcke and Grumbkow, as a "high commission" to hear a most humiliating complaint against the ministers of justice. On the 5th of November, 1737, Cocceji was appointed chief minister of justice, with supervision and control over all colleges of justice, but in his increased responsibility he saw only new dangers and complications.

His fears were justified. His colleagues, who besides Broich were Ministers von Arnim-Boytzenburg and von Brandt, maintained themselves on a footing of equality. Arnim started

a conspiracy among all the ministers of the different departments against the chief minister of justice and, before he suspected it, he was, by a cabinet order dated the 10th of May, 1739, placed under the supervision of the whole secret state council. The next step was his complete retirement from reform work. The secret state council intrusted the continuation of that task to a commission of which Cocceji was not a member, while Arnim, his principal opponent, was its head.

Cocceji saw himself deprived of all occupation. Because of suspicion and impatience the dying ruler lost the satisfaction of seeing the seed he had planted sprout from the long-prepared soil.

Apparently, while still crown prince, Frederick II, in his copy of Montesquieu's *Causes of Roman Greatness and Decay,* expressed his consent to one of the author's remarks by writing on the margin: "Never change anything in a system of government before knowing from experience what is favorable or harmful to the nature of this state; never be prejudiced for or against that which exists; examine everything with your own eyes, judge for yourself, and finally introduce only such changes or improvements as reason suggests."

This principle the king followed to the letter

in the matter of judicial reform, at first observing, hesitating, waiting, and then acting the faster and more absolutely.

The new ruler's first decision was consequently a great disappointment to Cocceji. On the 18th of October, 1740, King Frederick decreed that the commission of 1739 should continue its labors. On resuming its work, it proved clearly its intention of destroying the entire foundation that had already been built; and its lawmaking reaction went as far back as 1725.

The cord had been tightened too much; after a few weeks the commission was instructed to reach an understanding with Cocceji, the hated one, concerning further proposals. At the same time the war, which had just commenced, diverted the king's attention from the matter; the commission made no report and through its own fault was forgotten.

During the following autumn, when the agreement of Kleinschnellendorf opened prospects of peace with Austria, the king sent his reminder to expedite reform, not to the commission but to Cocceji, whom he also intrusted with the reorganization of the system of justice in the conquered province of Silesia. The cabinet's communications became more urgent about the ever increasing complaints regarding

poor and slow justice, which should be thoroughly and promptly remedied by "attacking the bad tree, not through the bark but from the root."

Cocceji made several proposals, none of which was accepted. Unexpectedly, toward the end of August, 1743, he was informed that, in view of present conditions and "many unsurmountable difficulties due to the state's financial position, the matter must be postponed to a more suitable period." Thus the work was again interrupted, and Cocceji's opponents became more confident and held their heads higher than ever.

After an interval of eighteen months they had the satisfaction of seeing issued the ruler's new order for correcting the abuses that were so injurious to the country. It was addressed to the board of ministers of justice and not to the chief minister of justice alone. This happened in January, 1745, when the king was in the capital after the unsatisfactory termination of the Bohemian campaign. The order was the signal for contests within the highest board of justice.

At the close of 1743, owing to a bitter quarrel between Cocceji and Arnim, the sovereign intrusted Count Podewils with an attempt at reconciliation. Arnim complained strongly to this mediator that Cocceji affected an unbearable despotism and unlimited power, and paid

no attention to regulations and laws, but sometimes had things done one way and sometimes another, according to the impulses of his violent temper.

The royal cabinet order commanding peace was more favorable to the complainant than to his opponent; it stated rather coolly that the late king had appointed Cocceji chief of justice, and the present ruler would not withdraw the appointment. At the same time this chief was warned, in all matters relating to the department of justice, to be modest, decent and courteous in his intercourse with Arnim, who was rebuked for his hot resentment against Cocceji. Both of them were asked to "meet each other in the manner required by the royal service, the intention of true justice, and decent behavior to people of their class."

The quarrel between the two, which again broke out after a year of peace, was based on differences in personality and principles. Arnim was rigidly conservative; he had the views, manners and education of his ancestors, and was suspicious of all proposals for improvement. Cocceji, a sanguine man of the new school, had from infancy absorbed the modern doctrines of natural rights. Arnim belonged to one of the old noble families, while Cocceji's nobility and that of his father dated only from 1702.

An entire year passed in fruitless explanations, although the king, just before again taking the field, on the 13th of March, 1745, ordered the ministers to make haste and do their whole duty.

After astounding achievements the royal hero came back from the field and found that in the matter closest to his heart nothing had been done at home. Instead of the expected results, he received news of an occurrence which clearly showed the injury done by existing institutions. A notary of Stettin, who was intrusted with the deposits of guardians, defrauded them to the extent of 6,000 thalers. The sovereign deemed the moment opportune for giving his ministers an undeniable proof of suspicion. He referred the investigation to two generals, who were the heads of two regiments stationed at Stettin, ordering them "to give the matter more weight and go to the bottom of it without much loss of time."

This mode of procedure was similar to the appointment of two field marshals as a board of investigating judges, in 1737; it was the more painful to the ministers of justice because a communication received from the cabinet on the 12th of January, 1746, plainly declared that the king, for known reasons, could not expect much success nor the necessary promptness from the

steps already taken by Cocceji, which "otherwise were pretty good."

Frederick William now decided to take a step of compelling importance; before all the world, he pledged his own person for reform. On the same day, January 12, 1746, he issued a public announcement, in the form of a cabinet order to Cocceji, such as the patriarchal state seldom indulged in, asserting that it was clear from innumerable instances brought to his attention that there was cause for the many complaints about the inadequate administration of justice; since peace had now been concluded he did not wish to keep silent in this matter but to take part in remedying the evil; his aim was, —"a short, solid method of justice without great expenses, abandoning the customary delays and frequently unnecessary different instances, a justice according to reason, right, fairness, and for the benefit of the country and subjects."

While the form of this programme was humiliating to the entire administration of justice, and consequently also to himself, the direct recipient of the cabinet order was reconciled to its contents because it plainly disowned the principle of preservation, which his opponent Arnim so zealously championed. The "use of old" so frequently referred to was disdainfully men-

tioned as "old stuff" and even counted among the "publicly tolerated measures of injustice."

The excuses offered by the opponents bore no weight with the king, principally because Arnim had just then proved his lack of ability. One of his decisions as president of the court of appeals was reversed by a jurists' faculty. The angry Frederick wrote with his own hand that each of the judges interested should be fined fifty thalers for their unjust decision. The president was told that the delay was unjustifiable, as the lawsuit had been pending for twenty years and the principal point of it had not yet been tried. Arnim tried to excuse himself and his tribunal, but the king cut him short by saying he should impress upon his counselors not to connive at such matters in future, and he personally must use more respectful language.

Cocceji made the best of his opportunity. He requested the sovereign to settle the disagreement between the ministers of justice by a trial, thus giving Arnim and himself a chance, each according to his own method, to finish within a time limit all suits pending before one of the high courts; at the end of a year the more practical method might be generally introduced. During the preceding year he had asked permission to use Pomerania, where the confusion was unusually great, as his field for experimentation.

Berlin at the time of Frederick the Great.

VUE DE L'EGLISE CATHOLIQUE

The king preferred to try one of them alone, and turned exclusively to Cocceji for the introduction of reform.

Some trouble was experienced over the money question and in providing for adequate salaries. Frederick also expressed his fear of difficulty in finding a sufficient number of honest people. He told Cocceji that if he succeeded in doing so his own salary would be largely increased.

The perfected plans were submitted to him early in May; he complimented their clearness and took them with him to Pyrmont, the watering place, for further examination. After his return there was more delay through other journeys and then because of his sickness, but he continued to give more or less attention to the reform problem during his first visit to the capital after his recovery. Cocceji had to appear at the castle on the 15th of September, early in the morning, for a verbal report; he obtained the final consent for his plans and an order for a journey of investigation to Pomerania.

On the 10th of January, 1747, Cocceji set out on this trip, which he had planned long before. The Stettin courts, having been informed of the minister's approaching visit, worked vigorously, and hundreds of old cases were quickly disposed of. Nevertheless, there were still before the highest two courts fully eight hundred cases

that were over a year old. Among these was the notorious boundary dispute between the fiscal and the village of Kantereck, which was particularly obnoxious to the king, since it had been pending uninterruptedly for two hundred years and filled seventy volumes of court records.

At Stettin and Köslin, where matters were almost as bad, the calendars were cleared within six months, to the extent that the local courts, thoroughly aroused from their slumber, could continue the work independently.

When hardly back in Berlin, Cocceji was ordered to straighten out the "tribunal," of which Arnim was the head, also the supreme court. At the beginning of the new year Cocceji submitted a list of lawsuits completed within twelve months, in which Stettin was represented by 2,101 cases, Köslin by 927, and Berlin by 1,364. The king praised the Pomeranian courts by telling them that they had gloriously shown the way to banish chicane from justice and set an example to the other provinces of what could be done, and lead them to follow in their footsteps.

Representatives of the high courts of Berlin, Magdeburg, Halberstadt, Minden and Cleves were ordered to accompany the minister to Pomerania to coöperate with him under his leadership in this arena of advancement, so that they

would be enabled soon to "reform justice on the same scale" in their home provinces.

After his first successes, which far exceeded his own expectations, Cocceji deemed it best to attend personally to most of the provinces. During the summer and autumn of 1749 he was at Cleves,—the headquarters for chicanery, as the king declared in his complaint,—and at Aurich, while reform was introduced at Magdeburg and Halberstadt by experienced assistants. From May until August, 1750, he was active in Silesia, and in the spring of 1751 he closed his round trip by visiting the province of Prussia.

Wherever Cocceji appeared with his chosen staff of old and young jurists, he presided in the courts and proceeded according to his "new mechanism" or, as the king expressed it, his new "train." Occasionally proceedings were considerably shortened; Jariges, one of Cocceji's assistants, said one day: "Go ahead, regardless to what falls."

At first Cocceji shared the opinion of those who believed it impossible to limit all lawsuits to one year. However, the weeding out of the large number of delayed actions was the standard by which the king measured the capacity of his ministers. Cocceji really succeeded, through his quick and decisive results in this field, in removing the doubting suspicion fre-

quently directed toward him in the course of preliminary negotiations, and in the silencing of his opponents.

By disposing of several thousand accumulated lawsuits, the effect of the inadequate judicial system had been removed for the time being, but its cause had not yet disappeared. An improvement from within, a cure that was more than a temporary suppression of symptoms, could only be obtained by fully carrying out the broad demands made by Cocceji in his many published articles. These demands were concisely expressed and justified in his instructions for the journey to Pomerania, in October, 1746: "Elevating the judiciary and the bar; disentangling and simplifying prosecutions; regulating the various grades of courts, and restoring a generally binding law throughout the country."

Even Cocceji's opponents agreed that the principal cause of the lack of ability among judges was the insufficient compensation. It was customary to supplement the salaries of court officials by fees, but Cocceji frankly confessed that this was the main reason for delay, because the longer the cases remained pending, the larger were the fees. The state's poor financial condition caused Frederick, after first objecting, to grant a general increase of salaries.

To make the fiscal interests agree with those

of justice, it was decided to decrease the personnel of the courts. While in this manner higher salaries were paid and the feeling of responsibility was raised in the smaller circle of officials and the desire for work was encouraged, there were also hardships, as was the case when the many pending lawsuits were hurriedly disposed of. Seventeen counselors of the supreme court, the least competent, were summarily dismissed at Cocceji's request and with the monarch's consent, in spite of all entreaties on the part of the dispossessed ones. A state statute to protect them had not yet taken form. From that time all fees were handed over to a separate treasury and applied to the payment of salaries.

The king would have preferred to place lawyers, by withdrawing their fees, on a fixed annual salary paid from the state treasury, but he discontinued his effort in that direction as soon as he saw that the change was impracticable. The attorney system was in about the same condition as thirty years before, when Frederick William I launched his war of persecution against the entire profession. He reduced considerably the number of lawyers, which was out of all proportion to the population, and forced the remaining ones to wear a cloak as a mark of recognition, so that, as he expressed it, the

"scoundrels" could be distinguished from honest people at the first glance.

The effect of this measure was not what it was intended to be. The stain attached to the word "lawyer," as Cocceji explained to King Frederick, kept capable and honest men from entering the tainted profession, which became overcrowded with unworthy members. In 1747 the minister said of Berlin lawyers that there were only a few who had "an idea about sentiment and honor, or the necessary science." For a long time a good many pettifoggers,—so-called procurators,—brazenly pushed themselves between the contending parties and solicited their patronage. Cocceji called them absolute pests, as we know they are in these days.

Cocceji reduced these dangerous, corrupt persons who encouraged bribery to the position of lawyers' secretaries, in the expectation that the "entire race" would be extinguished. Lawyers had to prove their thorough qualifications; those admitted to practice in the higher courts were required to have several years' professional experience. The result of examinations alone did not decide as to their admittance; the college of judges had authority to refuse; and finally, royal confirmation was required. People of "low and poor descent" were to be kept out of the profession, including children of artisans, "because

such people have no means for acquiring a good theory." Neglect and dishonesty were severely punished. Charges were to be collected only after judgment was rendered, so that the lawyer also would be interested in shortening the proceedings.

The attorneys felt hurt at still being obliged to wear the small silken cloak, which was considered of disgraceful origin. Cocceji tried to secure the abolition of the obligation regarding the cloak. Eichel, the cabinet counselor, who had done a great deal for the advancement of reform among ministers, entertained the king by a lively picture of the origin and results of the detested custom; his royal master did not change it, but said he regarded the lawyer's cloak simply as a distinction, like the soldier's uniform.

Cocceji created guaranties for the scientific and practical preparation of court officials, by founding a school for young lawyers, who could become judges or practicing attorneys only after passing severe examinations. A decree regarding examinations was issued in 1737, but for a time was not generally observed. As was his custom in all things, Cocceji took part personally in these examinations, and at the suggestion of his successor, Jariges, a regularly organized commission of examinations was established

in 1755. The king decided that the visiting journeys throughout the country, through which Cocceji and his companions obtained marked results, should become a regular institution and be repeated every three years.

The new instructions as to the position and duties of judges and lawyers were incorporated in the regulations for lawsuits, which Cocceji, with his wonderful capacity for work, completed during his visiting tours while attending to his duties as judge and organizer. The first publication was intended for Pomerania and was called *Codex Fridericianus Pomeranicus*. In April, 1748, the draft of a *Codex Fridericianus Marchicus*, or regulations for the supreme court, was published; it was a complete rewriting of the first code and was intended to "serve in future as a model for all the provinces."

Details affecting nonjudicial commissions touched decisively the monarch's personal function as a judge or cabinet justice.

So far as criminal cases were concerned, the ruler's highest authority, which afterward was reduced to the pardoning power, had not been questioned by theory. It was considered his unquestioned privilege not only to make sentences milder, but to make them more severe. King Frederick required all sentences by the criminal courts to be submitted to him for con-

firmation, and expressed the opinion that otherwise "the people in the provinces might be clumsily dealt with."

Gradually, however, the ruler's position toward the civic system of justice became the subject of considerable criticism.

In England and France it was long a recognized principle that the ruler's power should not permit him to interfere personally with the course of civil justice. More than thirty years before Cocceji approved of this measure to a limited extent, in his *Jus controversum,* by declaring inadmissible the ruler's power over well-acquired private privileges, but he did not protest against interference in pending lawsuits.

In 1752, in his *Political Testament,* the king wrote: "I decided never to disturb the regular course of lawsuits; in the courts the laws must talk and the sovereigns keep silent." A few years after the introduction of the first Prussian judicial reform, Cocceji's successor, in a treatise written under the monarch's supervision and apparently printed with his consent, referred to a state "constitution," and in plain words called any interference on the ruler's part in questions of law, even the most just cases, "illegal" and not compatible with the state constitution. A few years later, however, in 1772, the king declared publicly on an important occasion: "We

personally or our ministry of state do not render any decisions which have the power of a judicial sentence." Even in the one case during the last years of his government when he was indignant with the highest court officials of the state, he shrank from formally abolishing the law that was objectionable to him.

Arnim continued his intrigues against the higher ranking "chief minister of justice," but Cocceji received powerful support by being elevated to the title of "High Chancellor of the Kingdom and all other Territories." The king gave to his chosen tool this "distinguished mark of gracious satisfaction," adding thereto the conferring of the Order of the Black Eagle.

Even then Arnim did not completely abandon his fight. When the rapidly advancing reform approached the highest tribunal, of which he was the head, he first offered passive opposition by not submitting the proposals for shortening the proceedings, as was demanded by the king. Arnim informed the new high chancellor that when appointed president he was instructed to maintain the tribunal in its regular order, which until recently he had unquestionably done. He added that he could not become accustomed to the innovations and, having informed the sovereign to that effect, he was convinced that Frederick's fatherly intentions could not be real-

ized by a precipitant system of justice; that he would not resist Cocceji's written instructions in any manner, and still less, would actually cooperate, but would simply look on. He grimly added that everything has its day. Whenever Arnim invited the counselors of his tribunal to his table there were jokes and uncomplimentary remarks at the expense of Cocceji's followers and their unsuccessful court reform, which was only carried through humbling oneself before the influential cabinet counselor Eichel.

In many quarters complaints were heard of Cocceji's duplicity and bad faith. Some claimed to find consolation in the judgment of posterity, while others were foolish enough to boast of the influence of the Schwerin family, which was favorable to Arnim, and was as highly regarded at court as the princely House of Anhalt. Nor was the high chancellor forgiven for having made the family lose, in a lawsuit with the fiscal, an estate worth 150,000 thalers.

Finally, in January, 1748, the king, who showed the loyal old servant of his House great consideration, reproved Arnim for his "very indecent actions purely due to private jealousy." He spoke of court reform as his own well-considered work, called attention to the success visible to everybody, and concluded by requesting the minister not to make it necessary for him to

appoint another president of the tribunal, "of whom I can fully expect that he will properly submit to my intentions as father of the country."

Ere long Arnim saw that his position had become utterly untenable. Like his eager follower, Counselor Nüssler of the tribunal, and other high officials of the courts of justice, nothing remained for him to do, as Nüssler expressed it, but to retire to his estate and plant cabbage.

After continuing a few months longer in his position, Arnim asked permission to retire. The king replied by requesting him to think the matter over: "Honest people may not blame you for your decision of rather giving up everything from mere pique than to give in."

The minister insisted upon his resignation and the ruler promised soon to comply, but permitted several weeks to pass without action. The impatient Arnim, in view of his "very old age" (sixty-nine years), "his from time to time occurring, partly deathly, spells" and "other important circumstances," entreated the king to grant him a little space between life and death, which interval he might spend in peace and rest. His wish was granted without further delay, but during the following year the king was glad of the opportunity of offering the sullen old gentleman the vacant office of postmaster general,

thus regaining to a limited extent his services for the state. On his return to duty Arnim was decorated with the Order of the Black Eagle.

Arnim's withdrawal from the judiciary crowned the victory of reform. Broich and Christian von Brandt, ministers of justice, had died within the last few years and Cocceji now had new men only as colleagues in the ministry, who in point of age and service were his juniors by twenty to thirty years; they were Levin Frederick von Bismarck, whom he had personally selected for the department; Freiherr von Danckelman, a nephew of the celebrated Eberhard Danckelman; and the less important Reichsgraf von Reuss.

The high chancellor had also at his disposal a number of excellent assistants who had been trained under his supervision. On his great trip of organization through Silesia, in 1750, he was accompanied by three officials who in uninterrupted sequence became his successors as high chancellor. They were Jariges, Freiherr von Fürst, and a lawyer,—von Carmer. The last was thirty years old and from Kreuznach, but saw his career at home in the Palatinate blocked because of his being a Protestant. Other jurists came from abroad; one of the most capable counselors of the tribunal at Dresden, Ernest Friedemann von Münchhausen, through admira-

tion for the great Prussian king and his judicial reforms brought to Berlin in 1750, found there a brilliant career, like Carmer.

In the midst of his great work of organization, Cocceji never lost sight of his last and most difficult task of all,—that of codification. It is probable that as long ago as 1714 he took part in the preparation of a programme which was sent at that time to the University of Halle, for the creation of a general penal code. In 1738, nothing having been heard from the professors at Halle about their work, Cocceji himself was intrusted with the preparation of a penal code. Immediately afterward, however, as previously reported, he met the most bitter disappointment of his life.

The fruit of his involuntary idleness, to which he had to submit during the last few years of King Frederick William's reign, was a scientific achievement of the highest class,—the publication of the *Novum systema justitiæ naturalis et romanæ* (New System of Natural and Roman Justice).

Grotius once said: "Many people tried to form jurisprudence into a system, but nobody succeeded. Cocceji desired to prove the contrary; he probably thought of the preliminary work mentioned when he told Arnim that he would complete a penal code within a year. The labor

progressed rapidly, although not quite so fast as the author had hoped. At the end of November, 1748, he informed the king that the first volume of the penal code was ready to be printed. It concerned personal and family rights and was published the following year under the title of *Project des Corporis juris Fridericiani.* The second volume, covering the chattel and hereditary rights, followed in 1751; the author devoted himself up to the time of his death to the elaboration of the third and final volume, relating to obligatory rights.

The details of the work agreed closely with the *Novum systema,* from which only purely philosophical statements had been omitted. Some chapters of the *Corpus* were simply translations from the Latin text of the *Systema.* In his preface Cocceji explained why the German language had been used: "His Majesty the king had this penal code issued in German, desiring that everybody having a lawsuit should be able to read it and learn from it whether he is right or wrong."

Cocceji's confidence in the people's ability to read the language of his code was his first great mistake. His treatment of expressions was far behind the ideal established in 1714. It was perhaps due to the influence of Thomasius, the famous purifier of the language, that the follow-

ing order was sent to the jurists' faculty at Halle: "All Roman names and artificial words must be banished from the language of courts of justice, and lawmakers must add to their projects an abstract showing in what manner the words heretofore occurring in the courts and in Roman law are expressed in German. Cocceji." In spite of the king's dislike of Latin expressions, which were not intelligible to him, he preferred to leave everything unchanged in the jurists' language "because the terms had become familiar and the German language was not suitable to express matters briefly." Thomasius and Leibnitz had in vain spoken eloquently to their countrymen about the richness and possibilities of their mother tongue.

Another self-delusion on the part of the author had still more serious consequences. Cocceji was not a Romanist; he was influenced by the new course of Samuel Styrck at Halle, the champion of a modern rejuvenation of the pandects, who emphatically objected to the indiscriminate application of the Roman laws. This sentiment was most vigorously expressed in the juridical testament of Leibnitz when the great philosopher demanded the *Corpus juris* should no longer have the validity of a law, but only the strength of reason and the authority of a great teacher of laws, and that a new code should be constructed

on the common basis of Roman laws, monuments of national laws, present usage and above all, fairness.

Cocceji repeatedly referred to the object of his work of codification as the "abolition of foreign and confusing Roman laws and the creation of German laws based exclusively on natural reason and the country's constitution." The result of his efforts, however, fell short of his promises. On the one hand, his draft showed him to be much more dependent on the despised Roman law than he was inclined to admit; on the other hand, it was evident that he did not give sufficient consideration for local rights.

King Frederick demanded that all legislation should be in keeping with the popular spirit, but the *Corpus Fridericianus* reflected only Cocceji's own spirit, the natural right, as he and his father, Heinrich Cocceji, had taught it, partly while following Hugo Grotius and partly in opposition to the great Dutchman.

King Frederick gave his high chancellor complete liberty of action in elaborating the *Corpus Fridericianus*. The king had absolutely no intention of interfering with the details of civil laws, which were exclusively treated here, as he had acquired only the most elementary ideas concerning jurisprudence. In the summer of

1734, during the war, he traveled through Halle and wrote in his memorandum book while still crown prince, "I studied law a little," which probably referred simply to a pleasant chat with the professors who came to salute him.

Cocceji's draft was now printed and subject to general expressions of opinion. Toward the end of 1749, in the midst of the great reform movement, the king showed the profound interest he felt in the matter by writing a historical-philosophical essay on the general problems of legislation, which he caused to be read in the new Academy of Sciences in January, 1750.

Two years prior to that time Montesquieu published his *Spirit of the Laws*. In March, 1750, he wrote to a friend that the kings would perhaps be the last people to read his work and probably never would read it, but he knew at least one monarch who had done so. Maupertuis, his countryman, the president of the Berlin Academy, of which Montesquieu was an honorary member, wrote to him that King Frederick had found matters in his book concerning which he held a different opinion, and Montesquieu replying offered to wager that he could immediately locate those passages.

Frederick's "dissertation" did not contain any reference to the *Spirit of the Laws*. Contrary to

Montesquieu's glorification of the English constitution, he strongly disapproved the constant wavering of the balance between royal and parliamentary power which injured the force of the laws. This might be regarded as Frederick's reply to Montesquieu's question of the practical mutual effect of the English constitution and the country's political welfare.

On this particular point Frederick, who previously had praised England's constitution as a model of wisdom, referred to explanations in the great historical work of Rapin de Thoyras. In all other passages Frederick was entirely independent without precisely contradicting Montesquieu. Many of his statements agreed fully with the views of the great Frenchman; for instance, the idea, which Montesquieu called the principal theme of his work, that the spirit of the legislator should be the spirit of moderation; the lawmaker should speak clearly and simply like the father of a family, together with the repeatedly mentioned necessity of making legislation agree with the character of the people. In illustrating the last point both authors used the typical examples of Sparta and Athens, and cited Solon's words that he had given Athenians, not the most complete laws, but the best of which they were capable.

Both too followed a historical lead, the king

having begun his work as follows: "Whoever desires to gain exact knowledge about the manner of making and discarding laws must consult history." On this subject his superficial remarks cannot compare with those of Montesquieu, who spent years of preparation and attained the standard of science as it then existed.

Although the results of Conring's investigation of the receipt of Roman laws were not yet generally known in the world of science, it could by no means be said that those laws were obtained through Germany's subjugation by Romans, and still retained when the imperial seat was moved from Italy to Germany. Owing to the lack of these historical chapters the opinion was expressed in Berlin that the "dissertation" was not one of the king's best productions. The style was considered as fine and flowing as usual, but the treatment of the topic was not regarded as consistent.

Frederick showed fine judgment in avoiding any reference to the *Corpus juris Fridericianum*. The flattering words of appreciation for Cocceji, "whose honesty, judgment and indefatigable energy would have been a credit to the republics of Greece and Rome at the time of their highest fertility in great men," were not meant for the lawmaker, but for the successful re-

former of the judicial system and the inflexible censor of judges.

Afterward Frederick praised his high chancellor as a legislator. In his *Political Testament* he stated that he found laws in his country which, instead of helping litigating parties, confused matters and lengthened lawsuits; that he spoke to High Chancellor Cocceji of his intention to remodel these laws and to retain only such as were based on natural fairness, and that "this venerable judge executed this plan amid general approval."

King Frederick overvalued the plan of codification, as did everybody else in those days. In France, Chancellor d'Aguesseau, who headed the department of justice, had the *Corpus Fridericianum* translated into French by Freiherr von Spon, a Bavarian diplomat who for several years was ambassador at Berlin. The translator sent with his work a letter which at that time was reproduced in the newspapers, inviting the French minister to imitate the Prussian example by having a *Corpus juris Francici* printed. One of the leaders in the literary circles of England, Lord Chesterfield, repeated to the king of Prussia the verses written by Horace to Augustus, whom he praised as the general purveyor of armed protection, purified morals, and legal reform.

Voltaire called his royal friend a great judge, a great producer of verses, and a conquering legislator, adding that the king had shown he could make as short work in peace as in war. Cocceji also was glorified with Horace's verses by some of his admirers; a ducal counselor had been sent to Berlin from Gotha for the purpose of learning the new Prussian art of justice, and from the same city Count Gotter wrote to the high chancellor that he might apply to himself the *Feliciter audet* and the *Bonos ducit ad exitus.*

Cocceji's joy was great. The fiftieth anniversary of his service was approaching; as an author he had been known fully as long among German jurists. For many years he had abandoned hope of ever being permitted to undertake the work which throughout his life had been uppermost in his mind. As late as 1745, when his legal-historic "deduction" about the Prussian claims on East Friesland obtained a literary reputation, he sadly told Count Podewils that he was happy because, near the end of his days, he had proven what kind of services he could have rendered if the king had trusted him. In 1747, when sixty-seven years old, he undertook the troublesome and exacting excursion through the provinces. Though weak in body, he was young in ardor and delighted at finally carrying his point. Soon after the beginning of Frederick William's gov-

ernment, Freiherr von Loen declared that Providence must do wonders by producing a ruler combining the qualities of Alexander and Solomon, if ever a general code was to be provided. Cocceji referred to this remark, in the preface of the second volume of his *Corpus,* when modestly diverting the academy's praise from himself to the king, in the following words: "This miracle really occurred in Prussia. Providence gave to the world at the same time an Alexander and a Solomon in the person of our great king; this incomparable monarch, like a second Alexander, cut the knot of doubt, which nobody could disentangle heretofore, and discontinued the confusing Roman law introduced into Germany seven hundred years ago; simultaneously, like a second Solomon, he had a new code prepared from the ashes of the Roman laws which in many instances were not without reason."

Only a man like the author, who throughout his life had absorbed a stubborn system, could be blind enough to overlook the shortcomings and the narrow doctrine of the work. It would have been impossible for any one alone to produce an adequate result. The *Corpus juris Fridericianum* was printed as a draft and it remained an uncompleted draft. The author lost his strength. Early in May, 1753, after a serious illness, he spoke of himself as having been resur-

rected from among the dead; he still lingered and suffered for over two years, but to the end continued his labors on the third volume of his *Corpus;* dying on the 24th of October, 1755. His manuscript was forgotten and most of it lost. Of the entire contents of the *Corpus* only the laws concerning marriage and guardianship were promulgated, and those only in some of the provinces. Nevertheless, his old opponents were unjust in derisively asserting that nothing remained of Cocceji's work except the marble bust with the inscription, *Vindex legum et justitiæ,* which the king had placed in the yard of the supreme court. Carmer and Svarez, who carried on Cocceji's reform, were more indebted to him than they seemed to realize.

In 1746, King Frederick decided between contradictory opinions and spoke the word which started the work; afterward he was again the man who, first overestimating it, judged the result clearly, realizing that only half the work had been done and that he would have to set the machinery in motion once more.

CHAPTER III

POLICY OF TRADE AND COMMERCE

IN 1677, when Elector Frederick William conquered Stettin, he thought the time had come at last for his state to take an independent part in the world's commerce, but his counselors warned the still youthful and impatient ruler not to be too rash; they did not wish to consider foreign and maritime trade until the sparsely settled and impoverished country had recuperated and become more densely populated, so that it could gain strength through the development of its industry.

This policy was adopted by the Brandenburg-Prussian government as a matter of necessity. The outlet or mouth of the river Oder reverted again to foreigners; the plan of using other Pomeranian ports for the purpose of injuring Swedish trade at Stettin was unsuccessful, and the beginning of the Brandenburg merchant marine collapsed. The industry, however, gained a new start when the religious refugees arrived from the West.

These new citizens succeeded in making of the state that to which they had been accustomed in their old French homes, from decade to decade protecting the goods manufactured by them with a higher tariff, in addition to discouraging by other means competition on the part of foreign manufacturers. Protection of the young home industry became the most important aim with the Great Elector's successors. The state's development depended on the building and enlargement of factories, particularly those of the capital. Berlin, according to Frederick William I, was intended to shelter the ruler's court, but since that court was abolished in 1713, the city ought to maintain its prominent position through manufacturing.

The duchy of Magdeburg, devoted entirely to agriculture prior to 1680, made the important industrial change under Prussian administration. Pomerania soon followed. A reorganization of the guild system created more liberty for industry and more space for the work than heretofore known. Factories and a house industry were added to the regulated trades of old.

Although under the grandson's administration, Stettin and the lower Oder became real Prussian property, a feat that could not be accomplished under the grandfather's government, the Great Elector's far-reaching plans were not

adopted. Principles of industrial protection prevailed exclusively.

Among Prussian officials, however, were men who rose independently above the common views and deemed the time propitious to develop an extensive and consistent policy of commerce. Five years after the peace treaty of Stockholm an expert's memoir called attention to the fact that the industry, not alone but only in connection with export, could increase the country's wealth. It was asserted that since the last change of government there had been a great improvement in the manufacturing business and that a good export trade had been established, but unfortunately most of the profits went to foreign middlemen and not to the inhabitants of the country. Merchants were not sufficiently respected. The small trader, like the most important wholesaler, called himself a merchant, and "the most miserable scholars and officials" looked down upon him, a practice which the existing conditions of the state administration seemed to justify to a certain extent.

Merchants who desired to be well regarded thought it necessary to acquire expensive habits; those who became wealthy preferred to retire from business and apply for government positions, or purchase country estates; at any rate they did not permit their sons to continue the

business, but made them study at the universities. A gradual improvement in Brandenburg-Prussian commerce, according to the memoir, might be expected from the social uplift of merchants in general, the increase of mercantile experience, and a proper coöperation of commercial capital and of mercantile societies, into which the merchants of the entire country ought to combine, so that "through their individual wealth they might assist and protect each other."

The author of this memoir, dated 1725, the champion of a new era in Prussian industrial polities, lived at Küstrin; his name was Hille and his title, "Kammerdirector"; a few years later Crown Prince Frederick studied national economy with him.

The crown prince absorbed his tutor's views and doctrines so perfectly that in a composition on trade with Silesia, which he sent to his father as proof of progress in his studies of national economy, he closely followed the ideas of Hille, but his impressions were not very lasting. In his *Antimacchiavelli*, in which he explained the aim of industrial polities, Frederick stated incidentally in recommending commerce that grain and wine countries would have to find an outlet for their products; otherwise he employed only the commonplace reference to the advantage which England and Holland through their com-

merce had over France and Spain. The benefit of industry in the customary way was explained on general mercantile doctrines as follows: "Manufacturing of any kind is perhaps the most useful and profitable thing for a state because it provides for the inhabitants' requirements and even forces neighbors to pay tribute to our industries; it also prevents money from leaving the country and rather makes it come in."

All the same, Frederick gratefully remembered his old tutor at Küstrin. When he ascended the throne he added to the general directorate a fifth independent department, which was for factories, commerce and merchandise. It was his desire to place Hille, who in the meantime had been transferred to the Stettin chamber, at the head of the new department, and he only refrained from doing so at the old man's own request.

To meet a long-felt want, a department for commerce and industry was established. At the time the general directorate was founded, one of the most prominent Berlin merchants submitted a plan for a department of commerce, and the idea had frequently been discussed among merchants and officials. Conflicting opinions, personal differences, and petty jealousy prevented an agreement during the days of Frederick William.

As a model for the department, which was established during the first month of the new government, the Great Elector used the commerce college, which was brought into existence at the time of the Second Swedish War. At that period commerce, and particularly that of a maritime kind, was considered most important, but for the last fifty years industry dominated. Samuel von Marschall, minister of state, who headed the new department, was officially instructed to pay attention to the following three points: Improvement of existing manufacturers; introduction of those still lacking; encouragement of immigration from abroad of any kind, character or condition. Only in the second respect were steps to be taken to ascertain how the goods produced in the kingdom could be "debited" abroad, for which purpose "good foreign correspondence should be maintained."

Inflexible, thorough principles for a policy of commerce had evidently not yet been found. The peace treaty of Breslau made the Oder a Prussian stream through its entire course, but no immediate advantage was taken of the favorable change of conditions. There were no harmonizing customs regulations for the three provinces constituting the territory of that river. Regarding commerce, Silesia continued for years to be considered a foreign country. Neither

were there any notable changes in trade regulations in the Magdeburg district during the first eight years of the new government.

On another occasion it was clearly shown that at the beginning of his administration King Frederick had no definite plans for an all embracing commercial policy. When possession was taken of East Friesland it looked doubtful whether Holland would voluntarily withdraw her garrison from Emden, an important seacoast city. The new ruler anticipated difficulties and, on the eve of a new war against Austria, he desired to avoid complications with the Dutch republic. For that reason, while taking the baths at Pyrmont he verbally directed his representative for the general states who happened to be at Pyrmont to inquire at The Hague whether there was any inclination to buy the city of Emden for the republic, at the price of one, two or three millions. Fortunately, such a sorry transaction did not take place; Holland withdrew the troops and Prussia retained the city of Emden, which soon gained importance in maritime matters.

It would be difficult to prove that there was any personal influence to which Frederick owed the gradual expansion of his views. There may have been suggestions from Field Marshal Keith, a Scotchman who left the Russian mili-

tary service for the Prussian and since the autumn of 1747 had belonged to the king's regular surroundings; he was consulted not only in military but in commercial matters. Frederick unquestionably learned something from Samuel von Marschall, whom he had placed at the head of the fifth department of the general directorate and who, in his reports to the young ruler, occasionally assumed an almost fatherly tone, but such hints probably referred mainly to trade details and did not open new points of view. At any rate, during the first eight years of Marschall's incumbency very few changes were made in commerce regulations. A new impetus was imparted to matters only when he took a back seat and, being well advanced in years, he gradually retired from work.

Among the new additions to the service regulations of the general directorate in 1748 one of the most important was regarding commerce. The king explained the theoretical gradation of profitable forms of this industry in the order of their usefulness, as follows: Sale of own productions for cash; trade in transit of foreign merchandise; exchange of home products for indispensable foreign goods.

The discrimination shown in the ruler's explanations seemed to indicate that he did not consider his ministers thoroughly familiar with

the basic ideas of commercial theories. A year prior to issuing new instructions he mentioned in his Brandenburg memoir that his father's commercial policy was a complete failure, and that the government acted upon principles which simply prevented the development of commerce.

It would appear as if the historical investigation of his ancestors' internal policies contributed to a clearer understanding of present demands on the part of Frederick. Encouraged by those studies he ordered the chambers to make out and send to him so-called commercial balances, which would give him an idea of the value of the exports and imports of each province, arranged according to the different lines of merchandise. He sought also to gain information from books, and did not, like his father, despise theories.

During the summer of 1749, the monarch ordered from Paris a book published fifteen years previously under the title of *Political Essay on Commerce*. It was written by Menon, whose contemporaries regarded it highly. It was one of the newest among a number of theoretical expositions of the mercantile system and was not marred by the prevailing monotony. Hille, at one time, taught Crown Prince Frederick that "The general belief that commerce must be free is not universally true." Menon, however, main-

tained that freedom was most indispensable in commerce. Were he given his choice between free trade and protection he would rather do without protection than without freedom, because commerce when left free would have sufficient power of its own to compensate for protection. He added, however, that the word freedom must not be misunderstood, for it is almost as much disputed in trade as in religion. Freedom in trade should not be arbitrary and unreasonable; it should only extend to goods of which the export and import would enable every citizen to exchange his surplus for the required necessities.

During the same year in which he read this popular book Frederick formed closer personal relations with the general directorate's department of commerce and industry, which he had created. The occasion for this step was the death of Minister Marschall, which occurred on the 11th of December, 1749. His regular successor was not appointed, the new head of the fifth department entering the general directorate not as minister, but with the title of "Wirklicher Geheimer Finanzrath." He ranked above the counselors of his department, but he was neither an inferior of nor an equal to the heads of the other departments, who held the rank of minister. His only immediate superior was the

king, who was nominally the president of the general directorate and from that time forward, for the fifth department renounced representation by a vice president, so that, in fact, he became his own minister of finance. The fifth department's pivot was transferred to the cabinet.

When the king personally assumed the management of the department of commerce, which he had created but not fully developed, he did not select for his assistant a man from the ranks of the officials. This was taken as a proof of his doubts in those trained under Frederick William I, so far as their efficiency in commercial politics was concerned. The one chosen was a merchant named Faesch, from the French part of Switzerland, who prior to that time, in the position of an international agent, had represented Prussia at Amsterdam, which city was then very prominent in the world's commerce.

Faesch was selected for the office prior to Marschall's death. Frederick's memoir, written by his own hand, in which he explained the plans of his new field of endeavor, was dated the first of October, 1747, and entitled, *General Idea about the Commerce of this Country.* It was his guide when he personally set out to manage the department of commerce and industry. Here is an extract from it:

"Our commerce is based principally on wood, grain, woolen goods, hemp, flax, linen and beeswax. Pomerania and the electorate export tall timber and masts for shipbuilders. March Brandenburg sends shawls, serge and cheesecloth to Brunswick, Leipzig, Frankfort and Breslau, in which cities fairs are held regularly; also to Spain, where some kinds of our cheesecloth find purchasers. Silesian linen is partly sent to England, whence English dealers export it to America. Silesia buys beeswax from Poland and resells candles there, also to Saxony. Prussia sells grain to Sweden and flax to Holland. I believe that a larger trade in lumber could be done if Stettin and Königsberg would build ships and try export. We can manufacture cloth at less expense than before by purchasing dyestuffs from producers and not through second hands. Linseed oil can be produced here instead of being imported from Holland; we can export linens to Spain, where our merchants could gain some of the advantages now held by England. In this manner, I believe, trade could be extended in goods for which we have raw material in our own country.

"Our silk mills are still in their infancy, but after growing up they will perhaps represent a large industry extending to Poland, Sweden,

Denmark, and the entire northern part of Germany.

"The goods we need absolutely and which will yield ambitious merchants a liberal profit on home sales as well as reëxport are spices, French candies, snuff, furs and drugs. Instead of being bought through second hands, they ought to be obtained from first hands, but such an enterprise requires wealthy people, who should be attentive enough to calculate prices and possible profits. There are other goods which are suitable only for sales in transit, from which our merchants also could derive profits, but to find them out it would be necessary to become acquainted with Poland, Saxony and the kingdom, a thankful task for an enterprising merchant.

"There are two kinds of manufactures, one finding raw material at home and the other through import. The first kind is preferable, but the second also has its merits because laborers find employment, which is important. Factories of the first kind are in pretty good condition in this country, and those of the second kind could be splendidly developed by great attention.

"It is not to be wondered at that much remains to be accomplished in a country where commerce never was known before, but I am convinced that, through the efforts and devo-

tion of Mr. Faesch, we shall succeed within a few years in developing all branches of commerce and in making this country more prosperous than it ever was. We have ports, rivers and vessels, but need a little more activity and some wholesale dealers wealthy enough to finance the new enterprises; time and unalterable devotion will do the rest."

The seven following years showed the department of commerce fertile in happy results under the king's leadership. He set his new assistant the example of unremitting devotion to duty. The cabinet records, the king's correspondence with Faesch, with Klinggraeffen, excise officer at Berlin, with the president of the police department, the first mayor of the capital, ministers, presidents of the chambers, customs officials and prominent business men, and his *Political Testament* of 1752, proved that national problems occupied a large space in this government which looked after everything.

Some paragraphs of Frederick's own programme are of special interest. The memoir intended for Faesch expressed satisfaction with the manufactures obtained from raw material found at home; this referred principally to the two most important national industries represented by wool and linen. The weaving of cloth, the oldest industry known in the Bran-

denburg and Magdeburg territories, received a new impetus through the French immigration. There was an improved technic, and more profitable forms of enterprise became customary.

Giving industry the preference over agriculture, an edict was issued in 1719 forbidding the export of wool; a quarter of a century later it was praised by the general directorate as "the great pragmatical edict," upon which all industrial success was based; the state had provided wool warehouses which protected manufacturers from speculators who otherwise could have bought up the staple and raised the price. A large model warehouse was built at Berlin by the state, and a Russian company was founded to which the czar's war department gave contracts for a number of years for cloth to be made into uniforms. In 1737 this contract was not renewed, but the Prussian cloth industry did not suffer because other markets were found and sheep raisers continued to improve the quality of wool.

In 1747 the general directorate reported to the king: "Experts agree that our fine cloth made of Spanish wool is equal to the French and Dutch products; it is also said that certain kinds are not made so perfect and durable in any other part of Europe." When the embargo against the export of wool was first decreed,

fears were expressed in some quarters that manufacturers at home would be unable to use all the wool, but it had now become necessary to import some from Mecklenburg and Poland. Foreign wool spinners continued to be in demand and were invited to immigrate. In 1752 the king estimated the number of spinners still needed at 60,000 and expressed the opinion that the vacancies could be filled if, during each of the next twelve years, one thousand families of five persons each could be induced to settle in Prussia. New villages were built and some of them were occupied exclusively by such spinners.

An important linen industry was not developed until after the state acquired Silesia. Frederick said: "Silesia in proportion derives as much income from linen as the king of Spain from Peru." The poor weavers, spinners and bleachers, however, had to work for very low wages, and the abundant profits went mainly to about a hundred large export houses.

A slight falling off had been noted in the linen industry as compared to the last few years of Austrian possession; the weavers complained that their bleacheries were far up in the mountains, which now were almost wholly beyond the state's boundary. Many laborers, who were afraid that they would be forced into military service, abandoned their looms and homes. The

king hoped to open new outlets and to bring about favorable conditions for the work. He tried to obtain artisans from the electorate of Saxony for the purpose of reviving the decayed art of weaving damask. So far the linen industry had undergone little development in the middle provinces, but a great deal of good was accomplished by Silesia's encouraging example.

At the request of the Berlin director of excise in 1750, the king decided to permit the free import of foreign yarns for the "Kurmark and Neumark." Klinggraeffen proved to him that this would only be an apparent deviation from the system of protection, because half-manufactured goods ought to be treated like raw material, and the linen industry of Brandenburg, no longer dependent upon the material obtained from its own acres, would make perceptible progress.

The assistance was not confined to foreign yarns; efforts were also made to obtain foreign workmen. Brandenburg people had the reputation of being indolent, and the king ordered spinners and weavers to be brought from Lusatia, saying that their example and merit would "wake up the nations." Chambers and counselors of the "Kurmark" were instructed to see to it "that subjects and their children did not spend the long autumn and winter evenings in

idleness, but by spinning and weaving earn something, as is done in other provinces."

The ruler expressed the opinion that this industry should flourish particularly in the country, as it did in Silesia. At the end of the century, in Pomerania and in the "Marks," it was about equally represented in the country and the cities. In the Magdeburg district, where this kind of work was introduced later than anywhere else, some seventy-five per cent. of the weavers were living in villages; in the old spinner districts of Minden and Ravensburg rural weavers were about six times as numerous as those in the cities. Besides the old cloth and linen industries, which gained through the French immigration, there was a steady and considerable improvement in the weaving of mixed materials.

Previous generations were accustomed to wearing heavy goods throughout the year, and even Crown Prince Frederick, when requesting his royal father to provide some light summer wear, was answered that it was a French style and not customary in Brandenburg or Prussia. Women, particularly those of the lower classes, favored calico of many colors until 1721, when Frederick William issued his Draconian edict against the goods, that could not as yet be manufactured in Prussia. The blast threatened with

heavy fines, or even by punishment with the iron collar, such persons as were found in possession of any wearing apparel or house furnishing goods made of calico. Afterward the Prussian manufacturers threw upon the market all their summer goods and other stylish materials, such as camelottes, serges and droguets, which were of French origin, as indicated by their names. In 1748 a census showed that there were in the old part of the city of Magdeburg forty-nine manufacturers of woolen goods, besides ninety-eight of serges and other light materials: this included Huguenots, in addition to many natives.

The German house of Diesing which was afterward continued by Gossler, a merchant with the title of Kriegsrath, outstripped all competitors, even those of Berlin. In 1746 Gossler had one hundred looms and six hundred workmen; his products were half wool and half silk; he sold them in the districts of Hildesheim and Hanover, in the Hanseatic cities, and in Poland and Russia. The king expressed his particular pleasure at the success of this factory.

In 1747 statistics for the "Marks" showed 3,313 independent makers of woolen goods, besides 1,273 masters of the cloth industry. Results were not quite so satisfactory in the cloth and "mezzolan" factories of Silesia. These

cheaper goods were made of mixed linen and woolen yarns and were popular with the poorer classes; they had been exported to Austria and Italy, but after 1750 the tariff prevented sales to Bohemia and Moravia, leaving only the less important export to Poland.

King Frederick declared that the cotton goods industry required improvement. It was introduced at Berlin in 1744 and fashion promptly adopted calico, which had been greatly missed since its importation was forbidden. There were some fustian factories in Silesia and the Magdeburg district; one was established at Brandenburg, but it experienced difficulties through the ill will of retail dealers, until the king threatened to withdraw the privilege of selling fustian from them and to make the sale, as in Austria, a government monopoly. In 1752 there was still a total lack of wadding factories; the king desired to see at least two hundred looms employed upon that commodity.

Of all the industries brought to Brandenburg-Prussia at the close of the seventeenth century by the religious refugees, the manufacture of hosiery was the most flourishing. French, Palatinate and Alsatian Protestants carried their hosiery looms across the Rhine and made considerable progress in their trade at Berlin, Magdeburg and Halle, before that industry gained

even a beginning in its later strongholds of Upper Saxony and Thuringia.

Among the immigrating French artisans the hosiery makers were most numerous, and the Germans soon learned the art from their guests. In 1740, when Frederick became sovereign, this industry had passed its zenith; at Magdeburg the number of looms fell during the last decade from 940 to 900. The king made personal inquiries on the spot in the autumn of 1742 and was displeased to learn through manufacturers that demand for these goods had decreased; he asked Minister Marschall to explain the causes. The minister named several contributing reasons,—higher wool prices, competition from neighboring states, and lack of a regular system in dealing with customers. There was an improvement when Silesia was opened to the Prussian market, and also when the weaving of silk hosiery was begun.

The Prussian silk industry was represented principally by two large ribbon factories at Krefeld and some establishments in Magdeburg and Halle. At first these sources did not suffice to supply the home demand for silk and other ribbons. The king repeatedly expressed to Marschall his desire to see the heavy import of ribbon from Switzerland and the Netherlands supplanted by home manufacture.

In many cases development was retarded by disagreements among the various guilds. In keeping with an absurd whim, the passementerie workmen declared that all those who learned their trade in a ribbon mill instead of the plain old-fashioned loom were unfit for any guild. In order to encourage the small industry, the empire forbade the use of the scientific ribbon loom, but after 1728 Prussia recognized the improvement, and Marschall recommended to punish severely all reactionary steps by the guilds. This quarrel over the ribbon mill was referred to in Frederick's *Political Testament*, in which the new technic was strongly recommended. In the same document even shoe laces were not considered too unimportant to be named for home manufacture.

Small things and details, however, never prevented large matters and the whole from being supervised. It was an audacious plan to create in the state, from nothing, the home of a silk industry which not only would supply the subjects' demands for all kinds of silk goods but would furnish work for exports. This revived the Great Elector's efforts when at Fehrbellin's suggestion congress forbade throughout Germany the import of French goods of luxury, and Leibnitz recommended that silk be produced on German soil. At least a portion of the raw ma-

terial could be raised at home, but this could not be accomplished immediately or to any considerable extent.

In 1740, shortly after the change of monarchs occurred, an account of mulberry stock showed that during the preceding severe winter the remaining trees had been destroyed by frost. New ones were planted, but as a rule six years had to elapse before they could be of any use. The planting was done by the Berlin Academy, but in 1748 the Berlin city government disputed that institution's right to use the trees, to which the king replied jestingly that he was glad to see a lawsuit instituted about a tree which he valued so highly and which previously had been so greatly neglected. A large crop was not expected before 1758. By that time all necessary preparations were to be completed, including the acquisition of a sufficient silkworm supply, the issuance of clear instructions about raising the worms, the treatment of their cocoons, and the establishment of a joint school for servant girls and peasants. The king was pleased to see that preacher Hecker of Berlin taught practical silk culture in his High School to prospective school teachers, who were expected to impart the knowledge thus acquired to owners of large country estates and mayors of villages. A special cabinet order notified authorities that it was

very important not to hatch out the eggs too early, at any rate not earlier than the middle of May, and not all at the same time. Furthermore it was mentioned that silkworms should never be offered any leaves moistened by dew. After 1750 prizes were awarded to preachers, sextons and school teachers who became prominent in the art of raising and treating silkworms.

In the meantime the first silk factories began operations. Of the old establishments founded at Berlin after 1686, under Frederick William I, only one was still active; it decayed gradually, and a new factory opened in 1732 with thirty-two looms—only six in 1740.

The allied industry of gold and silver tapestry was of more importance. The most prominent representative of this art at Berlin was Charles Vigne, a master with a European reputation. A velvet factory was established in 1730 at Potsdam by a Mr. David, and was the only one in Prussia until after the peace treaty of Dresden; a second was founded at Berlin by Mr. Blume, a merchant, whose son-in-law Gotzkowsky was frequently consulted by the king concerning industrial matters. At Christmas, 1746, Frederick ventured to offer a present of velvet from this factory to his sister at Baireuth, who was an expert judge of everything

pertaining to female adornment; the delighted marchioness congratulated him upon the success so quickly achieved by the new Berlin factory. Three years later Gotzkowsky founded the first large silk factory by taking over and adding to the looms of a manufacturer who came from Lyons, France, in 1746. It was particularly mentioned that this man did not immigrate at Gotzkowsky's expense.

Again the king sent to his sister, at Christmas, 1749, "the first results of our new factory." Wilhelmine was preparing for a visit to Stuttgart, where her only daughter had given birth to a child. Frederick's letter, owing to the colors of the silken present, reminded her that she had read in some work on mythology of Lucina's custom of dressing in gray and white. She wrote to her royal brother that, possessing the gifts of that goddess, she would also follow her style of dress.

Following Gotzkowsky's example, three other silk factories were established during the period of peace, all in Berlin. There were also many silk weavers working independently on a small scale, or partly for the large factories. In 1754 the total number of looms was 417, of which 368 were owned and operated by the large velvet and silk factories. In the city of Berlin the state favored competition in that line, but at

Krefeld the von der Leyen family had a monopoly of the silk industry. From 1740 to 1756 the largest of that family's factories doubled its business and exceeded the Berlin production not only in quantity but also in quality.

The founders of the new Berlin factories were experienced silk merchants but not manufacturers by trade, and in explanation of many drawbacks it was afterward stated that these people had to depend to a certain extent upon their foremen and weavers, who were obtained from Lyons, Geneva and other foreign cities. They were somewhat exacting and unreliable because many of them naturally felt drawn to their old homes, but were compelled to instruct German workmen in their art. In this manner the king expected gradually to see two thousand apprentices trained, their expenses being partly paid by the state while they were learning.

In 1746 a loan of 60,000 thalers was obtained from the "Kurmark" Savings Bank for advances to the manufacturers, but soon afterward the ruler felt warranted in obtaining an annual loan up to 100,000 thalers for this purpose. Good results were rewarded by similar advances.

A silk storage house planned long before was established in 1751, for the sake of assuring reasonable prices of raw material during periods of high figures. The export of silk goods to

eastern Europe was at first favored by a bonus, which led to various kinds of fraud and was soon replaced by premiums on each loom in operation. The king refused on general principles to establish and operate factories at the state's expense.

In April, 1756, by request of the manufacturers under Gotzkowsky's leadership, after import duties on foreign silk goods had been steadily increased during the preceding few years, a decree was issued tentatively forbidding the importation of silk goods for all provinces east of the river Weser.

Hatters, leather and morocco makers and tanners, mostly Frenchmen, started successful factories at Berlin as well as in Magdeburg and Halle; Danish gloves of excellent quality were made and sold through a very extensive territory.

In order to increase the manufacture of paper, the export of rags was forbidden by Frederick William I, but the skilled technic was lacking. In June, 1754, King Frederick, while at Halle, persuaded the manager of the Kröllwitz paper mill, which belonged to the Francke orphan asylum, to make a visit to Holland for the purpose of studying the system. The manager also received a monopoly for the purchase of rags in East Friesland, where experienced ragpickers

had until then been exclusively employed by the Dutch paper mills.

Immigrants from Ruhla and Schmalkalden were the first manufacturers of cutlery in Prussia; they began operations in 1743 at Neustadt-Eberswalde, where a copper mine was in operation, and other iron and steel workers joined the colony later. An effort was made to obtain needle makers from France because Aix-la-Chapelle, the headquarters of the German needle industry, had no surplus of experienced men. The establishments at Neustadt-Eberswalde were at first conducted by the state, but at the close of 1752 the king transferred their management to Splitgerber and Daum, Berlin merchants and bankers, who afterward took over the large mirror factory at Neustadt-an-der-Dosse, a different city with a similar name.

David Splitgerber had been a poor bookkeeper who gained wealth and became very influential, although in many quarters he was strongly disliked. He started a sugar refinery at Berlin in 1759, for which he secured two years later a monopoly covering several of the Prussian provinces. The protection granted this new industry was directed against Hamburg, since up to that time all of northern Germany had to depend on the sugar refineries of that city. The beneficiary, however, was instructed not to

charge higher prices than Hamburg and Holland did, so that the people would not be burdened with "a new kind of impost." Marggraf, a chemist, informed the Berlin Academy in 1747 that he had discovered sugar in beets, but strange as it may seem the king did not give this new discovery a trial. For some fifty years longer the rich soil of the Magdeburg district was not required to produce sugar beets, but continued to furnish huge wheat crops, utilized largely by numerous manufacturers of starch at Halle, while Magdeburg became the center of a rapidly growing tobacco industry which was started by immigrants from the Palatinate who knew how to cultivate the weed. Pipe factories were started and easily conducted at a profit, since a plentiful supply of suitable clay was found in the country. Skilled pipemakers were sought in the Netherlands, the old home of that industry, but the king observed great caution in the matter as he feared the envy of the Dutchmen. The work was managed very carefully by the ambassador at The Hague, while Minister Marschall was expressly instructed not to tell the secret to the other ministers of the general directorate, so that the Dutch ambassador at Berlin would have no means of "hearing about it ahead of time."

A pipe factory started in 1753, in the Silesian

village of Zborowsky near Lublinitz, added the manufacture of crockery on the style of Delft in a neighboring village. The first efforts to imitate Meissen porcelain were made at Berlin in 1751, by a merchant named Wegely.

The industries depending upon natural products of the soil were still far behind those of textiles. At Rothenburg, in the Prussian part of the territory of Mansfeld, a copper mine yielded large profits during the sixteenth century, but during the Thirty Years' War the unemployed miners and mine owners combined into a ruthless band of robbers, and naturally the mine "went to pieces."

Gradually, however, there dawned a new era of prosperity. A mining company was organized in 1691 for the production of ore and coal in the "Altmark" and the territories of Magdeburg and Mansfeld. During the last years of Frederick William I, and the early ones of the government of Frederick II, until it grew more and more difficult to control the water pressure, the Rothenburg mine yielded annually five to six thousand quintals of copper. The same section of the country provided the state with millstones, which had previously been brought from the upper Saxon mountains.

At first King Frederick was not satisfied with the sandstone yielded by the quarries on the

southeast borders of the Harz mountains; and in 1752 he succeeded in securing the services of a competent quarryman, under whose management the yield was so great that the quarries near Siebkenrode and neighborhood furnished stones enough for all the mills of the middle provinces and for the large buildings in Berlin and Potsdam. Two years later the importation of foreign flat, square, and millstones was forbidden in the interest of the home industry.

The salt works were very valuable to the state as a source of income, since each subject was obliged to buy a certain quantity at a specified figure which exceeded the market price by one-third or even a half. The salt works previously conducted by private enterprise at Halle, Grossalze and Stassfurt were guaranteed, at the time the royal privilege was granted, a sale equal to that which they had formerly attained in the interior. The largest salt works were owned by the state, and were located at Halle and Schönebeck in the Magdeburg district, at Neusalzwerk near Minden, and at Königsborn in the county of Mark.

By improving and increasing the facilities it was made possible to supply the entire home demand, and to eliminate from the Prussian market the salt formerly distributed by Lüneburg throughout the north German lowlands, be-

sides abolishing the importation of bay salt from across the ocean. Prussian salt also found ready sale in the electorate of Saxony, Thuringia, Franconia, Bohemia, Mecklenburg, and the vicinity of the Westphalian salt works.

During the second decade of his reign, King Frederick devoted personal attention to the state's salt works at Magdeburg, which had fallen slightly behind. He sent two Westphalian experts to Schönebeck for the purpose of working out some plan of improvement, but when the Magdeburg chamber and the general directorate were asked to pass on the matter and could not agree, Frederick called in a Hessian named Waitz who had the title of Kammerdirector, approved his plans for new buildings and technical improvements, and furnished him with 100,000 thalers to carry out his plans. In this way a fully competent man was secured for the Prussian state service. Afterward he was made minister of mines, smelting works and salt works, which industries were formed into a separate department because they previously lacked special management, not being under the jurisdiction of the general directorate's fifth department.

The king had received statements from the chamber about imports and exports each year since 1747, although only approximate figures were used. These reports were always eagerly

looked for since they showed what progress had been made by the industry as a whole, and which branches were the most profitable, thus indicating where further improvements were needed.

When giving one of these statements to Faesch for the first time, the king instructed his new assistant to examine it carefully, as he would have to make sure that the importation of foreign goods would decrease automatically "by additions to factories in our country." Some imported goods, like oysters for instance, could not be obtained at home, and whenever the statement showed amounts which the king considered high, the import duty would be increased so as to curtail the consumption and thus decrease so far as possible the outflow of money to foreign countries.

In 1752 Faesch was sharply blamed when, after examining all the statements, he marked on his list only a few factories as still required. The king said: "You evidently examined those extracts very superficially; you must not rely on the orders given to the presidents of the different chambers to report also on this subject; you must remember that they have a great deal of detail work while the fifth department has this object only, and you can see for yourself that you must give the matter full attention."

Still, on the whole, the statement indicated a satisfactory condition. For the year 1752 the figures showed exports amounting to 22,625,992 thalers, and imports of 16,954,955 thalers, proving an enrichment of the country by five and a half millions. To stimulate the spirit of enterprise among merchants, the king arranged matters so that the lists of imports were open for general inspection; thus everybody could see where his business had prospects of competing with foreign productions.

In planning new factories the preference was always given to poor neighborhoods where industries had not existed before. A factory for cotton and half linen goods was started at Gleiwitz in Upper Silesia; fine woodenware and toys, on the style of Nürnberg, were produced at Tarnowitz, where wood was readily available and a good market could be found at Cracow and Teschen.

During the summer of 1750, while passing through Pomerania, the king noticed that in the neighborhood through which he was traveling there was not a large city suitable for the sale of the farmers' fruits, etc., without driving too far. It seemed to him that the small city of Naugard was favorably located for such mutual dealings, and he ordered the president of the Pomeranian chamber to report "what kind of

factories and manufactures" would be most desirable there.

On the 24th of January, 1750, Frederick wrote to his representative in Paris: "We are fully posted about our own commerce." He instructed his ambassador to tell the French capitalist, who had bragged about his experience, that advance was not required from abroad, but men and money, adding: "We principally need people who are inclined to combine and form a trading company." While he had previously endeavored successfully to attract foreign mechanics and peasants, he now made strenuous efforts through his ambassadors, principally in Holland and France, to prevail upon wealthy business men to make their homes in Prussia.

In the summer of 1742, at Cleves, while on his way to Aix-la-Chapelle, the sovereign met his ambassador to The Hague court, Count Otto Podewils, who reported to him verbally and the conversation drifted to the prospects of securing wealthy commercial people from abroad. Podewils spoke of a very wealthy Israelite who was willing to move to Prussia on condition of being raised to the nobility. Frederick at first treated the demand as a joke, but when told that Charles VI in a similar case had granted the title of *Freiherr,* he laughingly remarked that

what the emperor had done he also could do. It is not believed, however, that he really meant what he said. While he admitted that Turks and heathens would be welcome to populate the country, it was well known that he discriminated against Jews. It was a principle with him to exclude them so far as possible from competition in the manufacturing and wholesale business. At the same time he was liberal enough to adhere to his principle of tolerance and not interfere with their public worship. His prejudice against them was not on account of religion but rather of a social-political nature, which led him to grant them only a restricted right of residence. He claimed that Jews would bear watching and ought to be prevented from intruding into the wholesale business.

There was special legislation for the Israelites of Silesia. In 1744, at the urgent request of the merchants of Breslau, all Jews with the exception of twelve privileged families and some religious officials, were expelled from the city on the strength of a decree issued at the time of Austrian possession.

Otherwise no difficulty was placed in the way of active, enterprising foreigners who desired to make Prussia their home, and no investigation was made of their birth and antecedents. Native merchants as a rule were too proud to have

anything in common with the "plebeians," who rapidly worked their way upward but without avail. Lenz, the president of the chamber, who agreed with the ruler's view, told the conceited "patricians" of Emden about a case which happened in nearby Holland. One of the counselors of Dutch India was the son of a poor peasant in East Friesland, and had started his career as a cabin boy; it was hoped that he would not be blamed or slighted on account of his modest origin if he should return to Germany. Besides these reliable, capable, business men some came who were doubtful people,—adventurers and swindlers,—who had nothing to lose and everything to gain. Records show numerous plans and proposals waiting for realization; they proved the young Prussian king's spirit of enterprise; he said: "There are many idlers known as projectors; a king has every reason to guard against their poor recommendations; they always claim to be acting in the ruler's interests, but on closer examination it is invariably found that their plans would only cause losses."

A Frenchman named Latouche who had been knighted by King Louis importuned the Prussian ambassador for a long time with his projects until finally Frederick invited him to Berlin, where in the autumn of 1750 he gave him a

charter which authorized him to form a stock company for maritime trade and deep fishing.

Soon afterward there were unfavorable rumors about the stranger; it was said that his capital was small and his credit poor. The king showed his suspicion plainly and threatened to withdraw the concession unless the enterprise was carried through in a short time, which he specified. Latouche had already found in Berlin prominent and wealthy directors for his company, but the king notified them that their participation in the enterprise was not desired, whereupon the knight returned his charter and left the country.

About the time that this concession was issued to Latouche one was also granted to Henry Thomas Stewart, a Scotchman, who justified the confidence placed in him. He was authorized to form a stock company in the city of Emden for trade with Canton, China, to which port he was to send each year one or two ships under the Prussian flag. Preparations were quickly begun. In June, 1751, the sovereign visited Emden, where he found the company established and the personnel at work. He appeared at one of the directors' meetings and was warmly welcomed.

Lenz, president of the chamber, did much for the new enterprise by arbitrating tactfully be-

tween the frequently disagreeing directors; he smoothed the friction due to the different nationalities,—English, Dutch and German,—and persuaded the Emden directors not to force their prior claims in the management of the company. His policy of insisting upon wealth drew criticism only from the stockholders, who complained that the president of the chamber and his local commissioner did not care "whether flayers or barbers become interested in our company, as long as they have money." It was said the trouble had been caused by mixing savants and jurists by profession with merchants in the directorate, so that finally the corporation might become known as "the Barbers' Society"; a decent Frankfort or Berlin merchant could hardly be expected to "sit among such people."

Nevertheless it was Lenz who impressed upon the king the necessity of letting the company retain complete self-government, even if only to prevent clashing between the supervising state officials and the foreign directors. This view was not shared by the man at the head of the department of commerce in the general directorate, Faesch, who formerly had been a merchant and induced the king on his return to Berlin to add a paragraph to the company's charter considerably increasing the state's power of interference.

In spite of internal wrangling, and intrigues on the part of Holland and Great Britain, the company met with gratifying success. Of the 2,000 authorized shares of 500 thalers each, 1,722 had been sold up to the summer of 1752; about one-third of the number was placed in Prussia, principally in Emden, Berlin and Magdeburg, and almost one-half in Germany, owing to the participation of a Frankfort and a Hamburg house. Rotterdam took 125 shares, but the largest number, 705, went to Antwerp. Upon the king's repeated urging, the company's first vessel, the *Koenig von Preussen,* 150 feet long, sailed from the harbor on the Logum Hock in February, 1752, with 120 sailors, 12 marines and 36 cannons. The second ship, *Burg von Emden,* followed in October. Both vessels were acquired in England; about the beginning of 1753 a third boat was purchased at Amsterdam and named *Prinz von Preussen;* two years later a fourth one was obtained at the same place and named *Prinz Ferdinand.*

In July, 1753, sixteen months after leaving port, the first ship returned from Canton with a cargo of tea, porcelain, raw silk and silk goods. Merchants from Hamburg, Bremen and Frankfort-on-the-Main, and from the free and Austrian Netherlands came to the auction sale. The amount realized was 440,000 thalers,—almost

half the company's paid-in capital, and more than twice the purchase price of the goods.

During the summer of 1754, after the second boat returned home, the company's shares were selling at 100 thalers above their par value of 500 thalers. The king was so pleased that he granted the company new favors by giving it a monopoly of the sale of tea and porcelain in the Prussian provinces.

After the first ship's return, the president of the chamber in high spirits reported to the king that his province was doing very well since the city of Emden had taken a new lease of life owing to the Asiatic trade. In 1755 the mayor of Emden declared that the company had greatly benefited the impoverished city, which had assumed new life "in its domestic and foreign trade," and that the continuance of this work was of "immeasurable importance to Emden."

Outside of the direct profits earned by those interested in the company, the public auctions conferred upon the city the importance of a real market center. A pamphlet issued by a man named Philopatrius expressed the opinion that what Denmark and Sweden had succeeded in doing could also be successfully done by Prussia. He spoke of Vineta, of Lübeck and the Hanseatic Union, stating that Emden could become to the

Baltic merchant what Sluys, Bruges and Antwerp were at one time to Hanseatic traders.

There could be no doubt that this beginning of competition against foreigners, who so far had monopolized the world's markets, flattered the Prussian and German pride, and roused sympathy throughout the nation. One of the empire's electors, Archbishop Clemens August of Cologne, was present as an active bidder at the first auction in Emden, and some of the Frankfort stockholders told the Prussian ambassador that they had purchased their shares not only as a profitable investment, but also out of respect for the king of Prussia, and in honor of Germany.

The sailors who had the privilege of being the first to display the Prussian eagle on the Asiatic shores reported that the Chinese claimed to have frequently heard of Prussians and they were now glad to become acquainted with that nation. Patriotic poets praised this new maritime policy. District President von Derschau, a native of eastern Prussia who had just been transferred to Aurich, exalted the day "on which the Prussian state married Thetis," while the leader of the German Parnassus, Frederick William Zachariae of Brunswick, published in his paper called *Tageszeiten* the following impressive lines devoted to national sentiment:

"On the stock exchange the crowds came to-

gether. The merchant from far-away India, from the Bengal shores, from the North full of fur, and from the Levant rich in coffee. Each of them brings his wealth here; Britons and Batavians proudly see everything flow into their ocean. Will the German always, blinded by prejudice, slumber free from care on the comfortable coasts of the world's sea? Will he deem it always beneath his dignity to subdue the ocean and to take from his own warehouses the goods which we now are borrowing from the Dutchman whom our silver enriches? But look! Prussian flags are moving through far-away seas and returning on boats loaded with all the treasures of trade, flying to the wind in joyful harbors in honor of Germans."

The example set by the Asiatic company soon found imitators. Harris the Scotchman, however, who was warmly recommended by Field Marshal Keith, his countryman, and who in 1753 became at Emden the head of a "Bengal company," turned out to be one of those restless, inconsiderate adventurers whom King Frederick desired to keep away. The new company did not become established on a firm basis and at the end of 1754, when after several unsuccessful efforts its first ship spread sail for Bengal, the management to cap the climax was intrusted to unreliable hands.

Nobody was further from overestimating those first Prussian attempts at entering the world's commerce than the king. He spoke of the Emden enterprise, which he desired to bring into close connection with the Stettin commerce, as a plan which if realized might become very important. He said: "I shall not live to see it completed, but posterity may if my plan is followed up and proper means are used for execution." He protested that nothing be done with undue haste. Lenz recommended the founding of a Prussian marine insurance company in order to stop the annual payments of tribute to foreign companies; the ruler replied that the time was not yet ripe for such an undertaking. Citizens of Emden requested him to "become formidable on the ocean," and a great French maritime hero, Labourdonnais, to whom his own country had been ungrateful, submitted in 1751 a plan to fit out a Prussian war fleet, to which he offered his services as admiral. Frederick declared that it would lead too far and he did not wish to commence too many things at one time. He believed the French proverb: *Qui trop embrasse, mal étreint* (He who embraces too much, squeezes poorly). The following year he declared more pointedly in his *Political Testament:* "So far the state's resources are hardly sufficient to maintain the army and contribute

the most necessary amounts to the war treasury; at the present time it would be a great political mistake to think of scattering the military power. Prussia's real enemy, Austria, has only land troops; Russia has a fleet, but since the Prussian coasts are not suitable for a landing nothing worse could be accomplished than to land troops in the neutral harbor of Danzig and disturb the connection between Prussia and Pomerania."

Austria and Russia hated Frederick who, in spite of the attention devoted to the young commercial enterprises, never lost sight of the enemies on his borders, always expecting an attack and ready for battle. The clouds' shadows still appeared only in fleeting narrow stripes between the peaceful fields of prosperity; but the storm began to gather threateningly for a frightful downpour.

CHAPTER IV

THE SOLDIER KING

IT has been asserted more than once that Frederick the Great did not take real pleasure in a soldier's life, and that he assumed his great military tasks only as a matter of duty. Tyrconnell, in 1751, wrote to the French court: "He is naturally lazy and despises everything pertaining to war; nevertheless he forces himself and has to be seriously ill before missing one of the parades which he holds with his troops each day, or neglecting to look after the details connected with the army administrations. He is convinced that by doing this he deceives Europe, and that only by this manner can he maintain the strict precision and necessary discipline in his army and among the officers of all grades, up to his princely brothers. Without such strong motives he might perhaps follow his natural inclination toward solitude and devote himself entirely to poetry and literature."

Occasional declarations of Frederick seemed to justify such an opinion, but it was disproved

forever by a sincere avowal made in 1742 to Algarotti, in the Moravian headquarters on the return journey from the theater of war, when the ruler said: "I should like to leave this kind of work to the devil, and nevertheless it gives me pleasure, which proves that there are contradictions in the human spirit."

Frederick was a whole-hearted soldier above everything else, and he acquired this preference while still at Ruppin and Rheinsberg. Even in his *Antimacchiavelli* he warmly insisted that it was a ruler's duty to defend his country and to lead and drill his army; when actual king he made the matter still more important. He prided himself on having been trained from infancy in the army and said that weapons were rattling around his cradle.

In giving instructions for the education of the future heir to the throne, young Prince Frederick William, he ordered that a taste for a soldier's life should be instilled in the child's mind by impressing him on every occasion that all men of high birth must be soldiers, and by showing him troops as often as the little fellow desired to see them. Thus Frederick came to consider it absolutely necessary for the ruler of Prussia to be a soldier and the head of the entire army,—in fact, the Soldier King. He said: "The king of Prussia must assume the office

which in republics is a matter of dispute and in monarchies an object of ambitious desire, but most European kings despise it to such an extent that they would consider it below their dignity to command their own armies. A disgrace to the throne are these soft, inactive rulers who, while making generals commanders-in-chief of their armies, confess tacitly their own weakness and lack of ability. In our state it certainly is an honor to work with the flower of the nobility and the cream of the nation in strengthening the discipline which upholds the Fatherland's glory, making it respected in time of peace and victorious in time of war. He who regrets the trouble and care required to maintain this military discipline must either be born very low or spoiled by laziness and unnerved by sensuality."

Frederick, for himself and his successors, made it a government principle that the sovereign should maintain the balance between his army and the civilian population, so that citizens would not be oppressed. At the same time he earnestly expressed his conviction that in this state surrounded by mighty neighbors, and presumably at frequent intervals exposed to war, the soldiers must always be considered first, as was the case with the Romans when those conquerors of the world were in the period of growth and expansion. Frederick never fully

overcame the contempt for officials which he openly expressed at Küstrin while still crown prince, and later himself, in the service of the administration. Whenever the position of a president became vacant he gave the preference to a retired staff officer; and special court service of importance, such as meeting a foreign ambassador to whom an audience had been granted, was intrusted to an officer rather than to a chamberlain.

Very rarely did the sovereign wear court dress in place of the customary uniform. Throughout the day he was surrounded by officers, whose places were taken in the evening by æsthetic table companions. Not one of his other poems was as close to his heart as the "Epistle to Stillness," which exalted the officers who had fallen in the two wars. Since he thus honored his living and his dead warriors, the whole army was regarded with general favor. Marquis Valory called particular attention to the fact that a Hessian prince, after being promoted to the rank of a Prussian lieutenant general, preferred to be addressed as "Excellency," rather than "Highness."

Under Frederick William I, young noblemen in eastern Prussia were forcibly taken by sergeants and mounted police to serve as cadets, but since that time the army had gained so

much prestige that there was a surplus of future officers for all the regiments, except in Upper Silesia. In 1753, at the review in eastern Prussia, when King Frederick saw the ensigns of the Dohna and Below regiments drawn up in line, he exclaimed: "For God's sake, how many young noblemen!" In 1752 a Mr. von Bonin proudly informed him that he was just sending his seventh son to the military academy, and that the eighth and last would follow soon.

It was considered a matter of course that sons of noble families should enter the army, and the ruler maintained that he had a right to their services,—a fact which seemed to be equally advantageous to the nobility and the king. A rank in the large army saved the impoverished nobleman, who could not guarantee any position in the Protestant state from sinking to the level of a mere peasant. On one occasion Frederick called it a good action to have saved a neglected noble boy at the proper moment "from the conversation of peasant lads."

For king and state the general service in the army constituted a pledge of loyalty on the part of the whole nobility. In a retrospective way the old time system of vassalage in its original importance had taken the form of serving in the army. Knighthood ceased to be an oppo-

sition political party,—a fact largely due to its gradual change to a military nobility. A son of Christian Ludwig von Kalckstein, who was executed for high treason, informed Frederick William I that his eldest sons were serving in the royal army and that the younger ones would follow their example. Among noblemen it was currently said: "The king's bread is always the best." Their desire to oppose the government, their political efforts, and their old-time longing for liberty were abandoned for service in the army, a new occupation and an active new field for ambition; the officer's uniform was regarded as a badge of distinction, indicating the nobleman's honor.

One of the unpleasant features of general military service were the efforts of noblemen to monopolize the officers' positions. Frederick William I, as was gratefully acknowledged in his successor's memoirs, purged the corps of officers, but it was principally done by weeding out those who did not belong to the nobility and through long service had been promoted from the ranks of common soldiers.

It is generally believed that great progress was due to this measure, since only from that time was there a specific difference between the privates and the officers, and true comradeship developed on the basis of social equality. This

was a great advantage to Prussian officers as a class. In 1743, when King Frederick reviewed the Bavarian army near Wemding, he was favorably impressed by the common soldiers, but saw at a glance the "miserable" condition of the corps of officers, which consisted mostly of people without any education, such as old troopers. In an Austrian army, where officers were not required to be of noble birth, the corps was divided into two separate halves; the lower grades were filled, up to old age, by those despised officers who had risen from the ranks, while the higher grades were reserved almost without exception for the rapidly advancing noblemen. Even in Prussia it was not intended that people not belonging to the nobility should be entirely barred from the possibility of becoming officers. In 1744 King Frederick promoted to a lieutenancy, for distinguished bravery in the trenches around Prague, a grenadier named Krauel, who was ennobled under the high sounding name of von Ziskaberg; after peace was restored the behavior of this brave man "became constantly worse and more slovenly," which was not considered an encouragement to repeat the experiment.

Frederick William I made it a necessity for sergeants not members of the nobility to serve at least twelve years before they could become

officers. This rule plainly showed that in those days there was little or no thought of finding educated people not belonging to the nobility in the ranks of privates.

For a time these conditions remained unchanged; so long as there were not many applicants from among the better class of citizens, such as officials, scholars, preachers or merchants, and so long as there were enough applicants from noble families, there was little criticism of this state of affairs. Gradually, however, it became known that the king, as a rule, preferred noblemen for officers in his army and would have liked to exclude entirely from that corps all people not of high birth. Naturally educated citizens, who had a good opinion of themselves, felt hurt. Frederick, in turn, let it be known that more than one commander-in-chief and statesman came of a plain citizen family,—a fact of which Europe might well be proud,—that nature distributes gifts regardless of lineage; that all men came from equally old races, and that each who is distinguished by virtue and talents is a nobleman comparable to Melchisedec, who had neither father nor mother.

Despite these philosophical observations the monarch could never wholly rid himself of an old deep-rooted prejudice in favor of the nobility. Moreover, he felt grateful to noblemen

for their bravery and devotion shown when facing the enemy, and he found "the race so good that it merits in every way to be preserved."

He did not desire to see untried people take the place of tried ones in the army. Afterward, when native noblemen no longer sufficed to supply the demand, he preferred those of foreign birth as officers, in place of native citizens, because he placed high value on family traditions and the solidarity of race, which undoubtedly contributed to ideal strength. The tacit understanding among noblemen to guarantee honorable behavior on the part of each individual seemed so absolutely necessary to him that, until the contrary had been proved, he supposed that less sense of honor prevailed among ordinary citizens who were under no such moral obligation. An exception to the general rule against admitting officers not belonging to the nobility was made in favor of the lately created regiments of hussars, as this light cavalry, on the strength of its origin, was considered an irregular troop; the same exception was made in favor of the garrison battalion, artillery and engineers.

Great difficulty was met in obtaining for the Prussian army a competent nucleus of officers for the engineer corps, many of them being de-

ficient in education. King Frederick, while speaking of his predecessor's period, said that in those days studies were despised in the army and knowledge was regarded as a kind of disgrace, as if the young men considered it a crime to improve their minds. As late as 1746, Ewald von Kleist complained that among comrades it was considered an ignominy to be a poet. There were, however, many educated officers of high ideals serving under the Prussian flag, undoubtedly more in proportion than in other German countries, including the Austrian army. A majority were students in universities prior to entering upon a military career; among those are mentioned Rothenburg, Keyserling, Stille, Kyau, Georg Konrad von der Goltz, and his cousin who afterward fell in the battle near Grossjägerndorf; Marshals Schwerin, Buddenbrock and Borcke.

One of Frederick's most famous cavalry commanders, Georg Wilhelm von Driesen, was on the point of matriculating at Königsberg as a theologian when King William made him change his mind; Puttkamer, afterward a general of hussars, was on his way to the university when he reconsidered and entered the military academy.

During the Seven Years' War, while in winter quarters in and around Leipzig, the officers

requested Gellert to deliver lectures to them. He was obliged to "read before half the army, and one young officer, Count Dohna, assured him that he knew all of Gellert's works by heart." Shortly before the war a Prussian officer, a grateful reader of those works, sent to the author as a token of personal esteem twenty gold pieces called *louis d'or*.

The average education of officers, however, was poor. Types like Peter Blanckensee, of whom Crown Prince Frederick derisively said that it would not be noticeable when his spirit departed, did not die out. The lacking education had to be compensated for by courage, bravery, strength and growth, although on one occasion King Frederick curtly replied, when a gentleman from the electorate of Saxony requested that his son be permitted to enter the Prussian service and called attention to the young man's size, that he cared more for a young nobleman's solid reason and decent conduct than for his height.

Hertzberg, who fell in the battle near Kesselsdorf, was not the only general concerning whose education it was said that "the village schoolmaster had to give him the entire fill of his wisdom." Some young men from Pomerania who could neither read nor write were sent to the cadet corps in Berlin, a fact which caused the

Dresden with the Bridge of St. August. Erected 1727 29.
Painting by Bernardo Belotto, called Canaletto.

king to establish a preparatory school at Stolp in 1769. The cadets were instructed in logic, mathematics, history, geography, French, and the rudiments of engineering. During their examinations the ruler occasionally indulged in the pleasure of asking a question or two, and in other ways exerted an influence. For the winter quarters during the first war each regiment was provided with a few copies of *Fèuquières's Military Memoirs,* which at that time was considered the best text-book on the science of war. In the autumn of 1743, a course of military lectures for the officers of the garrison was inaugurated in Berlin. The results of this innovation were not satisfactory to the king, who expressed the opinion that a complete reorganization of the national system would be required to overcome the obstacles of superficiality, laziness and inclination toward excesses.

None the less, the awakening of a scientific spirit among the officers was noticeable. Stille and a staff officer of his regiment, Krosigk, were engaged in writing the history of the two Silesian wars; Krosigk also translated Voltaire's *Universal History,* and some chapters from the *Art of War,* by Count Turpin. In 1747, Major Humbert of the engineer corps also revealed himself as an author by publishing a work on *Tactics of Siege;* in 1756, an ensign in a regiment

of the guard, Friedrich Moritz von Rohr, published *Incidental Ideas about War History,* in which the influence of the king's historical views was easily recognized. It was rather discouraging to hear Frederick say of Humbert's work that practice gained by experience was preferable to the deepest theory, and to hear him tell his friend, General Stille, while reviewing a regiment, that study alone would not suffice because the regiment must also be looked after.

The king told commanders of regiments that among other things it was their duty to watch over the officers' demeanor when off duty. Those who permitted among their subordinates a "wild mode of living, excessive drinking, or a harmful home life," were sharply called to account. Lieutenants and ensigns acting badly should not be admitted to a company.

A decree published in 1743 stated: "To prevent all indecent and bad manners, the higher officers are instructed to invite their younger comrades frequently, to talk to them and associate with them in an exemplary manner." The sovereign personally set the example for such sociable gatherings by attending evening meetings of the first battalion of the guards, which he had introduced, and even when away from Potsdam he invited captains as well as staff officers to his own table. Whenever a colonel

did not recognize the proper limit, he was instructed to refrain from "familiar association with subalterns." Karl von Hülsen, an officer, spoke of the worthy and unworthy among his comrades as follows: "There is a rude, bragging, quarrelsome type and there are also honest, warm-hearted, self-sacrificing, enthusiastic fellows; there are harsh and mild superiors; some commanders are well-meaning while others are not entirely free from nepotism, 'like a cranky old Pomeranian.'"

In 1747 King Frederick blamed a highly respected officer, Field Marshal Kleist, for still causing unrest, disputes and annoyances, frequently for scant reasons. He said: "I like to see in the regiments peace, harmony and pleasantness, which can easily be maintained by not being too stubborn and by not looking with suspicion at everything that is not very serious or can easily be settled amicably."

In another regiment there was too much indulgence and the ruler wrote: "It is a well-known fact that in any regiment where strict subordination and discipline are neglected and officers are not closely kept to account, the whole regiment soon feels the effects and even among privates excesses soon increase to such an extent that the entire regiment deteriorates and becomes useless. Read my letter to your sub-

alterns so they may understand that I do not desire to have among my officers ill-bred people; the officers must have honor, ambition and a reasonable conduct."

Officers were not in any way to be injured in their honor. One day in a sudden burst of anger the king struck the horse of a captain of hussars across the nose; the officer immediately shot the animal, expressing to the ruler his unwillingness to ride a punished horse, whereupon the king made him a present of another horse.

Frederick demanded that his officers should "serve him with body and soul"; those who did only what the regulations required were called "indolent people," and there was dire punishment for those who neglected their duty, even to the dismissal from service. A review under Frederick was regarded throughout the country as the great moment "for wives, mothers, children and friends to pray ardently to God that their dear ones might not meet with misfortune during those three terrible days."

No favor was shown either to person or regiment. Those who distinguished themselves at the review were sometimes rewarded beyond all expectations. After the Berlin ceremonies Major General Driesen, the brave fighter, who three years later helped Frederick to gain his

most brilliant victory, received 2,000 thalers as an honor present in 1754. When the modest officer expressed his thanks, the king in a liberal humor replied that he had not received enough, and promptly ordered his income raised by 1,000 thalers per annum.

In his *Political Testament* the ruler complained that his resources were insufficient to reward merit adequately. The order *Pour le Mérite* could be gained by any officer, but the order of the "Black Eagle" was reserved for lieutenant generals and generals.

Marshal Keith called the king, with his four campaigns, the best officer in the Prussian army. After peace was restored Frederick said of his officers: "All battalions and all cavalry regiments had old commanders, tried officers full of bravery and merit. The captains were mature, reliable, courageous men; the subaltern officers were carefully selected and many of them were qualified for higher grades; in short, devotion and zeal in this army were admirable."

He was not quite so enthusiastic concerning his generals, claiming that while some were of marked merit the majority, in spite of great bravery, were careless and dependent. These shortcomings were only noticed when in view of a new war it became necessary to organize several armies simultaneously. Frederick be-

lieved the fault was due to the customary promotion according to seniority of service.

Referring to the financial concerns of officers, Frederick warned all those who did not hold respect and honor above material interest never to choose a soldier's profession. Ensigns and lieutenants received monthly only from eleven to fourteen thalers, and could not live without having some private means. On an average twenty years were required to attain the rank of captain. Many of the young fellows had a hard life, as set forth in the following lines:

"These little verses will tell you exactly
What trouble I have to pay my board.
I was born poor and say it compactly:
The lieutenant owes, and has no hoard.
He had nothing and borrowed right from the start;
To buy on credit was the only way.
'Twas war, and no thought of payment at heart,
A signed note would do from day to day."

These rhymes were written by a Prussian cavalry lieutenant, and show why the king permitted young officers to marry only under certain conditions. He explained that there was too much danger of "seeing hunger and thirst meet."

In some regiments considerable wealth was displayed; uniforms were trimmed with gold and silver; coats, in accordance with changing

civilian styles, were sometimes shorter and sometimes longer than stipulated in instructions; the hair was often arranged contrary to the military form, and there were other offenses due to prevailing styles, against which even the king fought in vain.

Those promoted to a captaincy were regarded as easy financially. The rank could not be bought, although such transactions were customary in the French army. Here even the poorest could attain the grade in the regular course of service. It was generally believed that the captain of a Prussian company would not exchange his position for that of a reigning prince. His income was so liberal that without being really stingy and even while financially assisting the younger officers he could lay by a small fortune.

This generous income, which compensated the Prussian officer for the many preceding years of privations and sacrifices, was made possible by a system called "company household," closely connected with the constitution of cantons.

It was the captain's duty to keep his company or squadron up to its full strength. His salary was small but he received from the war treasury a fixed amount to pay the stipulated number of sergeants and privates; no allowance, however, was made for the expense of recruiting to re-

place those leaving the service. Thus it would have been impossible for a captain to make both ends meet if there had not been two conditions in his favor; one was the supply of recruits from the home district, who did not require any advance money, and the other was a liberal leave of absence granted to these young men.

The policy of general conscription was never entirely forgotten. Basing his action on this principle, King Frederick I enrolled the young men to serve in the "national militia," that is to say, for actual defense of the country in case of necessity. The successor regarded his father's militia as a caricature of real soldiers, and founded the addition to his regular army on the same general obligation to serve in case the country needed men for actual defense, although he temporarily forbade all recruiting and admitted only voluntary applicants.

After this, tacitly at first, he permitted the captains, on their own authority and in competition with each other, to inscribe in their lists and enroll young fellows who were not,—like wool workers, farm owners and certain citizens,—protected by special royal decree.

In 1733 he systematized this rather confusing state of affairs by assigning to each regiment (at first in the eastern and middle provinces) a certain territory or "canton," with the names of

places duly recorded, in which youths were enrolled with certain restrictions so that afterward the most suitable among them could be selected for service.

This method of recruiting did not yield the full supply of men needed and it still remained necessary to obtain recruits from foreign countries. Frederick William I then recognized as admissible a system previously adopted by captains on their own authority. This consisted of granting to trained home troops a leave of absence for the greater part of the year, with the avowed purpose that captains could obtain recruits from foreign countries with the pay thus saved.

This arrangement seemed to be beneficial to all concerned; the captains spent less for recruiting abroad than they saved by granting a leave of absence to the "canton" soldiers. These men, while obliged to serve twenty years, spent only three months, and afterward but two, each year with the flag; the country missed the tillers of the soil only a short time annually; the king, after many experiments with mutual financial arrangements between the canton and the leave of absence system on one hand, and foreign recruiting on the other, secured a large army without additional expense. The "canton" system, adopted as a makeshift under the stress of the

hour, was very effective for the time and capable of remarkable development in the future.

A French officer directed attention to the contrast between the French and Prussian armies: in France officers obtained leave for entire months, while privates always remained in active service; in Prussia the reverse was the case, officers were formed into an exclusive body, while for the troops the boundary line between soldiers and civilians was eliminated. Voltaire perhaps was thinking of Prussian institutions when he demanded in his philosophical dictionary that in times of peace the soldier should find an opportunity of making himself useful.

For foreign recruiting the regime obtained from the king the necessary passes with which the officers in charge and their companions started for the scene of their delicate work; such orders to go abroad were eagerly sought. In German cities outside of Prussia, where the electors by usage possessed the exclusive privilege of recruiting, there were regular Prussian stations. It was even reported that a Prussian general proposed to divide the Holy Roman empire into Prussian cantons, on the pattern of the home system.

Germany still resembled, as was said a century before, a Trojan horse from the body of which armed soldiers emerged. Poland was a particu-

larly fertile field for recruiting, and many natives of Courland served in East Prussian regiments. The hobby for very tall men passed its climax when Frederick William I died. Frederick II, who considered important the bayonet attack, which required physical power, placed the lowest limit of stature for men of the infantry in the first line at five feet eight inches, and in the second line at five feet six inches; in the new regiments created by himself he permitted a reduction of one inch.

Similar to Frederick's action in 1740 was a decree issued by his successor rigidly forbidding recruiting officers to use "deceiving or violent means"; but there was no noticeable change in this respect. As a rule the officers were backed by their superiors, who at sight of a very tall recruit were so delighted that they met the victim's complaints with sophistry and took care that they did not reach the monarch's ears. Such complainants, however, formed only a small fraction of foreign recruits in the Prussian army; the average man deliberately "sold himself" and chose a soldier's life either from inclination or because he was not fit for anything else.

There were peasant lads whose home life was too easy and who expected to earn money as well as glory while in uniform, but afterward re-

turned home as prodigal sons. Most of these were sturdy, adventurous fellows who followed the sound of the recruiting drum and seemed made for the handling of weapons, but a good many of them were of uncertain disposition and after running away from home were inclined to change flags as frequently as the journeyman changes shops. This was partly due to their restlessness, partly to dissatisfaction, and partly to selfish impulse; desertion was almost a professional occupation, carried on in order to earn advance money elsewhere.

These traveling soldiers kept moving from one army to another, but since each state lost through desertion the expense almost balanced itself. When the observant king noticed a new recruit at a review, he general inquired whether the man had already served in some other army. In 1767 it was asserted that the Prussian army contained at least 30,000 French deserters, but this was probably an exaggeration. A list shows that in 1747 one company of grenadiers of the Rettberg regiment had among its 111 foreigners 65, and the other among its 119 foreigners 92 men who had "previously served other foreign potentates."

The Prussian service was a little stricter than that of other armies, but a Frenchman called it a mistake to suppose that the Prussian soldier

constantly felt the rod. Blows were inflicted only when ordered, and not arbitrarily. Such punishment was common elsewhere, even in the French army, where for a long time the rod was rejected but finally admitted temporarily because of its effect on the admirable Prussian discipline.

Prussian service left soldiers so much freedom that many of them worked for masters of some guild, or followed a trade as their competitors. The new Prussian subjects in the land of the linen industry soon became accustomed to seeing here and there a "young Hercules with a mustache handling the spindle." Some of these soldiers earned enough money to buy freedom from guard duty, for which they had to pay their captain.

They had still another advantage; while Austrian soldiers had to turn most of their small pay over to a corporal, who absconded when he saw fit, the Prussian custom was to allow the men, in small groups among themselves, to do their own housekeeping. The regiment saw to it that citizens furnished soldiers with suitable accommodations. A clean room, neither in the cellar nor the garret, was required, with not more than four men in one room and a good bed for each man.

These regulations could well be carried out

for ten months of each year, when the native troops were on leave of absence. During campaigns the Prussian soldier was sure of a liberal meat ration, and Archenholtz claimed that many deserters flocked to Frederick's flag for the sake of the one pound of beef per week.

It was customary to accept deserters in war and peace, and it was only a step further in the same direction to give prisoners of war the option of changing masters and accepting advance money. The nucleus for a garrison regiment formed in Silesia, and for the "Markgraf Heinrich fusileers," was furnished by a free company disarmed at Brieg, and in 1744, when a regiment of yellow hussars was founded, it was completed by men from the Austrian garrison at Prague.

In times of peace desertion did not hurt the Prussian army as much as formerly. A Frenchman claimed that in Prussia one-half of the garrison had to guard the other half, but another Frenchman reported that no great pains were taken in Prussia to prevent soldiers from leaving their garrison, because matters were so arranged that the entire country constituted a prison; both informants agreed that of 100 deserters, 98 or 99 were returned.

The rural population was interested in stopping deserters because each foreigner in the army meant relief for one of the young peasants

from the home canton. Moreover, there were reliable men among these foreigners who were granted leave of absence year after year. This refers particularly to people from the neighboring state of Mecklenburg. The Protestant Alsatians were found true to such a degree that Frederick finally said of them: "They are as good as the men from our own country."

He knew that his own warriors were superior to strangers, and he referred to the last named in his special instructions about prevention of desertion in the field, which he addressed to his generals in 1748. Among the natives there were also some "unreliable cantonists," as they were officially called, people who tried to escape before or after entering the regiment, or who kept in hiding when the cantons were investigated, but, fortunately, their number was few. On the whole, to use Frederick's own words, "there was splendid success in changing the awkward peasant, through the proud discipline and high courage of the troops, into a brave soldier." A Silesian author wrote that in the practical school of military training the common man became accustomed to order and cleanliness, that in the villages of Upper Silesia those on furlough were generally the only ones of genteel appearance and able to talk some German, and that in a large portion of the province military service

contributed toward refinement of manners and mode of living.

Of eastern Prussia it was said in 1748 that most of the soldiers would not resume their old positions as farm hands for three times the wages. The young fellows known as "enrolled," whose names had been entered on the lists but who had not yet joined their regiments, were proud of wearing the red necktie which indicated that they belonged to the army; they began to feel that they were now the king's men. In 1758 nine hundred recruits who had just been trained were on the march to join their regiment when they were attacked by an enemy in superior numbers; they did not give way and were almost annihilated.

A Prussian general who, as one of the combatants, described the Seven Years' War, wrote of these youths of seventeen to twenty years that Spartans and Roman veterans never fought for their country with more courage. The cantonist combined with the love for his country and the devotion to his Fatherland something of the spirit shown by the professional soldier, and of the pride displayed by the old-time *Landsknecht*. Frederick insisted that through the canton system the solidarity of native troops in a regiment created a rivalry in bravery, and that countrymen, friends and relatives would

not readily abandon each other in an ordinary battle.

While he purged the canton system from some of its defects and abuses, Frederick did not elaborate it in the consistent sense of general obligatory service. On the contrary, he added considerably to the number of those excused by his father from military duty, such as property owners, the educated classes, merchants, manufacturers, etc. Entire cities and territories were exempt from service, particularly the numerous immigrants.

This was not the only time he subordinated the military to the industrial interest. From the first he would have renounced the great work of colonization and the establishment of industries had he desired to make obligatory service more general and to oppose prevailing views more outspokenly. While there were important political reasons for his course, there was also a purely military cause.

A regiment should not regard its canton as an ordinary source of supply, but rather as a reserve to be nursed carefully, "from which, in case of great losses, through war or otherwise, the depleted ranks could quickly be restored to their full strength." According to the regulations of 1743, infantry, cuirassiers and dragoons had to have twice as many foreigners as natives,

but the needed number of strangers could not be obtained.

The closer the danger of extraordinary losses approached, the more saving the king appeared to become. In 1744 when taking the field he forbade all regiments to withdraw a solitary recruit during the war from "the king's territory." This regulation, however, could not be carried out. During hostilities the cantons' supply of men revealed itself as a more inexhaustible military treasure than the coins and gold bars of the war funds in the vaults of the castle.

Although in the minority and in times of peace only spending a small part of the year with the flag, the cantonists were the men whose spirit permeated the entire regiment, which they made appear like a real war unit of ability and reliance.

Besides the more or less favorable mixture of natives and strangers, the ability of officers contributed to the specific value of the troops. The longer term of service and the patriarchal character of those days facilitated personal intercourse. Marshal Schwerin wished from each of his officers two things,—fear and love,—claiming that after obtaining them an officer could accomplish anything with his men, but if one of the two elements were missing it ought to be love, since nothing could be attained with-

out fear. Karl von Hülsen, avoiding Schwerin's little exaggeration, said that the commander of a company could not do everything, but he could do a great deal after acquiring confidence, love and fear. The brave Barsewisch prided himself on the fact that during the seven campaigns of the third war not one of his men, either native or foreign, deserted. He called this luck, but insisted at the same time that an officer must be loved by his men and should always look after their welfare, because frequently the common soldier could not appeal to anybody else in his small troubles and desires.

The Meyerinck regiment, after a splendidly executed attack, was ordered to assume its place in the second line of defense, so that fresh troops could take up the fight, but the men refused to withdraw and called for more ammunition. The same enthusiastic fellows were attacked at night and although taken by surprise and many slain, they did not retreat. Moritz von Dessau told the king: "Your majesty may intrust this regiment with scepter and crown; when these men run from the enemy, I shall not like to remain either." With his own eyes Moritz saw Prussian grenadiers and musketeers run over to the enemy's line and pull Austrians down by their feet from an elevation on which they considered themselves safe. He exclaimed

admiringly: "Can anybody ask more of brave men who work unto death?"

The courageous soldiers had a hard time, but their honor and devotion were unsurpassable. These sacred sentiments could be awakened and utilized. King Frederick,—aged, hardened and embittered,—did not at first recognize this fact, but under the influence of his first great victories he became more just in his conclusions. And he was not satisfied with showing his gratitude by distributing money, on the anniversary of heroic deeds, among the regiments that distinguished themselves in battle, but he also wrote of the men: "These troops are so agile, courageous and well disciplined, that whatever human beings can accomplish may be undertaken and ventured with them; a general who elsewhere would be called reckless does among Prussians only what is natural."

The Prussian army of those days was not the populace in arms; not everybody was called to the colors and, on the other hand, many of those defending the country did not belong to the common people; but as it was the army was a mighty lever for patriotism and solidarity. Among noblemen as well as peasants, military service awakened a feeling of a close union with the state. The king decreed that everybody in arms should become accustomed to the common

name of "Prussia," and all of them learned to feel proud of being Prussians.

The monarchic, centralizing administration was built up from the army's requirements; the system of taxation well served military purposes, while through the army and the prompt payment for board, uniforms, arms and ammunition, most of the money collected was quickly put back into regular circulation.

After the peace treaty of Dresden was signed, the total number of troops was still about the same as in 1744, when the war opened. At that time there were, excluding about 5,000 men left in the garrisons, 140,000 soldiers at the front; in 1751 the number was 132,000 men, which by the next year increased to 136,500. The king's first addition to the infantry consisted of nine regiments; during and after the first war he added seven regiments more, besides three independent battalions of grenadiers. The number of field battalions had thus, since Frederick ascended the throne, grown from 66 to 100. The six garrison battalions had increased to 21. Since 1735 a grenadier company had been attached to each battalion of five musketeer or fusileer companies; in case of mobilization these grenadier companies could be detached and formed into separate battalions, thus increasing the number of war battalions from 121 to 151.

The new garrisons created by Frederick William I contained five regiments of uneven strength and in time of peace were not kept together permanently, the men being called in for only a short time each year, while the officers, sergeants and corporals remained always in active service. Dragoons had increased from 45 to 70 squadrons, forming twelve regiments; and hussars from 9 to 80 squadrons, composing eight regiments. To the cuirassiers only one squadron, known as *gardes-du-corps,* had been added.

The artillery was doubled, that is to say, to the battalion of field artillery already in existence Frederick added another, and to the four companies of fortification artillery he joined four other companies. In 1740 a corps of mounted sharpshooters was formed, principally for courier services, and two companies on foot composed of men specially trained for rifle shooting were used for outpost duty. Twelve garrison companies were distributed in less important fortresses, such as Peitz, Regenstein, Moers, etc. They were not attached to any battalions and besides the regular men included half invalids, or convalescents who were strong enough to do guard duty. Such of these as were able to read, write and figure were placed in modest civilian positions, but most of them—about four or five

thousand—were each given a small sum of money and sent to their homes.

In November, 1748, a battalion of veterans from the Silesian wars moved into the recently completed invalids' home in one of the suburbs of Berlin. On that occasion the king saluted his old comrades with the following warm words: "This is probably the only battalion in the entire army of which I shall be glad if it never attains its full quota in numbers." The old home is still in existence and over the main entrance can be read the great king's inscription cut in stone: *Laeso et invicto militi* (To the wounded and unconquered warriors).

The army had gained self-confidence and a spirit of unity before the enemy, but discipline had suffered in the field and the light part of the service had somewhat deteriorated. Frederick spoke of the change from war to peace as a particularly difficult and laborious period for the army and its administration. In the usual order of the day, on New Year's, 1746, he expressed to the officers his thanks for their devotion to duty, "which gained for Prussian arms an almost immortal glory," and his hope that they would not neglect anything "to restore fully the good order and discipline which so far made my army unconquerable."

In the midst of the exacting and monotonous

but absolutely necessary routine drill of peace days, the recollection of the greatly varying war practice was kept alive. The king expanded the drill and parade grounds to the size of a real field for maneuvers. He claimed that the customary spring exercises had only been sufficient to drill the soldiers and make them alert. To train the officers and keep them accustomed to the all-important service, he introduced the method of gathering the scattered troops in each province into one encampment and of imitating war in peace times.

This practice was begun during the summer following his first war. The largest of the peace camps was concentrated in 1753 between Spandau and Potsdam, with about 36,000 men forming 49 battalions and 61 squadrons. The printed "prospectus" of these Spandau maneuvers, prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Balbi, was only a covert parody on a description of the Saxon encampment festival in 1730; it even showed a reproduction of the celebration cake, forty-four feet long. Count Podewils was ordered to hand a copy of the printed matter to Bülow, the Saxon ambassador, which he did gravely; Mr. Bülow replied that he saw the point but would gladly bear the burden of such jokes. Frederick called this Saxon camp more of a theater production than a war picture; his own maneuvers, how-

ever, made the participants feel as if they were taking part in a real battle. It is reported that even the king became so enthusiastic on such occasions that he showed himself exactly as he appeared in his famous fights. Those around him were always afraid that during such exercises he would overestimate his strength and injure his health; even Voltaire, who at that time had grown quite envious, could not suppress an exclamation of admiration in the spring of 1752, when he saw the philosopher of Sans Souci force a foot swollen by gout into his boot; according to the Frenchman he had a right to play Philoctetes, but instead of emitting heart-rending plaints, he found it convenient to mount his horse and command the troops of Neoptolemus.

Count Guilbert, a contemporary, called these Prussian peace maneuvers a school which in certain respects had advantages over war, inasmuch as during actual hostilities, under the stress of the moment, the exactness and significance of movements could easily be overlooked, because a certain amount of quiet was required to derive and formulate principles.

The mature results obtained from the war experiences, later examinations, new observations, examples and experiments during maneuvers,

were then utilized and explained in the regular order of the day to the different branches of the army, in a poem concerning tactics, and above all in a document entitled *General Principles of War* which was completed in 1748 and distributed five years later among generals as the most sacred secret. In 1755 a supplement to this extensive paper was prepared under the title of *Ideas and General Rules about War*. It was first submitted to Winterfeldt, who enthusiastically called it "an invaluable drug store for the field and a panacea to cure all embarrassments."

Young Count Gisors, a son of Marshal Belle-Isle, traveled day and night that he might arrive in time to witness the celebrated Prussian maneuvers. In the spring and autumn of 1754 he watched the old and new tactics of this unique army with astonishment, on the *Tempelhofer Feld* and in the camps of Stargard, Koerbelitz and Golau. He saw the riders repeat the attack of Hohenfriedberg by emerging from an opening made by their infantry and crushing the opposing battalions; he was convinced of the importance of having grenadier companies bar the empty space between opposing infantry lines, to prevent threatening flank movements; and saw for the first time the newly invented form of marching to the attack, admiring the

phenomenon of the deviating battle line which replaced the straight formation.

In 1741 Frederick said to the French ambassador, "A long war cannot suit me." The principal reason for this declaration was the state's poor financial condition; war could be conducted only with the long accumulated savings. The two campaigns of the first war absorbed half the state treasury; it was replenished, but the two campaigns of the second war exhausted it entirely. Frederick now put forth efforts to save enough money for four campaigns, which he believed would meet all requirements. Even if France and Austria launched seven campaigns in succession, as they did during the last war, or a dozen as was done at the beginning of the century, the king thought that he would have to find and could find ways and means for a quicker decision for Prussia.

In his work entitled *General Principles of War* the ruler enumerated the various reasons for battle recognized by his method, but for Prussia he added one more general cause: "To all these maxims I add that our wars must be short and lively; it does not suit us to let the matter drag, because a lengthy war would destroy our admirable discipline, depopulate our country, and exhaust our resources. Therefore those commanding Prussian armies

must try, although carefully, to strike a decisive blow."

In September, 1741, near the river Neisse, he found that he could not force the enemy into battle at his pleasure, and again the fact was established during the Bohemian campaign of 1744. Afterward he discovered that, in spite of the increasing effect and boldness of the Prussian attack, there remained positions which could not be assailed.

A great drawback to Frederick's campaigns was the prevailing system of provisioning. It was believed that troops in the field could be provided for with certainty only by wagons following the army. Requisitions were not resorted to except in very exceptional cases, because they were apt to lower the discipline and encourage desertions.

The generals of Louis XIV maintained that, as a rule, the army should not be separated from the stores by a greater distance than could be covered in five days. King Frederick added somewhat to this interval and was able to supply his men for twenty-two days.

Before starting on long marches soldiers were given sufficient bread to last for six days; the company's wagons carried enough for six days more, and the large vehicles of the commissary department had sufficient flour for ten days.

The baking was done on iron stoves, which ran short in 1744. Forty-eight of them were purchased during the period of peace and were deemed sufficient for an army of 100,000 men. Hand mills were taken along to facilitate the speedy establishment of stores in the enemy's country. When grain fields were encountered the soldier became at the same time mower, thresher and baker. Mounted men had to depend entirely on the fields to feed their horses.

Frederick never felt entirely free in his movements. In 1745 he said that the commanding was not really done by him, but by flour and forage.

Marshal Neipperg asserted that the king of Prussia had never pursued the beaten enemy because he feared that the powerful formation of his ranks would be broken. Count Gisors repeated these words in 1754 to Frederick, who replied that Neipperg did him too much honor, since his principal reason for not pursuing was always a lack of sufficient food, which convinced him that practice frequently had to remain far behind theory.

Frederick did not believe in the old principle of building golden bridges for the fleeing foe, and claimed that not to pursue rendered doubtful to a certain extent a matter just decided; to pursue he declared "more necessary and useful

than the battle itself." While explaining in detail how this should be done, he confessed that it was not an easy matter, as he had learned by experience. He mentioned as convincing proof, many years later, that after the victory of Sohr his glorious cavalry incessantly acclaimed him, but could not be prevailed upon to pursue the enemy, either by warnings, scoldings, or even beatings; he naïvely added: "I think I know how to scold when I am angry."

After the many disturbances of 1749 King Frederick considered as eliminated the immediate danger of war, which had threatened from the North, but he coolly calculated the short respite on which he might count. During the autumn of 1749 he expressed the opinion that peace might last for five years; the following summer he reduced this estimate somewhat, and added that at the expiration of the period he would undoubtedly be attacked unless some unforeseen accident tied Austria's hands.

In a letter written in February, 1753, he expressed to his successor great satisfaction at the prince's view that an attack on Prussia by jealous neighbors was not impossible, adding: "That has always been my opinion. I do not say that the event is close at hand, but I can positively assure you that it will occur and then

everything will depend on circumstances. If we have as many allies as enemies, we can emerge with honor from the fray, owing to our splendid discipline and to the advantage which rapidity has over slowness."

At this time he obtained a new proof of the hostile plans made by his principal opponents, Austria and Russia. He knew that he was surrounded by spies and that his messages as well as those of his ambassadors were examined at Vienna, St. Petersburg and Hanover, and even translated when possible; accepting these lessons, he too formed valuable connections. After the summer of 1747 he was served at Berlin by a secretary of the Austrian embassy, and after the spring of 1752 he had at Dresden the services of an official employed by the Saxon cabinet ministry.

Early in February, 1753, he received from Dresden a copy of the secret paragraphs in the St. Petersburg treaty of alliance, dated 1746, of which the courts of both empires had communicated to him only the principal paragraphs, including the fourth one, which referred directly to Prussia. As a receipt, so to speak, for this communication, Frederick gave to his enemies a carnival joke consisting of three humorous "letters to the public," which were published in quick succession during the month of March.

Lessing, who translated these missives, called them "a satire, of which nobody really knows on what."

An exact knowledge of conditions prevailing at that time made it possible, however, to understand the many political and personal references; the main point was a jesting revelation of a defensive alliance concluded very secretly between the king of Prussia and the republic of San Marino. It was stated that this portion of the treaty had not yet become known and was hardly worth reading, because it was intended for everybody to see. The quintessence of the poison was hidden in the most secret paragraph, which the ambassador of San Marino, while dining with the representatives of the thirteen cantons, dropped accidentally when taking his handkerchief from his pocket, and which was surreptitiously picked up by the ambassador of Fez, who published it.

During the stormy period of 1749 Frederick again formed an alliance with France, and such documents, facts, proofs and suppositions as came to him from his secret sources were promptly communicated to the Frenchmen, who thus were informed and warned, and at the same time found new clews for their own investigation. The chief purpose was frequently to remind France of the dangerous position in

which the king constantly found himself. At that time France appreciated these confidential communications. Early in 1751 the French secretary of state, Puyzieulx, expressed the opinion that nobody could blame the king of Prussia if some day he took one of his opponents by surprise and put him out of the running.

Relations between France and Prussia became very cordial, as was soon learned by an Austrian statesman who tried hard to separate the two states and bring France over to Austria's side. On the basis of his personal observations Count Kaunitz, the Austrian ambassador at Paris, changed his old plan of 1751, in an hour of discouragement, into the opposite by advising the empress-queen to forget Silesia and form an alliance with Prussia for future resistance against France.

This advice was not accepted. In Dresden, after conquering that city, Frederick II told Count Harrach that, after such violent differences between the two German powers, time alone could heal the deep wounds. Harrach, referring later to those words, said with regret that the wound had not yet healed. Occasional attempts made by the king of Prussia to cultivate more cordial relations with the Vienna court proved fruitless, and the case was just as hopeless when he temporarily tried to be accom-

modating in small matters, inasmuch as it seemed impossible to agree on important ones.

Emperor Francis, who appeared to be sincere in his desire for a reconciliation, did not have enough influence to bring it about. Quarrels over details of the Dresden peace treaty continued year after year; Frederick characterized the wrangling as a war in which haughtiness, chicanery and pens were used instead of actual weapons. Annoyed by a new, lengthy Austrian letter of dispute, he called it a "great and pompous Gallimathias," and to ever recurring objections he replied that he could not afford to be sent from Pilate to Herod, adding in doubtful humor that in self-defense he would look around for a savant whose pen was accustomed to rudeness. Finally, in 1751, the demand on the empire to guarantee the Dresden peace treaty in accordance with the conditions stated therein was taken by the emperor to congress, where it was accepted.

Disputes over the Silesian debt and trade questions became all the more violent. In 1751 Count Otto Podewils, a nephew of the cabinet minister, was relieved by a successor after five years' service as ambassador at Vienna, and at parting the empress-queen told him pointedly: "I regret that your stay here was not pleasant;

you must blame this on the political situation and on the unpleasant negotiations which you had to conduct."

The relations with the other imperial court were even less satisfactory. Since the king became convinced that he only had to reckon with the hostile chancellor and not with the czarina, he discontinued the personal attentions with which he had previously flattered Elizabeth's vanity, saying: "All politeness shown to the St. Petersburg court had no particular effect and did not help us."

Toward the end of 1749, through his ambassador, he informed Vice Chancellor Woronzow, who still liked to be regarded as Prussia's friend and counseled pleasant relations, that every possible consideration and attention had been shown, but since Russia disregarded even ordinary rules of politeness all conciliatory steps would now be discontinued.

Soon afterward Prussia sent to Russia a peremptory note in favor of Sweden, which displeased Woronzow. During the summer of 1750 a messenger of the Tartar chief was received at the Prussian court with conspicuous distinction because the king desired to "make certain people feel uneasy." The vice chancellor complained that through this impolitic action everything was spoiled with the czarina. The still

outwardly existing connection between the two courts was soon abolished. Until recently Russia had been represented at Berlin by Count Keyserling, a savant and a well-meaning, thoroughly honorable man, who at parting expressed his regrets over the coolness which had sprung up between the two courts. In doing so he mentioned that Peter the Great in his last testament instructed his successors to cultivate Prussia's friendship.

Keyserling was succeeded by a restless diplomat named Gross, who had left the Paris court on account of a quarrel and who was made the instrument of an open rupture. A trumped-up question of etiquette was used as a pretext; and late in November, 1750, Gross was ordered to turn his back on the Prussian capital immediately, and without giving any notice of his departure. Prussia then perforce withdrew her representative at the Russian court also.

Diplomatic relations between London and Berlin also ceased, without, however, being violently severed. In this instance the trouble was caused by Prussia. In 1750 King Frederick not only withdrew from the court of George II his own ambassador, Klinggraeffen, whom he needed for Vienna, without appointing a successor for him, but about the same time requested the recall of the British representative,

Hanbury Williams, who had been in Berlin only a short time, but long enough to make himself *persona non grata* through his mischievous tongue.

After renewing his relations with France, Frederick showed plainly the little value he placed on England's friendship by sending to Paris in the summer of 1751, after the death of his old and tried representative in that city, a Scotch immigrant and rebel, who was also a Jacobite chief. When the king calmly presented Lord Marshal of Scotland to Podewils as the new ambassador, the frightened minister exclaimed: "What will the uncle say?"

Naturally, in political circles there was much talk of the fact that Prussia was now represented in Paris by a Scotchman, and France in Berlin by an Irishman. Valory had been succeeded by Tyrconnell. King George, in his anger over Lord Marshal's mission, even went so far as to raise futile objections at Versailles to his admittance. The personal tension between uncle and nephew became more strained than ever; in an official Prussian document sent to the Vienna court, from Frederick's own pen, George was referred to as the "youngest one of the electors."

After 1749 the Prussian policy continued as it had been since the close of the Second Silesian

War,—that of a satiated state bent only on preserving what had been acquired and avoiding warlike complications. It was not, however, a policy of submission, reconciliation, self-denial or self-abasement. Strong in the knowledge that he was sincere in his love of peace, Frederick in case of necessity met his opponents boldly, returning lack of respect by lack of respect and harshness by harshness. On one occasion he declared that he would not yield one iota, even if 200,000 Russians were stationed in Livonia. With him it was a principle not to lower his dignity nor tolerate contempt when meeting an opponent, and this was due to his temperament as well as to his policy.

Perhaps the temperament sometimes dominated further than politics ought to have permitted. At Vienna it was considered very fortunate that the king of Prussia personally provoked the Russian high chancellor as well as the Saxon head minister and made bitter enemies of both.

Frederick was really more of a statesman than a diplomat, since he lacked many of the qualifications found in the professional, trained diplomat. He was too restless for a verbal exchange of opinion, because in conversation he was easily carried away by his own vivacity. Aware of this, he avoided political discussions

with representatives of foreign powers whenever possible. In writing diplomatic notes or proclamations, his literary nature suggested a style and expression in marked contrast to the conventional, smooth language of diplomacy, although he stated occasionally that he was willing to sacrifice his antithesis to politics.

An offensive note intended for the king of England was first scrutinized for hours and changed by the careful Podewils as well as by Ambassador Tyrconnell, with the purpose of eliminating too strong expressions. In its final form it still showed who the first author was, and proved equally objectionable to friend and foe. The dissatisfied Frederick said to the French ambassador: "If I ever should again have occasion to compose such a document, I shall first examine the records and elucidate all points before handling the pen."

His attitude toward England steadily increased in harshness, and it looked as if the king of Prussia had really abandoned the purpose of holding any longer the balance of power between the two great western governments which he held during the latter period of the Austrian War of Succession. The new agreement between Prussia and France, although not based on a written treaty, regulated the balance of power in Europe independently of the Swed-

ish affair, which in 1749 again brought the two states together.

Since Swedish matters no longer constituted a menace to Europe, the king of Prussia gave close attention to the plans of the courts of Vienna and St. James, in the effort to have the young archduke Joseph elected Roman king. This scheme was conceived in London, where since the experiences of 1742 such an election, which meant actual inheritance of the empire by archdukes, was considered necessary for the purpose of maintaining Austrian influence in Germany and strengthening European resistance against France.

Strange to say, it was a French diplomat who on a previous occasion urged this royal election. In 1748, at Aix-la-Chapelle, Count St. Severin tried in every possible way to convince the Austrian plenipotentiary that the court of Versailles sincerely favored Austria's interests and opposed the king of Prussia. Vienna at that time did not consider this effort of much importance and only concluded from it that France desired still less to see the imperial crown go to the House of Brandenburg than to remain in Austria.

It was now a painful surprise to find France among those opposing the election and King Frederick was astonished to see his ally, after being lukewarm at first, labor ardently against

the young archduke's elevation. At first he expressed the opinion that it was too late to counteract the harm that had been done and that France had only herself to blame. Nevertheless, he did not desire to strengthen the Vienna court's belief "that everybody must promptly agree with Austria's whims."

A simple consent to the election seemed degrading; to start a general upheaval throughout Europe was dangerous and not worth while; so it was decided to make matters as hard and unpleasant as possible for the Roman king and future emperor. Frederick told the French ambassador that the great art in politics was not to swim against the tide but to turn all events to one's own advantage. Using an old but doubtful claim of German rulers to be heard by the electoral college as to the necessity of a royal election before the imperial throne became vacant, he started first of all an active diplomatic and public battle with the pen.

The mere fact that Prussia wished to consent only under certain conditions, and that she and France, united as heretofore upon the northern question, now agreed on this German matter, sufficed the Vienna court to repudiate the election. The Roman royal crown, which liberal England offered to procure for the Austrian House, seemed overpaid if it could be bought

only at the price of humiliations. At proud Vienna it was considered degrading to accept any dictation from the king of Prussia. The crown seemed a dangerous present if its possession led to new trouble with France, or even to a still closer connection beween France and Prussia.

Although the British king guaranteed before the assembled parliament to carry the plan through, the opposition of those principally interested was an insurmountable obstacle. At London as well as at Hanover loud complaints were heard of the ingratitude of the House of Hapsburg, which did not wish to have English benevolence forced upon itself. None the less, with persistent patience, Britain renewed the effort year after year. King Frederick said he was glad that his English uncle had discovered a harmless pastime in this eternally renewed election campaign, because otherwise his restless spirit might have found different disturbing matters.

During the same year a second Lotheringian candidacy to the throne occupied the various cabinets. In the same manner that England had proffered the German electoral crown, Russia now offered that of Poland to the Vienna court. Following the summer of 1748, a suggestion made by the restless Bestuschew to place Prince Charles of Lorraine, Maria Theresa's brother-

in-law, at the head of Polish affairs after King Augustus's death, had been the subject of negotiations between the two imperial courts. Formerly a Polish king was compensated after losing his own country by being given Lorraine; now there was to be a move in the opposite direction by making the House of Lorraine reoccupy its lost home in Poland.

So far, in the confused congress at Warsaw and Grodno, Prussian diplomacy had always succeeded in overturning the plans conceived by the disorganized powers of the Polish republic, with the intention of placing them at the service of the Russian-Austrian coalition. The increase of the regular army, the renewal of the "holy" alliance with the two imperial courts, and the abolition of the veto, all greatly desired by the Saxon court and the "family," that is to say, the loyal party of the related houses of Czartoryski and Poniatowski, collapsed through the opposition of messengers sent from the camp of the "Potocki," provided with French, and partly also with Prussian money. After the excitement and turmoil in congress, which met every other year for its invariably fruitless work, the intervening years were filled with periods of relaxation and quiet, during which the quarrels of the Sarmatians were ignored by their neighbors.

The year 1751 was one during which congress did not meet, but it did not pass without seriously attracting the king of Prussia's attention to Polish affairs. Early in November he received knowledge of the first, still unconfirmed, scheme made three years before, for the Lorraine succession to the throne, and before the year ended his suspicion changed to certainty.

In view of the rivalry between the neighboring states of Brandenburg and Saxony, the Polish kingdom was always regarded at Berlin, during the days of the "Wettiner," as harmful to Prussian interests. There was much more danger now in the possibility of seeing, at the next change on the Polish throne, the electoral crown come under the control of a new and rising great power of hostile intentions, a dynasty which was a much more dangerous opponent to Prussia than the House of Albert, the retrogressive and indebted middle state of Saxony.

King Frederick began his preparations without delay. He applied to France with a view of influencing Turkey; it was his old political belief that the Porte alone could prevent Russia from arbitrarily bestowing the Polish royal crown where he chose; the dispute in 1734 showed conclusively how little France, of her own power, could do in Poland.

The claim of the prince of Lorraine seemed to indicate that there would be a new war over the succession to the Polish throne. To prevent it, Frederick proposed a radical remedy, a diversion on the part of the sultan. As he viewed it, this ought to be brought about immediately through French diplomacy at the Golden Horn. He claimed that a good opportunity was presented by a change of ministers in the seraglio, which brought a great and warlike vizier to the front.

Prussia and France did not agree over this Polish question, because King Louis had his secret plans of proposing at the next election a Bourbon—Prince de Conti—as a candidate for the throne. Nevertheless, the representatives of the two powers worked in harmony at the Grodno congress of 1752, and with their followers decisively defeated the Russian party. The two imperial courts were unable to overcome the French-Prussian resistance and the Lorraine candidacy disappeared for Poland as well as for Germany.

In both cases, as in the Swedish matter, France's advantage and honor were too closely involved to refuse coöperation in the diplomatic defense. The year 1753 brought new and unexpected complications, and there was more danger for Prussia in remaining alone, for the

reason that this was an exclusively Prussian affair.

The conflict this time was with England and soon grew so threatening that the quarrel with Austria and Russia was temporarily relegated to the second place, and it seemed as if the signal for a general attack upon Prussia would be given in London.

During the last war between England and France the new Prussian maritime trade was much injured by English privateers. King Frederick could not afford to neglect his merchant marine. He believed in the principle, recognized by international law after a century's quarrel, that the flag covered the cargo and only contraband of war could forfeit the protection of a neutral flag. According to the British view, based on decisions of the *consolato del mare,* a collection of maritime usages dating from the fourteenth century, all property belonging to subjects of an enemy, even when carried on neutral ships, was subject to capture, unless protected by special concessions to neutral flags. Furthermore, the meaning of "contraband of war" was arbitrarily extended to all kinds of lumber, ship's supplies, and especially grain. Under this contention, besides Danish, Swedish, Dutch and other neutral ships, a number of Prussian merchant vessels were taken to Eng-

lish admiralty courts, where either the seizure was maintained or a release was ordered without any payment of damages. At the beginning of the sea war Lord Carteret, the secretary of state, verbally declared his agreement with the Prussian view, but his contention was not accepted by his successors in office.

Toward the end of 1748 King Frederick deemed it politic to be more moderate in his treatment of England, but when his position was strengthened by his new understanding with France, he proceeded more energetically than ever in the interest of his subjects. By the peace treaty of Breslau Prussia recognized an English company's claim against Silesia amounting to 405,000 pounds; from 1743 to 1751 the debt was reduced by 360,000 pounds, including interest, but in November, 1752, Frederick refused, as he had repeatedly threatened to do, to make further payments until the claims of his outraged merchant ships had been satisfied. At the same time he deposited with the supreme court at Berlin the 45,000 pounds remaining due on the Silesian claim.

British pride was offended. Many Britons regarded it as an unpardonable impudence that Prussia should resist Archduke Joseph's candidacy to the throne, which had been recommended by London. This new assumption was

all the more objectionable since it was aimed directly against England, and especially against the purses of her citizens. This dispute with Prussia was the universal topic of conversation in London, "from the lord to the pauper." The tribune of the lower house recommended reprisals. Horace Walpole in his indignation asserted that the Prussian "baby fleet" could not be seriously considered, in view of Albion's powerful maritime resources, but nobody forgot that the king of England was vulnerable in his German possessions.

Newspapers reported a Prussian attack on Hanover as imminent, and the rumor received new credence when preparations were made near Spandau for maneuvers of 30,000 to 40,000 men. Hanover brought suit against Prussia in the highest court of the empire, because of East Friesland; this led to angry words between the representatives of Brandenburg and Hanover at Regensburg, and added to the general excitement. In March, 1753, the Prussian representative at Hanover made an official statement for the purpose of quieting the disturbing rumors, but it was regarded as a threat. The government of the electorate placed the country in a state of defense and hurriedly removed the Guelph crown treasure from the city of Hanover to Stade.

King Frederick did not intend to attack, but was not wholly free from fear of being attacked. In April, 1753, there were particularly disquieting reports of the gathering of troops in Bohemia and Moravia. He thought the king of England might take advantage of the excitement prevailing among his subjects and, jointly with Austria and Russia, precipitate a war which apparently would be for England's honor, but really in the interest of Hanover's dynasty.

On the 15th of June Frederick wrote to his ambassador at Vienna: "Should the king of England start a new war conflagration, it will be on account of East Friesland, although the attachment of the balance due will be the pretext."

At the king's request Prince Henry elaborated a plan of campaign in the summer of 1753, which probably was desired only as a theoretical lesson. This plan, presuming a war against the coalition of England, Austria and Russia, included a Prussian invasion of Hanover. Early in 1751 Count Podewils told the French ambassador that, in case of hostilities, the king would have no other choice than to let Russia enter eastern Prussia, as was intended in the plan of 1749, and compensate himself at the expense of the neighbors, forcing his opponents to

conclude peace at Hanover, as had been done at Dresden.

Lord Marshal in Paris, familiar with English conditions, was requested to express his opinion and he replied that it was improbable that England would select war as a means of reprisal. He was convinced that even if the nation desired such action King George would do everything in his power to prevent it, because he would not like to expose his country to any peril.

Lord Marshal believed that in case of war the king of Prussia would have various means of protecting his states and making effective diversions. He said there were not many Prussian merchant vessels that England could take away, while Prussia could capture quite a number of prizes by giving letters to French and other privateers authorizing them to sail over all seas under the Prussian flag.

Lord Marshal also sent estimates of the strength of Stewart's party, and offered to make one of the Jacobite leaders come to Berlin. Frederick replied that he would welcome such a visit, and some time later a Scotchman named Dawkins presented himself at Berlin. As a matter of prudence Lord Marshal had not informed him that his visit was expected. The king, after a talk with Dawkins, notified Lord Marshal that

just then he did not wish to make any arrangement with the Jacobite party.

In the meantime, the ruler watched with close attention the progress of the subsidy negotiations started by England at the czarina's court, for the purpose of securing the assistance of Russian troops. Through his secret sources Frederick learned all the proposals made by the English ambassador and all the replies of the Russian chancellor. In the beginning of September he was relieved to learn that, owing to Russia's excessive demands, no business would be done for the time.

Negotiations, however, were not abandoned. Peace seemed assured for the current year, since in 1754 Frederick was prepared for almost anything. He wrote to France that he would take all honorable steps to preserve peace, but nothing in the world, neither the terrible alliance of his enemies nor their superiority in the number of troops and in resources, would cause him to withdraw from the understanding with England.

France naturally was not displeased by the tension between Prussia and England; requested by both parties to do so, she accepted the rôle of mediator, which was a hopeless task from the start, but she did not talk as forcibly to the British cabinet as Frederick desired.

Early in November, 1753, the king wrote to

Fontainebleau: "If France continues indifferent much longer and permits matters to take their course, the consequence will be that England comes to an agreement with both imperial courts and the three powers will then be so overbearing that I may lose patience and feel obliged to break with them for honor's sake."

The new year brought an event in which Frederick was inclined to see a partial guarantee of continued peace. On the 17th of March, 1754, Sir Henry Pelham, the English statesman who for eleven years was first lord of the treasury and the recognized leader of the dominant Whig party, died. As a consequence, the ministry could not feel assured of a favorable result in the approaching parliamentary elections. Sir Henry Pelham's brother, the duke of Newcastle, assumed charge of the finance department instead of the foreign. The Prussian representative expressed the opinion that this was another point in Prussia's favor, because it might be expected that the most eager promoter of the subsidy negotiations with Russia would now be apt to inspect more closely the unfavorable side of the matter.

In May, 1754, after much hesitation, Frederick reached the conclusion that in spite of the large concentration of Russian troops and of Austrian maneuvers and encampments, the year would

pass quietly "because the big bell, namely England's money, would not ring." Step by step he watched the English-Russian negotiations, which wavered and then stopped. Some months later he regarded them as broken off, and believed that the plans made against him during the preceding year were not abandoned.

It seemed to him, however, that in the end only the death of King George could prevent war. Little did he suspect that after a time this monarch would be his only helper against his present opponents and his present allies.

At the time of the Huguenot wars a Spanish statesman claimed to have discovered in Frenchmen the disposition of suspecting everything that did not emanate personally from them. Whenever this clever Castilian desired them to do anything he did not submit it as his own opinion, but referred to it as information that had come to his ears.

King Frederick made use of the same strategy. He claimed that in diplomatic intercourse with Frenchmen their self-regard must be particularly considered, in addition to their superior political ability, which they regarded as their due. He added: "French statesmen are very sensitive, and their fear of being influenced frequently makes the best advice useless. I let

them have the honor of all my plans as if they were their own ideas and I followed them. These people must be made to believe that they are leading us."

Such tactics were effective. In 1749, when Marquis Valory returned to his post as ambassador at Berlin, he showed a suspicion of the advice, communications and warnings of the king of Prussia, as well as a certain irritation against the monarch's person. Instructions given a year later to Tyrconnell were absolutely free from doubt as to the veracity of confidential communications from Berlin, acknowledged the hostile position of the courts of Vienna, London and St. Petersburg, and called particular attention to the community of interests between France and Prussia. King Frederick expressed his satisfaction with the policy of Minister Puyzieulx. Certain French diplomats did not quite attain to that level, but the king of Prussia declared more than once that the ministry of Versailles showed better sense than its representatives at foreign courts.

Puyzieulx, like his predecessors D'Argenson and Amelot, remained for only a few years at the head of the ministry of foreign affairs. On account of poor health, and partly perhaps because one of the court parties intrigued against him, he resigned his position in September,

1751, and was succeeded by Marquis de St. Contest.

Frederick looked upon the frequent change of ministers in France as a serious matter, and wrote to his ambassador at Paris: "I have always noticed that a court cannot stop after once commencing to throw over or change ministers; it always continues like a game of cards." It soon became evident that the new minister was unable to do justice to his position. St. Contest was personally devoted to the king of Prussia and the Prussian alliance, perhaps more so than his predecessor, who at first was somewhat prejudiced, and he was regarded as an opponent of the Vienna court; but he was not one who could successfully manipulate the politics of a great state and make himself felt at a court that was undermined by intrigues. Contrary to the opinion previously expressed, Frederick had come to consider the ministry and its yielding agents abroad as worthy of each other.

In July, 1754, St. Contest died, but politically his loss was looked upon as insignificant. The king wrote: "It was impossible to make any headway with him." He was succeeded by Rouillé, previously minister of the navy, whose reputation was that of "a very weak man, entirely inexperienced in foreign affairs and not competent to fill such an important position."

Members of the diplomatic corps were soon convinced of his ignorance and lack of judgment.

After the retirement of Marquis Puyzieulx there was no end to Frederick's complaints of the laxity, inconsistency, superficiality and carelessness of the French ministry. Again and again he reminded the Frenchmen of the example set by Louis XIV, but they gave no heed. To his disgust and discomfort he saw France abandon one position after another, either sacrificing allies like Genoa or permitting them to join the enemy, as at Modena. This fatuous policy was pursued to a certain extent with regard to Denmark and Spain.

The diplomatic superiority of his own federal system, in which Frederick had felt secure ever since 1749, was over; his opponents were evidently making more progress than he. In the summer of 1754 Eichel wrote to Count Podewils: "With written proofs in hand that the diplomacy of the powers allied against Prussia and France acts in full harmony and with mutual assistance, it is a sad spectacle that the king, without the slightest help from his ally, has to bear the entire burden alone and earns envy besides, if not even ingratitude. There is hardly anything left to do except to hope that God, through an unexpected, fortunate event, will change matters, as otherwise more than hu-

man reason and application would be required to bring the ship safely from the rough sea."

The *Political Testament* relating to France contained the following passage, dated 1752: "Business is superficially treated in this country, in which pleasure is regarded as the real God. A weak king imagines that he is ruling this monarchy, while his ministers divide his authority and leave him nothing but a fruitless name. A mistress working only for her own enrichment, administration officials plundering the king's treasure chests, much disorder and much robbery, are plunging this state into an abyss of debts."

Almost every report from Paris deepened the dismal situation. According to Lord Marshal's clear observation the ministers were corrupt, the finances unsettled, all classes dissatisfied, and the common people embittered against the government because of the high price of grain, not due to a real shortage but to the manipulations of a few buyers who were favored in high circles. The clergy and parliament strove to take advantage of the government's weakness,—the clergy by creating a sort of Inquisition, and parliament by extending its power. The mistress was interested in the preservation of peace, which fact contributed more than anything else toward preserving the general stupefaction. To

hold the vile king in his luxurious loathsomeness, he was told—and he believed it—that he had done enough for his glory, having obtained equal success in war and peace, that nobody would dare attack him first, and that consequently he need not do anything but enjoy his well-earned glory. His only occupation was to travel through the country from one castle to another, hunt, sleep, gorge and revel, amid continuous diversions, living a life of constantly shifting amusement and idleness in which every conceivable vice was practiced.

Frederick was impatient with France because she would not accept the proposition to force Turkey to take a stand against the imperial courts. Early in 1753 Louis XV answered Frederick's repeated suggestions in a memoir which the latter pronounced the weakest document so far received from the French ministry.

The French reply sought to prove that if a close understanding could be had between France, Prussia and Sweden, the position of the two empresses would become anything but brilliant, while on the other hand their own prospects would be more favorable. It also declared that the Turks, if they launched a war on their own account, would probably be defeated, with the consequence of a quick peace through the mediation of England, while the after effect

would be increased presumption on the part of both imperial courts. France, therefore, would count on the Turks only after trouble over the throne in Poland had actually opened; the sultan was to be backed by diversions concerning which France, Prussia and Sweden would have to agree in time. In that event, Prussia could make military demonstrations in Hanover.

There was, perhaps, more method in this French memoir than the king of Prussia was willing to see. The Prussian and the French standpoints were actually in opposition.

Prussia desired that a local conflict should be started immediately between the sultan and the two empresses, in order to prevent the threatening general war in Europe. Frederick wrote: "Europe must remain at peace while war is made on the powers abusing their strength against Poland. The imperial courts must become exhausted while fighting the Mussulmans, so that they will miss their aim in Poland."

France, on the other hand, desired and needed a general struggle, but not at once. For Prussia, France's friendship had its value as a guarantee of peace; for France, the system of alliance meant, above all, backing in a future conflict, Prussia being regarded as the cornerstone of the great continental combination, upon which France in due time would like to lean while

fighting for her American interests against England.

The time for this war had not as yet arrived, which fact was France's reason for opposing Prussia's plan of fomenting hostilities in the Orient. France, however, seeing her Prussian ally uneasy, would gladly have taken advantage of that situation for the purpose of completing the military organization of her continental coalition; hence the proposal to agree in advance on diversions.

Matters on the other side of the ocean approached a decision faster than was expected at Versailles. The peace treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, well termed a box of Pandora, with its new dissensions, did not specify established boundary lines between the French and English settlements on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. In 1753 the British ministry sent to New England an order to oppose armed force each time the French rivals intruded into the Ohio basin. On the 28th of May, 1754, young George Washington and his American recruits exchanged, in a western forest, the first shots with their opponents, but six weeks later were obliged to withdraw from their encampments on the great plains, before superior numbers of Frenchmen. At home the cabinets began to exchange notes and ships were fitted out in the respective harbors.

Frederick's correspondence with his ambassadors at Paris and London clearly reflected the intricacies of the compromise negotiations between the two courts. In the beginning of February, 1755, it still seemed to him that everything would be straightened out "very softly"; but soon afterward he was convinced that both parties, who were continuing their preparations, would finally be involved in war without desiring it and without knowing how it all came about. Early in March he saw a slight turn for the better, "with all his heart as an indication of lasting European peace," but in the very next mail he reported that the breach appeared to him "inevitable," and this last impression continued.

On the 6th of April, Eichel wrote to Count Podewils: "Reports received in today's mail justify in every way the king's view that war between France and England is as certain as if it had already been declared, and that it is very near. God may prevent the king from becoming involved in it contrary to his will."

During those gloomy days King Frederick had a private conference with Chevalier de Latouche, who was Tyrconnell's successor as ambassador at Berlin. The chevalier was not accustomed to such consultations and the king of Prussia did not consider him a bright diplomat;

confidential communications, such as were frequently made to his predecessors, were now regularly sent to the French ministry through the Prussian ambassador at Paris. This time Frederick made an exception to the rule.

He opened the conversation by saying: "Through a reliable source I learned that all attempts at an understanding between your court and that of London not only met with difficulties but appear to be absolutely hopeless." Latouche replied that the alliance with Germany for which the king of England was looking, in order to strengthen himself, could never equal that of the king of France with Prussia, because the latter was based on principles which would make it endure eternally. Frederick interrupted him by saying: "Do you know, sir, what I would do under present conditions if I were king of France? As soon as war was declared, or as soon as England committed any hostile act against France, as she is reported to have done in the Mediterranean, I should send a large army to Westphalia and without delay invade the electorate of Hanover. That is the surest way of curbing this——" Immediately after finishing this harsh sentence the king retired to his cabinet, leaving the astonished ambassador alone in the reception room. In his report to Versailles

Latouche did not mention the severe epithet applied by the king to his English uncle.

By his ostentatious lack of formality Frederick evidently desired to deprive his communication of an official character. On the 5th of April he instructed Knyphausen, his ambassador at Paris, to treat the matter as coming from himself, and to recommend the invasion of Hanover to Minister Rouillé as his own idea.

Accordingly when Knyphausen talked to Rouillé, the minister first repeated what he had told him on a previous occasion, that no plan of operations had been arranged and that the intention was to wait until England really showed her hand. Should she actually attack, a diversion would undoubtedly have to be made into the territory of the elector of Hanover and his allies. The minister added that France hoped that the king of Prussia alone would undertake the campaign against Hanover, since the geographical location of his state would enable him to succeed quickly, and in the electorate of Hanover he would find rich compensation for the expense in which the war would involve him.

Soon after this conversation Marshal Löwendahl, the able commander-in-chief in the last war, spoke to the Prussian ambassador about the desirable military rôle intended for his master, and hinted at the possibility that he might

be honored with an order to go to Berlin to consult with the king on a plan of operations.

Frederick never expected such an issue. His own proposition was for the purpose of smothering the war flame at its first appearance. What France advised was likely to scatter the brands all over Europe, because Prussia's first appearance in Hanover would bring Austria and Russia to the rescue. The king found new ground for his old suspicion that France followed the "principle of putting on her allies all the burdens of war and keeping her own hands free, that she might be able to act as she pleased."

Frederick instructed Knyphausen, in case the French minister should again refer to the subject, to reply in the most courteous and considerate manner that his master would always be glad to take every possible part in anything concerning France, but that it would be difficult for him to carry out the diversion desired. Rouillé ought to remember that each summer the monarch had to contend with 60,000 Russians in Courland, which was no small matter; that he also had to reckon with the Saxons; and that in the third place 80,000 Austrians could be quickly assembled on his borders; that he could not count with certainty either on Denmark or the Porte; in short, that without some powerful support he alone could not assume the entire

burden of the war. Without showing the slightest irritation or assuming a tone of reproach, Knyphausen was to mention on this occasion that during the second Silesian war France did not live up to the provisions of the Paris treaty of 1744. If she now desired to involve the king in an enterprise of such magnitude, it would be necessary to give guarantees of active support.

Rouillé underestimated Frederick's statesmanship and even his common sense if he thought he could overreach him in a matter which did not in the least concern Prussia, and succeed in doing this to such an extent that the king's retreat, and even any independent movement, would become impossible. The treaty of Breslau, dated June 5, 1741, the only existing alliance between Prussia and France, obligated both parties, as Frederick specially emphasized, only to mutual defense of their possessions in Europe.

Furthermore this treaty was near its expiration, which would occur on the 5th of June, 1756. It was very important for the French ally to inquire carefully whether the other party to the treaty was willing to renew it. Latouche tried hard to lead the conversation up to this subject when talking to the Prussian ministers, but did not succeed. He reported at home that his efforts were purposely disregarded and the discussion was turned to other matters. He gained

the impression that the king of Prussia had no intention of becoming reconciled with his opponents, but wished to shape his policy according to coming events.

This supposition was correct. Early in June, Podewils reported to the king concerning the Frenchman's fruitless hints, and Frederick lauded his clever minister, adding: "Latouche did very well not to insist; we prefer to see them come."

Frederick had already made up his mind not to bind himself again, and least of all at the present time. He obeyed his dying father's warning to beware of alliances. The rule which he laid down to his successors was: "No policy for far ahead; no advance treaties." He claimed that it had been in his favor not to have found any binding treaties in 1740, and now, in 1752, he kept close to France but desired no alliance with her, in order that he might be free to decide his future policy.

Naturally France, on the eve of a war, was anxious to strengthen the ties binding her to her most valuable ally, the only one who did not demand any financial compensation. Advances, however, were made with hesitancy, step by step, and in a roundabout way. In June King Frederick made a journey through his western provinces, and while on the Rhine granted his

former secretary, Darget, permission to meet him in Wesel. The French ministry promptly selected this popular and honest man as a confidant and helper, although he held only an inferior position. Darget, who had just applied for a financial appointment in Paris, was given one of the customary sinecures, and furnished with elaborate written instructions for his trip. If the king of Prussia should ask him where in his opinion France, in case of rupture with England, would strike her first blow, he was to reply that he thought it would be in the Netherlands and Holland. Should the answer then be, "Why not in Hanover?" he was to say that France probably was willing to carry out such a plan, but he thought it could not be done unless she had an agreement with the Berlin court, and he did not know whether that was the case; the king probably knew best. In this manner Frederick could perhaps be induced to throw some light on his intentions. Records do not show whether France's chosen tool had an opportunity at Wesel to test this kind of diplomacy.

From the Rhine, Frederick, accompanied only by Colonel Balbi and a page, undertook the much-discussed excursion to Holland where, on the Freckschuyte, between Amsterdam and Utrecht, dressed in an ordinary colored suit and black wig, he introduced himself as the king of

Poland's musical director to Henri de Catt, a young Swiss, who afterward became his reader.

It was the counterpart of the Strasburg adventure of 1740,—a surprising act which, according to Darget, those not familiar with the king's many accomplishments could not consider compatible with his majesty.

At the end of June, after returning to Potsdam and the old routine, the king was again approached with an elaborate question by his ever uneasy ally. Latouche asked for information as to how, in case of war with England, his court could most effectively utilize the 20,000 hired troops kept at France's disposal in Germany; they were from Brunswick, Hesse, Württemberg and Baireuth. Frederick gave orders to reply that France would have to judge for herself, as she was better informed about her own interests than the king of Prussia could be.

In the meantime, the storm signals increased. Early in July, Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick notified Frederick that England offered the Brunswick court rich subsidies and the hand of an English princess for the abandonment of France, and soon afterward he learned that England had already struck a bargain with the court at Cassel. The prince expressed the belief that King George, who spent the summer in Hanover, did nothing but offer money to German

princes, from which he concluded that England intended to conduct her war in Europe rather than on the ocean.

From America came news that on the 7th of June, opposite Lewisburg, the English admiral had attacked and vanquished two French frigates, after a hard fight. On the 25th of July, Latouche notified Berlin officially that France, in view of the attack, had immediately recalled her representatives from London and Hanover, that a plan of operations would be quickly arranged and that it would be submitted to Prussia for approval.

King Frederick decided to break the silence which he had kept for the last few weeks. At Sans Souci, by special request of the Versailles court, he granted the French ambassador an audience on the 27th of July, at which he gained the impression that France now seemed inclined to strike England in her most sensitive spot,—Hanover. He told Latouche, in conformity with his previous explanation on this subject, that he could not coöperate in this move, but two days later he instructed Knyphausen to refer the French ministers to Denmark, where assistance could perhaps be obtained.

As to the part which he was expected to take in the operations, the king again told Knyphausen in his next letter of his ill treatment dur-

ing the last war, when France coolly left him to his own resources, and about the difficulty of his present position, owing to hostile neighbors. Knyphausen was to make it clear that, unless France was openly supported by Turkey, Prussia could not take any active part, and without an alliance with Denmark and that state's active coöperation, she could not proceed against Hanover.

Frederick also mentioned that the armies of the small German rulers were absolutely out of the question in a campaign against Hanover. Prospects as to Danish assistance looked more favorable, because there was a rumor abroad that the czarina would land the hired troops demanded by English at Lübeck, thus bringing to Denmark the danger of having these northern strangers encamped in the duchy of Holstein and placed at the disposal of the House of Gottorp, which was seeking revenge and had not yet forgotten the loss of Schleswig.

The king of Prussia did not consider it probable that France would at once proceed energetically against Hanover or Belgium, which state had served during the preceding war as security for losses suffered in America. He thought for a moment,—if France should grant neutrality to the Austrian Netherlands,—of having the two German powers, Prussia and Aus-

tria, in spite of all the accumulated hatred and disputes between them, act jointly as friendly mediators between the quarreling western powers.

Knyphausen sent many reports showing how quickly the war excitement of July had disappeared from Versailles, where now the opinion prevailed that if at all possible the fighting would be confined to the sea and the colonies. The weakness of the French ministers in continuing negotiations with overbearing Albion, in spite of all that had happened, appeared to the king of Prussia as being without precedent in the world's history, and as likely to deprive the state of Louis XIV of all respect in Europe. He likened French statesmen to children who, holding their hands in front of their faces, think themselves invisible. He declared that the first moment's advantage was forever lost.

Frederick was informed in July that a peer of France, the duke of Nivernais, would be sent as a plenipotentiary to formulate with him the steps necessary to be taken in view of the situation. The departure of the aristocratic messenger, however, was postponed from week to week and from month to month. At the end of September Knyphausen was informed that the king of France had implicit confidence in Nivernais and empowered him to write his own

instructions. Frederick, when notified of this fact, angrily replied that, whether Nivernais wrote them or not, *he* would not be guided by them, but by the position which France would take.

Three more months passed before the messenger started, although Frederick had written to Knyphausen to tell the French ministry that important and remarkable information had come to him, details of which he would present to the duke on arrival. This hint could hardly be misunderstood.

For a considerable time there had been rumors afloat of an approaching reconciliation between Prussia and England. Toward the end of 1754 it became known that the hereditary prince of Hesse-Cassel had embraced Catholicism; the matter had been kept secret for a long time, and the old landgrave Wilhelm, uneasy over the religion of his grandsons and the future of his Protestant country, made preventive arrangements for his state and House, which arrangements he placed under the supervision and protection of the Protestant powers,—Prussia, England, Holland and Denmark.

This revived old recollections of the historical days when England and Brandenburg fought side by side in behalf of a common interest, to

preserve the Protestant succession to the English throne. On this occasion the duke of Newcastle expressed to the Prussian secretary of legation, Mitchell, his king's and the entire ministry's satisfaction with the example set by Prussia to the other Protestant powers. Mitchell replied with a simple phrase of politeness, and that answer had Frederick's approval.

In March, 1755, the king said: "I know only too well that the moment to speak about the return to a closer friendship is not yet at hand." Four days later he granted Bockerodt, the assistant secretary of state in the foreign department, two months' vacation, for a trip to the Spa and Aix-la-Chapelle, with the express understanding that "for particular reasons" he must not visit the city of Hanover, either going or coming.

A few weeks later, when Frederick set out on his western trip, it was impossible to avoid Hanover without taking a long, roundabout route. It seemed advisable to find out in advance through the Brunswick relatives how a passage across that territory would be regarded. This inquiry caused sanguine conjectures at the court of Herrenhausen, where King George had recently arrived; the reply was that the distinguished traveler would be royally received. Frederick then instructed his ministry to in-

form the Brunswick college of counselors officially and "very politely" of his impending journey, requesting at the same time that all distinctions and homage be avoided, as he desired to travel incognito.

Nothing was said about meeting his uncle from England. The rumor of reconciliation, which had been persistently circulated at The Hague and in Denmark, found new believers nevertheless. Before Frederick started on his trip the Austrian ambassador wrote to Count Kaunitz that a good friend had told him in confidence of the approaching reconciliation between the Prussian and English courts.

After his return from Wesel in July, Frederick gave some advice to the Brunswick court, from which his attitude toward England may be judged. The prince of Wales's wooing of one of the duke's daughters appeared to him as the most advantageous offer that could be made to the father; but the latter considered it premature and improper for his "good, dear sister," Duchess Charlotte, to be sent at once with the two eldest princesses on a visit to Hanover. He also saw an advantage in the liberal offer of soldier's pay which Brunswick would be free to accept in December, when her subsidy treaty with France expired. He called attention, however, to the fact that such an agreement could

painfully embarrass the duke if war should break out. Furthermore, he requested his brother-in-law not to be named throughout the negotiations, and to make it appear even as if no advice had been requested from Potsdam.

But in the castle at Herrenhausen there was a resolution to draw the king of Prussia into the negotiations with Brunswick. Among the members of the king of England's suite was, as customary on trips to Germany, the secretary of state for German and northern affairs, now Count Holdernesse, after Newcastle's transfer to the treasury department. On the 9th of August this lord hurried to Brunswick, preceded by a letter from Freiherr von Münchhausen, president of the Hanoverian secret counselors, indicating pretty plainly that the family connection would depend upon the ability of the duke or duchess to make the king of Prussia agree to remain neutral in case of a French attack upon Hanover. In an audience with the duke, Count Holdernesse demanded still more: Prussia should not only promise not to interfere with the repulse of a French attack against Hanover, but should warn France and prevent the attack.

Back in Hanover, Count Holdernesse expressed great satisfaction with the result of his trip; the careworn faces of the German secret counselors brightened, and soon the newspapers

reported that on the 6th of September, the day before leaving Herrenhausen, King George at his table publicly offered a toast to the king of Prussia, his future ally.

Such assurance was not quite justified as yet. To the first English message sent by Münchhausen Frederick replied to his relatives in Brunswick that everybody had a right to make arrangements for his security, but that there was neither any cause nor the proper time for a formal declaration.

The second and more urgent demand made by Count Holdernesse elicited no reply from Frederick, who treated it as if it had not been received, by offering in his letter (the contents of which were to be communicated to Hanover, and to both western powers) his services as a mediator in their American differences, without referring to the continental war mentioned by Holdernesse. On the same day he stated in a confidential letter to Duke Karl that under different conditions he would not have deemed the English proposal worthy of a reply, and that the answer he sent was given only out of regard for the interests of his brother-in-law and niece. To him, the duke, however, he felt bound to say in absolute secrecy that England would never force from him the promise demanded, but that in the duke's as well as in Prussia's interest it would

be best to keep the matter pending and not to destroy all English hope. Somewhat later, after Holdernesse in anticipation of Prussian mediation had promised to obtain details of American laws, Frederick again wrote to the duke that it was very important to gain time.

This was followed by a sudden reversal of opinion. On the first of September, without having received any news from Hanover during the six intervening days, Frederick again wrote to his brother-in-law. He stated that after further considering the matter he felt, since his treaty with France for mutual defense would expire the next spring, that an agreement could then perhaps be made with England as to Hanover's neutrality; at the same time he requested the duke not to mention the king's name in the matter, but to arrange things so that England would make some propositions. On the following day he demanded from his London representative an opinion as to whether the British ministry considered it important to see its king's possessions in Germany secured by a neutrality treaty, or whether it was a matter of indifference.

This change in attitude was due to certain information which Frederick had just received from The Hague, to the effect that a subsidy treaty had been signed at St. Petersburg, placing 70,000 Russians at England's disposal.

Negotiations for such an agreement were begun two years previously, when Frederick felt much concerned about them, but he no longer believed they would be successful. He was under the impression that Williams, the new English ambassador, who went to Russia at the beginning of 1755, had instructions merely to keep the fire smoldering and not to let it die out altogether. Thenceforward the changes in these negotiations served as a compass for the king's politics.

The information obtained from The Hague was not confirmed, and early in October Frederick learned that out of formal and material consideration the English government refused to ratify the treaty signed by the ambassador; at the same time Holdernesse again demanded in Brunswick Prussian guarantees for Hanover's protection, and also against France. Frederick promptly refused the demand as absurd, adding that he was willing to guarantee for Prussia, but could not give any orders to France. He called it arrogance to think that everybody was obliged to defend such a poor little country and spoke in unmistakable terms of his suspicions of British sincerity.

The Prussian representative Mitchell was instructed to say in London that the appearance of Russian troops in Germany would cause the

king of Prussia to take part in the war; he hoped that this threat would awaken new doubts of the advisability of concluding the subsidy treaty with Russia. The Hanover ministry sent a letter calling attention to a guarantee for Hanover assumed by Frederick William I many years before. Frederick directed that this letter should be answered, "according to Vienna court style," by entangling one parenthesis with another and making the sentence so long "that nobody could understand what was meant."

Williams and the Russian ministers signed a new document the last of September which was acceptable at Westminster. In November the king of Prussia, uneasy and impatient, asked the Brunswick mediator whether the additional details promised by Count Holdernesse had arrived. The new proposals did not come to him by way of Brunswick, but direct from London.

After Charles Fox, the recently appointed second secretary of state, had done the preliminary work by declaring to Mitchell his devotion to the king of Prussia, and mentioning particularly the purely defensive purpose of the English-Russian agreement, Holdernesse officially invited the Prussian representative to a conference and, by order of the king of England, handed him a copy of the agreement with Russia. He added that his master was ready not only to renew in

brief form the previous guarantees of Prussian possessions, but to form a still closer alliance with Prussia and, in view of it, to grant the Prussian merchant vessels a fair compensation for the damage suffered during the last war. It would depend on Prussia whether, like Spain in the South, she would maintain peace in the North, as the king of Prussia held a commanding position, the olive branch in one hand and the sword in the other.

King Frederick decided to take the important step. On the 7th of December he instructed Mitchell to thank the English ministers for their communications and to add, word for word, without changing a single expression: "I thought that the matter could be arranged between the king of England and myself by concluding for the period of the present European troubles, a neutrality treaty for Germany without mentioning either France or Russia, so as to hurt nobody's feelings, and by this consideration to enable me to work more effectively for the reconciliation of the two warring or estranged nations."

Thus Frederick declared himself ready to do that which until then he had decidedly refused to do. Whether the proposed agreement named France or not, it barred her road to Hanover. The king decided to disregard all other consid-

Frederick II.
Engraving by John Frederick Bause (1738-1814).
After an original painting by Anton Graff (1736-1813).


FRIDERICUS II

erations because the gain was important, upon the granting of which he made his consent dependent. The roads should also be barred against the Russians; they, too, should be forbidden to enter Germany.

The last communication of Lord Holdernesse made it appear very probable that England would accept this condition. The English-Russian treaty meant constant danger for Prussia so long as England remained among King Frederick's enemies, but the moment Prussia gained England's friendship she secured a most important advantage, and could hope to see the Russian bear—to use the king's favorite expression—chained by his British leader.

The negotiations between Prussia and England were the direct consequence of those between Russia and England; without the treaty of St. Petersburg there would have been no Westminster convention such as was now in course of preparation.

Years prior to that time Lord Hyndford declared that the king of Prussia feared Russia more than God, while Valory regarded the dread of Russia as hereditary at Berlin; both gentlemen seemed justified in their views.

Whenever Frederick desired to discourage French advances, he spoke of Russia as a nail in his flesh; he purposely made France believe

that he feared Russia "like a child fears the black man." On one occasion, however, he stated that Russia was not quite so terrible as one might perhaps think, adding: "Russians do not eat little children."

He was perfectly familiar with Russia's corrupt administration, and indignant over the squandering of money at that court, where the income from the empire and the receipts from abroad were consumed, while as he jestingly said occasionally the czarina owed money to her baker and butcher. Furthermore, he knew that the army's organization was bad and its leadership worse; he called it a robust body without a head; up to the time he first faced the Russians in battle and even later he undoubtedly underestimated their strength.

His own weakness in a war with Russia, according to his opinion, was his inability to use an offensive movement. When Voltaire congratulated him in advance on victories in Russia, he wrote back that no laurels could be gained on the river Neva. As mentioned before, if there had been an open rupture in 1749, Frederick would have vacated eastern Prussia without firing a shot, because he did not believe that there could be a war with Russia without facing Austria at the same time, nor a war with Austria while Russia remained at home.

This was the basis of all his calculations. At the close of 1755 Frederick, to avoid a clash with Russia, consented in England's interest to a step prejudicial to France, which he had previously rejected; but in doing this he considered much more than merely his position toward Russia. While in itself the Russian power was by no means prominent, it really could decide peace or war on the continent at that time, because without Russia's assistance Austria could not think of attacking Prussia. According to Frederick's view, to avoid war with Russia meant to avoid war altogether.

He was not the only one who thus saw matters. Frequently Count Podewils was of different opinion and sounded a note of warning. This time, however, the old pessimist congratulated his master, who soon took him into his confidence concerning the negotiations begun in London. Podewils considered what had been done a master stroke if it succeeded in turning into an advantage a critical complication which otherwise would have yielded only wounds and injury. He expressed the belief that some means could be found to convince France of the necessity and harmlessness of the turn taken.

But Podewils still believed that the agreement of the two imperial courts against Prussia was simply of a defensive nature. To convince him

of the contrary the king communicated to him, through Eichel, the contents of two documents kept in his secret box. One of them, received two years before, was the protocol of a counselors' meeting which took place at Moscow on the 25th and 26th of May, 1753. It was signed by eighteen dignitaries, and the czarina fondly called it her political testament; it showed for Russian politics the principle that every possible effort must be made to push the king of Prussia's power back into the formerly narrow confines; preparations on a large scale should make it possible not only to assist King George by a diversion if Prussia should attack Hanover, but also, from Russia's own desire, to declare war against Prussia if it should become necessary in order to subdue the restless neighbor.

The second document showed that in October, immediately after signing the treaty with England, the Russian counselors passed a new resolution to the effect that the army should be mobilized immediately in case Prussia attacked one of Russia's allies, or one of these allies assailed Prussia.

In view of this resolution, which shortly after London had been informed of it came to Frederick's knowledge in the customary way through Dresden, and convinced him of his new policy's necessity and correctness, he wrote to his am-

bassador at Vienna, Klinggraeffen, that he was well aware of the close connection between the two imperial courts and of their plans, but that Providence had thwarted them.

A week later Frederick communicated to the same ambassador: "I can assure you that at present I can regard with the greatest equanimity anything my enemies may plan and that, provided the English system remains in its present shape, I shall have no fear about anything else."

When rumor predicted a Russian invasion of Germany for the following February, the king wrote to Klinggraeffen that the inventors of that report could not have thought of anything more unreasonable, because as the ambassador knew the Russian troops provided for in the agreement could be ordered out only by the king of England, and from all military preparations made by the Vienna court so far it was only too clear that Austria harbored evil intentions toward Russia and hoped for an opportunity of fishing in cloudy water. He added: "She may, however, be greatly mistaken and things may not turn out as she hopes."

Frederick began the new year full of confidence and hope for continued peace. The first days completed the negotiations. On the 16th of January, 1756, at Westminster, the neutrality

convention for Germany was signed, wholly on the basis indicated by Prussia, with an additional paragraph in favor of the Prussian merchant vessels.

Both monarchs vowed peace and friendship, in the midst of the warring going on in America which might perhaps involve Europe. Each promised not to invade the other's territory, either directly or indirectly; they obligated themselves to prevent their allies from undertaking anything against these territories; the concluding paragraph read: "If, contrary to all expectation and in violation of peace, which the high contracting parties mean to maintain in Germany through this agreement, a foreign power under any pretext sends troops into Germany, both high contracting parties will unite their fighting strength to resist the invasion by such foreign troops and the breach of peace, and to maintain quiet in Germany, in accordance with the object of this treaty."

At Podewils's suggestion the term "Roman Empire" used in the original British draft was replaced by "Germany," because King Frederick did not wish to be bound in any circumstances to defend the Austrian Netherlands or the district of Burgundy, pertaining to the Roman Empire; a secret paragraph expressly excepted this territory from the agreement.

The next and rather delicate task for both powers was to communicate the contents of the treaty to the allies of each,—on the one hand to France, and on the other to Russia. It remained to be seen whether the two suppositions on which the king of Prussia based his action were justified, whether Russia would adhere to England, and France to Russia, whether the czarina and her counselors were willing to forego the hatred they felt toward the Prussian king for the friendship and gold of England, and whether at Versailles the motives of the old ally would be sufficiently appreciated not to create a desire to make him suffer for his treaty with the enemy.

On the 12th of January, 1756, four days prior to the ratification of the Westminster convention, Duke de Nivernais arrived in Berlin.

CHAPTER V

ADMINISTRATION REFORMS AND PROTECTION OF NATIONAL LABOR

ON the threshold of his reign the successor of Frederick the Great was urgently advised by his friends to resume the government principles and administrative institutions of his grandfather, King Frederick William I. In one of the memorials devoted to the problems of Prussia's domestic politics, which had been written by his subsequent minister, Woellner, for the successor to the throne, the claim was asserted especially for the financial administration that "the machine of state would in its essentials have to be mounted again exactly as Frederick William I had instituted it, in which everything was simple, concise and adapted to the conditions of the country."

But if the simplest forms of administration were at the same time always the best, the art and science of administration would never have had need to develop. The experience of an-

other century had taught that everywhere the task of administrative politics had grown more elaborate and intricate, and the problem of bringing the claims and conditions of the great productive branches of industry, trade and agriculture in harmony with one another had become increasingly difficult. It was a problem the solution of which, as we shall presently see, had been one of the endeavors on the part of Frederick the Great.

He himself wished to accept the principles and system of his father as inviolable. However, did he fail to appreciate the conditions to which the conservative principle is subject at all times? It was only a proof of Frederick's greatness as a statesman that after twenty-five years he thought of the reorganization and strengthening of the administrative machine for the increasing needs of his state. Thus in the second half of his reign he undertook more extensive innovations than before, which as a matter of fact left the foundation untouched, but essentially changed the whole course and organization of the administration.

The most decisive administrative reorganization was brought about in connection with the reform of taxation.

The king had set himself a high ideal. Social, administrative and fiscal reforms had to be

carried out simultaneously. By simplifying the administration, by a more synoptical arrangement of levy, a better financial result was to be produced, and at the same time the opportunity created to relieve poverty and to impose a greater contribution upon the wealthy.

Frederick had occupied himself with these thoughts for a long time. Already, in 1743, he had pointed out to the general directorate what he disliked in the existing system of indirect taxation,—"too much detail in the excise," which burdened commerce inordinately; the arbitrary computation of the taxes, and the chicanery in which the excise officials indulged.

The king in those days specified a well fixed purpose: levy should be taken on each article only once and in one place only, and the tariff should be fixed so that the merchant would be able to ascertain the amount of the tax beforehand. The manner in which this could be accomplished was left to a discussion in the general directorate.

Again, in 1748, the ruler had told Minister Boden: "According to my principle it should always be considered in what manner the poor, the small artisan, and the manufacturer can be taxed upon those commodities which are absolutely necessary for their sustenance, and therefore beer, bread and meat, which the poor are

living upon, have in fairness to be taxed very lightly."

The general directorate did not fail to refer to this order as soon as shortages were noticeable in the excise department. With these suggestions pressed on its attention, the authority could not make any headway. During the war no less than four of the five department chiefs died: Happe, Katte, Adam Ludwig von Blumenthal and Boden. The sole survivor and successor of Viereck, who had resigned previous to the war, Frederick William von Borcke, whose services in the administration of the electoral Saxonian contribution had been found wanting, handed in his resignation in 1764. Frederick had frequently complained that it was a difficult matter to find suitable men for the post of ministers; what he expected was, as he explained on one occasion to one of them, the combination of noble birth with expert knowledge, and a devotion to the duties based upon liking and inclination.

Presently he replaced the old stock by two chancellors of the exchequer,—Valentin von Massow from Minden and Christian von Blumenthal, who had done excellent service in Magdeburg. The young, eminently gifted and extraordinarily industrious privy councilor of finance was Ludwig Philip von Hagen.

When the new ministers had assembled in Potsdam, in the third year of peace, for the annual debate upon the budget, the king discussed the necessity for raising the state revenue. Massow, who had charge of the treasury administration, declared that the country was too exhausted in consequence of the war to bear the additional burden. As chancellor of the exchequer twenty years before Massow had incurred severe blame, hence his appointment to the orphaned general directorate may have been a makeshift rather than that a great statesman and arithmetician were seen in him; but at all events, after his death in 1775, the king fully recognized his "skill" and "patriotism."

The king had made preparations after the ministerial debate to carry his tax reform through without his new ministers. Evidently he had once more strengthened himself in the opinion to which he had been already led by previous perceptions: that his "big wigs," as he liked to call his ministers, were merely trained administration artists who were plodding along in the old rut, but men of no great foresight and creative ideas, not even of adaptability. Of Boden, whom he had formerly held in such high esteem, he said during the war that this man of commerce, of high finance and exchange, did not possess the slightest notion or knowledge. This

did not deny, however, that the performances of a few of these ministers in their own sphere were greatly esteemed and warmly appreciated.

When Hagen after an official activity of seven years died in 1771, the king in a decree to the general electorate called him "a minister the like of whom His Royal Majesty may well wish to have many of, but of whom he has unfortunately only a few." Frederick ordered that a picture of the deceased which had been donated by him should be solemnly exhibited in the audience chamber, which had hitherto contained only the likeness of King Frederick William I, "in full assembly and with open doors to the perpetual memory of this honest servant of the state."

Now, three months previous to the conference of ministers, the French physician Helvetius had arrived in Potsdam for a visit of several weeks, warmly recommended by D'Alembert. He was already known to the king as an author and, in spite of reservations on principle, made welcome as a man of the world, of intellect and fine taste, and as one who suffered persecution. The physician was also an experienced financier, who had acquired his wealth as a partner in one of the large French excise leaseholds, and Frederick had been eager for some time to learn something definite about this French system of

which Krockow and Quintus had told him several things. After Helvetius's departure the ruler resolved to make a trial of it and requested him through D'Argens, who later denied all participation, to send him experts from France, consisting of a foreman and five assistants, in order to be able to prepare everything necessary for the next fiscal year.

Thus, in the beginning of 1766, there appeared at the Prussian court the man who during the following two decades eclipsed all the native financiers. He was de la Haye de Launay, welcomed by Frederick as the Jupiter who was going to disentangle a chaos.

Originally the king's intention was simply to introduce the general leasehold system, after the French model for the levy of duty and excise. He negotiated through de Launay with a syndicate of Parisian capitalists. De Launay's indorsers, however, were unable or disinclined to deposit the 300,000 dollars (German) which were asked as an advance on the cost of installation, or perhaps as a security bond.

It was easily explainable why the king objected to have an "areopagus of beggars" from Paris interfere with his affairs. He proposed to Launay, as the only one in whom he had confidence, to intrust him and four assistants with the administration for a fixed salary and a share

in the net profits. On the 14th of July, 1766, an agreement was made upon this basis to continue until May 31, 1772. The administration took charge of the indirect taxes under the supervision, but not under the management of one of the ministers, with salaries aggregating 60,000 marks and five per cent. commission on what would accrue over the revenue of the fiscal year 1765-66.

Previous to this reorganization of the administration the king had discussed the principles of the desirable tariff reform with his new confidential man.

In a personally written decree which Frederick issued on March 15, 1766, on De Launay's proposals, the social-political tendency of the reform scheme was taken first into consideration. The most indispensable foodstuffs were to be exempt from excise duty, or at least to be under a very light taxation only, while all articles of luxury were to be heavily assessed. Bread was not to be taxed at all. De Launay intended, in order to make up for the deficit, to impose a heavier tax than before upon meat and beer, but the king would not permit it, as the taxation was too oppressive to the people. He was willing to allow a slight increase on meat and domestic beer, but showed no consideration for foreign beers, wines, French liqueurs, pepper,

cinnamon, spices,—in a word, "all that belongs to luxury." "Then," said he, "the poor would not be the paying part, nor the artisan, nor the soldier, for it is they whose advocate I declare myself, and whose cause I have to lead." It should be remembered that the soldier in those days had to buy his own bread in times of peace; consequently the repeal of the corn tax meant a great relief.

The same point was developed four weeks later in the "Declaration Patent" of April 14, 1766, which substantiated the necessity of the reform and organized a commission to work out a new tariff. The corn tax, however, had been totally abolished in accordance with the principles agreed upon between the king and De Launay, with the exception of a slight inspection toll of two pfennigs per bushel which was introduced for the prevention of smuggling.

On the other hand, the excise duty on brandy was increased to cover the deficit, and it bore heavily also on wines; the duty on beer was raised one pfennig per quart and that on meat one pfennig per pound, an increase which did not apply to pork as the food of the poor. One purpose of the reform was announced as that of establishing the state revenues upon a fixed and continuous basis, without striving for an excessive increase in the taxation. Hence there was

no concealing the fact that an increase was virtually intended. But, coincident with the higher taxes, there was to be a more equitable distribution of the burden. The king publicly declared that since the war he had continually striven to help his subjects and to afford them relief by "putting the burden upon a fair proportionate basis, so that they could be borne by equally strong shoulders and according to the capacity of the contributor."

It was the fundamental idea of the laws of 1743 and 1748, and that which Frederick in 1768 pronounced in his new *Political Testament:* "Fairness and humaneness must always figure in the administration of the exchequer; humaneness must be in the chair and prescribe the manner of taxes; fairness demands that nobody pays taxes to the state which are beyond his capacity, and that they remain in proportion. He who has only a hundred dollars to live on is not to pay more than two dollars, whereas he who has an income of a thousand dollars is able to pay a hundred dollars without any inconvenience. The taxes must neither apply to the laborer, nor to the soldier, nor to the poor, but only to the wealthy and rich."

No one could deny, regarding the foundation of direct taxation in Prussia of those days, that the message promulgated was only a beautiful

dream. The ability and the achievement remained far behind the wish and the intention. The attempt at a material reform of the excise administration failed. The needs of the state revenue spoke too peremptorily. The immediate commission for the working out of new tariffs, which had been appointed in the summer of 1768, and which was composed of representatives of the old officialdom, introduced into the discussion of the new régime, with a clear-headed conception and great expert knowledge, a series of proposals to which the French always opposed the fear that through them the finances of the state would suffer.

In technical matters concerning excise affairs, the king relied upon De Launay, and consequently the victory was his. While on December 21, 1768, it was decreed that the excise taxes hitherto levied on all foreign goods should remain in force, the fate of the social-political programme, without its author being able to measure this after effect, had been essentially decided; for only through an increase of those taxes could the intended rise in the taxation of the wealthy be brought about. Now one had to abide by that provisional tariff of the interior excise duty which particularly affected the poor people. Inasmuch as the Declaration Patent of 1766 contained positive provisions which were

certainly meant to be a transitory right only, it remained a permanent order, but in so far as it contained a general principle, it remained unexecuted. It was not in any way different from that with which the commission reproached the administration; compared with the former taxation, the excise duty on beer remained at a double increase, and the brandy excise at one-half.

The king could not deny that the food of the poor man was taxed too high. It almost seemed that the rôles had been exchanged since the discussion with De Launay in 1766, when six years later one of the chancellors of the exchequer spoke strongly in favor of the abolition of the tax increase on beer, brandy and meat, whereas the king rejected the "erroneous and highly dangerous financial principle whereby the state revenues, which can only find their security and certainty in the paramount necessities of man, are practically exposed to arbitrariness and caprice."

Hence beyond question the excise tariff with which the administration was working brought about an increase of the burden that was most bitterly felt. The abolition of the corn tax was not considered, and one only noticed the increase which resulted from the tax on meat and beverages. Consequently the social-political inten-

tion of the reform remained substantially unfulfilled and at any rate quite without appreciation and thanks.

Frederick himself regarded the restriction of smugglery as the greatest advantage gained by the excise reform. A patrol of the borders had hitherto been wanting in the empire of the *roi des lisières,* everything had to be performed by the inspection at the city gates. Now frontier bureaus and a partly mounted frontier guard were established as the so-called brigades. Certificates of origin and waybills had to be shown and lead seals put on for goods in transit, being technical measures of protection which the French officials brought with them as natural adjuncts from their native country. Certainly much was necessary to prevent smuggling wholly; the beginnings of 1766 remained far behind a real frontier system such as was created in 1818.

A more recent investigator is inclined to trace "nearly all harshnesses and effects of Frederick's duty and trade policy which are going beyond the mark to the still considerable deficiencies of the excise constitution." Compared, however, with the conditions of those days in England, the Prussian must appear favorably, for one assumed that previous to the financial reforms carried through after 1784 by the

younger Pitt, half of the English people were engaged in smuggling, and that annually five and a half million pounds of tea paid duty, while seven and a half were smuggled into the country.

The greatest administrative progress lay in the fact that the whole system of indirect taxes was organized into one, only the Rhenish-Westphalian provinces having exceptional treatment as they redeemed themselves from all excise duty by a "subscription." Developed one after another in the course of time, the various duties were administered in one and the same place by different officials—the ancient interest and duty, the licenses, that is, harbor tolls dating from the time of the Thirty Years' War, the excise duty introduced since the reign of the Great Elector, and as a tax of a more recent date the transit duty.

Again the excise administration branched out at the central depot into the four provincial departments of the general directorate. Presently provincial directors with a staff of assistant and minor officials were appointed for the exclusive and uniform administration of indirect taxes, so that the war and the domanial offices were relieved of all these matters by the new authority; nor did the general directorate, the chiefs of the four old departments, have anything more to do with the indirect taxes. In that domain they

had to make room for the duty and excise department, with its French administrators under a German minister,—that is, to a new department embracing all provinces, such as had been established in 1740 for commerce and manufacture, and in 1746 for the administration of the army. The course adopted in those days was now carried further. Not concerned with the actual administration affairs, the directing minister of the excise department arranged all matters between the tasks of the former and the course of the general state administration, and gave the king his expert opinion previous to all fundamental decisions.

The future belonged to the basic idea from which the whole domain of indirect taxation received its own organization and its uniform management. The division of labor within the body of the administration had become more and more a principle and a necessity. And yet great evils resulted from the practice of the new order created in 1766. The undeniable technical-administrative progress which lay in the uniform organization of the entire indirect taxation faced the disadvantage that, through the new institution, the financial administration of the state as a whole lost its cohesion more than ever.

As was the case before with a whole province,

—extensive Silesia,—now an entire branch of the administration was taken away from the ministry of finance proper. For not only with the administration and collection of indirect taxes, that is, about the third part of the total state revenue, but also with their accounts, the general directorate had nothing more to do. The surplus of the excise administration which remained after carrying the total sum forward to the general war treasury was not incorporated in the state revenue, but was transferred to the royal disposition fund, and in such a way that the general directorate did not even learn the amount.

Furthermore, frictions and quarrels began anew between the various resorts, recalling the period immediately before the foundation of the general directorate. The organic uniformity of the internal administration and the safe working of the apparatus were lost again. The whole was held together only by the rule of the cabinet; the direct decisions of the king were stern enough, though the cohesion was only in appearance and lacked strength. Frederick charged his ministerial collegiates with intriguing "to set his good administration institutions at naught and overthrow them."

The jealousy among the various courts was aggravated by the national contrast. The en-

trance of the French into the excise administration had not met the success which the excited public opinion expected. Of the 2,000 posts concerned, only about 175-200 were filled with Frenchmen. All the same, this administration, which was under French management and worked according to French laws, remained equally disliked by the native officials and the populace as a foreign rule. The English ambassador Mitchell was credited with the remark: "The French have been beaten by the Prussians at Rossbach, and for this now the Prussians are beaten by the French in all the towns and every day."

The time of predilection for French ways and education, and for French visits, had passed. Rossbach and the appearance of Lessing had contributed to this change. Even a D'Alembert, who was received with the warmest courtesy in Berlin society, could not avoid seeing that the general sentiment was against his countrymen; he regarded the compliment made to him by one who said he had never made the acquaintance of a Frenchman like him as equally flattering to himself as doubtful to his nation.

The shortcomings attached to the new institution could not long escape the attention of the king. As a matter of fact, he preserved his confidence in the general administrator, and pro-

tected him and the department against all accusations; but in his last years he did not reject the criticisms so offhandedly as in the past, nor could De Launay now do as he liked. Above all, he began to complain of the unreliability of the French, and demanded from De Launay that vacant posts, like that of the Stettin excise director who was dismissed in 1781 on account of fraudulent machinations, should be filled again by Germans. The repeated complaints of two years finally led to the following generalized practical application, in a letter to De Launay of February 28, 1783: "Such is the majority of Frenchmen; driven from home they settle in our country, obtain the first posts in the administration, plunder the provinces, and when they have enough money in their pockets, they return to France. So I do not wish you any more to appoint Frenchmen for such positions."

It also annoyed the king that in spite of all attempts at economy the overhead expenses of the administration continued very high. They consumed in the long run more than one-tenth of the gross revenue, whereas under the old excise administration they had not claimed even the fifteenth part. It is true, however, that in those days the arrangements for guarding the frontiers were imperfect and therefore less expensive. The total financial result was fluctu-

ating. The part payment due to the general war treasure, the so-called fixation, amounted in the beginning, in proportion to the revenues of the old administration in the fiscal years 1765-66, to 4,662,210 dollars. This was reduced in 1772, at the expiration of the first agreement, to 4,395,095 dollars, in connection with other alterations, by which the surplus credited to the royal disposition fund was increased in equal proportion.

The gross revenue had risen from 5,585,000 dollars in the first year of the new administration to 7,814,634 dollars in the fiscal year of 1785-86, after a new province had in the meantime fallen to the state. If we leave its revenue out of consideration, the surplus which had been gained in these twenty years against the net receipts of 1765-66 may be estimated at a total of twenty-three and a half millions. The opponents of the administration had already pointed with justification to the fact that without the French management the excise revenue would have increased in proportion to the rising wealth.

While with the introduction of the monopoly the fiscal point of view was only of secondary importance, it was the decisive one in several other administration reforms.

An innovation quite after the model of the

monopoly was introduced in the postal system in 1766. A general superintendent assumed charge of the administration of all the post offices, adding a fixed amount to the aggregate of the hitherto postal revenue, and delivered the surplus to the royal disposition fund after deducting a bonus for the officials. Here also a Frenchman, Jacques Marie Bernard, set and kept this innovation in working order until 1769, when he was replaced by a German postmaster general after he had escaped a criminal prosecution by fleeing from the country.

For the execution of the state tobacco monopoly, introduced in 1765, the general tobacco administration was instituted in the spring of 1767, an attempt to lease the monopoly having failed. The financial result was really favorable; until the conclusion of the reign, the annual net profits increased to 1,624,711 dollars, despite a grave crisis in the beginning of the eighties. The king was constantly endeavoring to increase the revenues by improving the raw material produced in the country.

During the American war of independence, when the import from Virginia stopped, the domestic tobacco industry considerably expanded. This naturally soon resulted in an overproduction. The king would have given a good deal if he could have succeeded in replacing the Vir-

ginia leaf with an acceptable substitute. That he had such an idea was proved by his inquiry of the chemist Archard: "If it would be possible to invent a fluid which is in no way deleterious yet able to improve the native country tobacco leaf in such a manner as to come up in quality to the Virginia leaf, if not *in totum,* but at least *in tantum.*"

The result of the experiments was a great disappointment to him. According to a report of the general tobacco administration July 27, 1782, of 1,180 samples submitted only 34 showed any improvement over the ordinary country tobacco, and these "despite their good appearance did not seem to be suitable to be mixed with the goods made from Virginia leaf without impairing the sales, as they had partly the bad country leaf aroma, and partly one of their own which was not at all that of the Virginian."

The state coffee monopoly was created in 1791 as a parallel institution with the tobacco administration. In this case the new monopoly frankly proposed to combat an article of luxury, the use of which had spread only for a generation, a "delicacy highly dangerous to the advantage of the state, so that not all the bricklayers, maids and like persons who live on the work of their hands should drink coffee."

It was not enough that the sum of 700,000

dollars was annually leaving the country, but the domestic breweries were "ruined abominably" through this modern beverage. "His Majesty himself has been brought up on beer soup, so other people can just as well be brought up on beer soup, which is much healthier than coffee." Thus the king answered the protest of the Pomeranian merchants against the fiscal imposition upon the brown beverage.

The establishment of state coffee storehouses and roasting factories, and the order that none should operate them without a special permit, which was only within reach of the higher classes, was answered by the poor man buying raw beans and roasting them himself. Finally the fixing of the prohibitive price of one dollar per pound was the weapon with which the fight was waged against both the consumer and the contraband shipper. They thought that perhaps coffee would soon be ousted in this way from the household of the small man and of the middle class, only to be replaced by an abominable brew. But the state revenue would not have been satisfied with such a measure. Already De Launay and his men were complaining about the deficit in their revenues from this branch of taxation. Twice they carried through a reduction of the tax until the pound cost only one-third of a dollar. Soon the revenue increased, but the

general hatred of the whole institution and its "spotters," who were sniffing in all the kitchens and pots, was unabated, and nothing placed the administration of the king in so great disfavor as this "coffee smelling."

Frederick had been contemplating the establishment of a state lottery before the Seven Years' War, in order to cause the profit which by the ventures of Prussian subjects went into outside lotteries to flow into his own treasury. Immediately after the war the plan began to assume shape.

The proposition of the Livonian Calzabigi was based on the model of the lottery scheme which was in vogue in Italy and the Austrian countries (subsequently combined with the class lottery after the Dutch system still in existence), and was managed in the beginning by the state's own administration. It was afterward leased to Calzabigi and Company, and after their resignation to the budget ministers, Counts Reuss and Eickstedt. This enterprise yielded a leasehold rent of 75,000 dollars to the state, at the end of the reign, against an initial amount of only 25,000 dollars.

With the institution of a special authority for the duty and excise administration, and with the separation of the tobacco administration and the coffee monopoly from the general financial ad-

ministration, the number of organized alterations of the period of 1763 was not exhausted.

The four provincial departments were reduced to three when the king assigned to the sphere of his highly esteemed minister Hagen the third department, comprising the West German territories of Cleves, March, Geldern, Moers and East Friesland, as well as the fourth department with Halberstadt, Minden, Ravensberg, Tecklenburg and Lingen. In 1771 the duchy of Magdeburg, heretofore combined with the electoral March, was attached to this department, which now united all the provinces on the left bank of the Elbe except the Altmark.

After Hagen's untimely death he was succeeded by a former army officer, Baron von der Schulenburg-Kehnert, who though respected for a long time caused serious provocation in 1806 by his attachment to the foreign conquerors. Meanwhile, in 1769, the old number of four had been restored: the first department was organized in such a manner that the minister Blumenthal kept only Pomerania and the Neumark, while the financial districts of Königsberg and Gumbinnen were taken over by Massow, who in turn gave his previous department of the electoral March to Frederick William von Derschau.

In the distribution of provinces nothing was

altered during the lifetime of Frederick. After Massow's death the Prussian-Lithuanian department was given to the Magdeburg chancellor of the exchequer, Von Gaudi, again a former officer, while the electoral March, in connection with the Salian administration and the office of postmaster general, passed after Derschau's death, in 1770, to Frederick Gottlieb Michaelis, who had accomplished numerous special tasks to the king's great satisfaction, as war councilor in Breslau, afterward as director of the electoral March, and finally as privy councilor of finance. Michaelis was the only bourgeois minister of Frederick the Great. He died after two years, and the king appointed a high sheriff from the Magdeburg district to whom he had taken a liking on his inspection tours, Minister von Werder, afterward strongly antagonized as the friend of Wöllner. In the two other provincial departments, the ministers Blumenthal and Schulenburg, appointed in 1763 and 1771 respectively, survived the king.

New departments besides those for excise and duty were formed in 1768 for mining and smelting, at first under Hagen, afterward under Waitz von Eschen, and finally under Baron von Heinitz. In 1770 the department for forestry was instituted under the above named Baron von der Schulenburg-Kehnert. Like that of the

excise, the new mining administration embraced the whole monarchy, Silesia included. Heinitz advocated the same extension for the oldest of the departments,—that for manufacture and commerce; here, however, as in the Salian administration, the king maintained the separation between the old and the new divisions.

This oldest of the real departments, always officially described as the fifth of the general directorate, parted at the close of 1767 more than before from the sphere of the collective authority, by the king's decisions that the affairs of manufacturers were no longer to come before the assembly at all.

For certain cases the connection with the entire collegiate was restored; for others it was upheld continually. Managed for years under the personal dominance of the king by a "directing" privy councilor of finance, the Swiss Faesch, this fifth department was once more intrusted to a minister, the same Baron von der Horst who was presiding in the excise department. Attached to him with an authority reaching beyond that of a privy councilor was the already named Faesch and, as *commissaire général de commerce,* Baron von Knyphausen, whom the experience gathered as ambassador in Paris and London stood in good stead for this task. The two resigned when Horst's successor, equally insig-

nificant and as unreliable as presumptuous, the son of the old minister Görne, treated his assistants with intolerable harshness. This Görne had a merited ending,—he was dismissed, and sentenced to a term in a fortress, for embezzlement of public funds. Nor did his collaborators merit any gratitude. The king declined to appoint a new privy councilor in 1776, with the ungracious reply: "I have not yet seen that any of the councilors of the fifth department performed anything particular."

The personal union between the fourth and the fifth, the excise and the manufacture department, which had been brought about for internal reasons, created under Horst and upheld under his successors, Görne, Bismarck and Heinitz, lost in significance through the fact that in the excise administration the minister, as we have already seen, had no real influence upon the affairs of the monopoly, but was essentially concerned only with the preparation of statistical information, traffic tables and preparing the commercial balance sheet. However, Horst managed to hold his own against the domineering and experienced director De Launay. He enjoyed the personal favor of the monarch, and knew how to hold it by a shrewd mingling of pliancy and candor. He was fond of relating that the king once said of him: "Horst is a very pe-

culiar man; always after I have reprimanded him, he asks for an audience."

After he resigned in 1774 and retired upon his Westphalian estate, Horst remained in the king's good graces and was repeatedly seen in Potsdam as a dinner guest. In contrast with the fiscal points of view of De Launay, who often disliked the exclusion of foreign manufactures from the domestic market through fear of deficits in the excise, Horst's department favored a stanch adherence to a protective tariff in favor of home industry. Between the two the ruler was meditating, as we are told, "always more in the sense of trade protection than that of finance."

When, in the beginning of the eighties, Heinitz twice managed the fourth and fifth departments as deputy for a short time, he tried to bring the mercantile-political point of view to the front against De Launay. However this man's position had consolidated itself in the meantime so strongly that the king, at the *minister review* in June, 1783, did not confer about the affairs of the excise department with Heinitz at all, his intention being as Heinitz thought not to hurt the feelings of the royal director. In consequence of this, on the following day the minister took the liberty of saying in a written statement: "The present task of

the minister of the fourth department practically consists only in laying before Your Majesty the annual extracts and financial reports."

The manner in which Frederick solved the problem of industrial protection was explained at great length by him to his French chief when De Launay again cautioned against prohibitive overzeal in the interest of his excise revenue: "I am going to prohibit as much as I can, as this is the only means to induce my subjects to manufacture all those things which they cannot get elsewhere. . . . If I should permit my subjects to introduce foreign manufactures, which may certainly be very much to their liking, what would become of them in a short time, since luxury has got the upper hand in all countries, and nowadays the lowest servant maid wants to wear silk? They soon would have spent all the ready money they are taking in for wool, linen and wood, our only articles for export."

However, this maxim taken from mercantile school wisdom, that one should not let money go out of the country, was not the king's sole guide. It had not escaped his notice that labor is a blessing, with a fructifying power beyond estimate. "By working," he declared, "one learns how to make money, keep money, and to make oneself useful to the community." The

value of labor was to replace the lack of natural wealth, which the monarch described to his director in the most vivid colors. It was a country without gold or silver mines, with sandy soil and poor pastures, with stunted, lean cattle, and a scanty growth of sour country wine. "My people must work and they would become lazy if industry would not command a safe market. . . . We both must endeavor to teach my subjects the double art to save money and to make money." He spoke of the "apprenticeship" of his subjects, during which it was important to come to their assistance. He admitted that the production so far was small, but "time, habit and one's own interest to improve upon everything" would soon help on. He stood upon the basic fact that a single manufacturer could keep 1,200 people in food, while tradesmen could serve only a sixth as many.

In this sense De Launay tersely declared after the king's death: "Frederick the Great has protected the industries, as it gave an occupation to his people."

We have learned of the most important branches of Prussian industry in those days. All had suffered under the stress of war, and the problem was not only to reëstablish, but to expand and increase them. The excise reform of 1766, consummated from different points of

view, was with its stricter guardianship of the frontiers also to serve for the protection of the home industries.

No statistics of the number of factories had been prepared, and efforts were now constantly made to fill in the gaps. The remarkable foresight of the monarch embraced the greatest as well as the minutest matters. A paper factory was to be built, and it was questionable whether the required stock of rags could be obtained. Frederick declared: "In this country exists the bad habit with servant maids in the towns as well as in the country to burn the best rags for tinder to make fire; one has to endeavor to get them out of this habit, and all those who are collecting rags must provide themselves with sponges which they can give to the maids in exchange for rags and with which they are able to start a fire just as well as with the tinder."

The founding of a new factory of cotton materials and East Indian kerchiefs was proposed to the ruler, who replied that there would soon be too many cotton factories, to the harm of the domestic products, and then he bluntly asked: "Why are East Indian kerchiefs necessary? The people have done so long now with linen handkerchiefs, which is certainly for the best of our linen manufacturers." He observed that little pictures of saints were in great demand

among the Catholic people; so he ordered their manufacture as cheaply as possible, warning that inquiries should first be made, "which saints the people preferred, and those had to be made in plenty."

Wherever private capital for building and running of new factories was not sufficient, the state helped with premiums or direct financial advances, which have been compared with the securities against a possible loss of interest that were granted at a later period by the state for the building of the first railways. "One knows once and for all," the king declared in the summer of 1779 to Minister Michaelis, "that whenever in my states something done exceeds the strength of my subjects, it is my business to bear the expense and they have nothing else to do than to gather in the fruit." It was of this time that Frederick Nicolai remarked retrospectively: "Every promoter of useful factories was certain of the most substantial assistance."

The metropolis continued to be the center of all industrial enterprises. Elsewhere the king granted only subsidies for the building of factories; in Berlin and Potsdam he had them constructed by the building department of the royal household, at the state's expense, and then donated them to the manufacturers. No less than nine million dollars were spent for this purpose

in Berlin from 1763 till 1786, although the cost in the individual case was not to exceed six or seven thousand dollars, for the king declared "it is not my intention to build palaces, so to say, for the manufacturing promoters." The number of Berlin tradespeople before the war amounted to 18,709; in 1765, after the debts caused by the struggle had been partly wiped out, this was reduced to 18,411; but the number of self-contained factories had diminished from 10,062 to 8,866, while that of dependent laborers had increased from 8,647 to 9,545. At the close of the century nearly every fourth Berliner was some kind of tradesman, whereas in 1729 there was only one among nine or ten inhabitants. Thus Berlin had shed its character of an agricultural city. It was estimated in 1786 that, of the value of the entire production of merchandise in the monarchy, nearly one-third belonged to the metropolis.

However much the Seven Years' War had paralyzed all industries, it originated one employment which subsequently flourished immensely.

The porcelain factory of Wegely, built in 1751, again suspended its production pending the peace negotiations. During the occupation of Saxony an opportunity offered itself to secure the secret of the process from the Meissners.

The indomitable Gotzkowsky established his factory in Berlin at the end of the Leipzigerstrasse and in the winter of 1762 was able to show a few samples at the royal headquarters.

Soon after the conclusion of peace the king bought the new factory from the founder in consequence of the latter's bankruptcy for 225,000 dollars, and now gave his close personal attention to it. Whenever he came into the capital from Potsdam he visited his beloved factory. In the spring of 1764 it gave occupation to 507 workmen and filled orders from Holland and Russia. The king, in his delight over the success, believed its products would secure preference over the genuine Meissner porcelain. Foreigners, however, criticised the bluish tone of the Berlin ware. The increase in sales served to exclude foreign products, the king made copious use of the articles for presents, and the Jews were obliged to buy Berlin porcelain to a fixed extent when marrying.

In the most important of the older industries, the manufacturing of cloth, in which the country towns, those of the Neumark in the front rank, vied with the capital, there were complaints of stagnating business during the first year of the war, and of the necessity of reducing wages and dismissing workmen. Independent factories to the number of 3,688 were running in

Berlin against 5,251 in 1755; the number of dependent workmen had increased from 2,964 to 3,448.

The reawakening of this industry in peace times can be traced in the Berlin trades statistics of 1786; they record 7,683 master concerns, with 6,014 dependent workmen. In the Neumark 31,000 wool workers were busy in 1779, but in Pomerania only 800. In the Magdeburg country the state of the woolen factories was considered satisfactory as early as 1769, and in the following year a hundred German and Polish cloth makers' families were settled in this province. In Silesia the number of masters had decreased from 3,519 to 3,090 during the war; in many places hardly half the number of cloth manufacturers of 1756 were in existence, as the king learned on his inspection tour in 1763. He made it the urgent duty of the authorities to secure manufacturers from Saxony and workmen from Austria and Poland, and Schlabrendorff, as the head of the province, was not slack in his zeal.

The manufacture of woolen materials was indebted above all to the king for its prosperity in this country whose inhabitants had long clothed themselves with material made of Silesian wool at Aix-la-Chapelle, or at Leyden. At his instigation spinning schools were estab-

lished, and the man servants of the country districts were not allowed to marry before they were able to spin; moreover, his experience in Pomerania taught him that this compulsion would not be needed long.

The export prohibit on wool and its through transit, which was now also extended to Silesia, did not fail to have an effect upon the Austrian and Saxon factories. The cloth regulation of 1765 for Silesia and Glatz combined the substance of the old guild articles with technical instructions and prescriptions for the manufacturers. The modern style of production began in this province through the erection of larger factories modeled on those of Berlin and Potsdam. Previously the Silesian merchant, as Schlabrendorff scolded, had done nothing in the manufacturing of cloth, "but only cunningly calculated how one could squeeze the cloth out of the poor maker and hardly leave him enough to buy bread with."

Thanks to the endeavors of the king and of the minister the Silesian cloth export increased, from 1763 to 1769, from 49,143 to 67,290 pieces. After another eight years Frederick estimated the value of the export from Silesia at 1,200,000 dollars, and Heinitz calculated it in 1783 as 1,234,000 dollars. The value of the linen export, probably that of the entire state, by the

king's calculations in 1777 was five millions, which was too high. For Silesia alone Heinitz in 1783 made the figures only 3,418,000 dollars, while the official records from year to year showed a round four millions, and for 1785 four millions and a half.

That the king still regarded the Silesian linen as his "Peru" was proved by his remark that he would not tolerate any mining enterprises in the districts of the linen industry, not even for gold, lest the bleacheries would be deprived of the necessary wood. With a view to filling the gaps in the number of weavers made by the war, a recruiting campaign no less vigorous than for the army was started abroad, and each weaver-immigrant received a loom as present.

Unfortunately the lot of these Silesian linen weavers,—a guild which was much oppressed in all the German districts and scorned in the folk songs as a poverty stricken community,—remained a lamentable one and it would be hard to decide whether their state of serfdom on the manorial estates, in which the majority often found themselves, was of more harmful influence than the working conditions in which amalgamation was unknown, and which made a manufacturer of the individual weaver without capital or intelligence, and permitted the dealer to gather all the profits.

With the greatest earnestness the king expressed the wish in Silesia that the manorial lords and the Catholic chapters should erect factories. Several noblemen set a good example, but unfortunately they had little emulation and the unimportant industrial enterprises of several monasteries soon proved to be failures which were allowed to drag along from year to year only to oblige the king.

The favorite of the state's care and support was the young silk and velvet industry. It has been calculated that Frederick spent two million dollars in round figures for it during his reign,—four times the amount of the total support which was given the rest of the new factories in the electoral March. The war had not caused a complete stagnation, but only a temporary restriction of the output. In the first year of peace several new enterprises were started, among them the first two factories which replaced home industry with the full manufacturing process,—the taffeta factories at Frankfort-on-the-Oder and at Köpenick. Berlin counted 500 looms in 1766 instead of the 400 ten years before.

However, as the product did not increase in equal ratio, this year brought a grave crisis in which only state intervention could be of any real benefit. It took the form of the support of

the unemployed workmen out of the public fund, and a series of measures for the revival of business; a considerable increase in the bonuses hitherto granted, an extra premium of ten per cent. on large sales, which enabled the manufacturers to give the buyers a proportionate rebate, thus facilitating the clearing out of the accumulated stocks; and finally, the establishment of a silk storehouse.

The latter succeeded only after overcoming great difficulties; it was endowed with more adequate means with the increase of the turnover, made it easier for the manufacturer to obtain the needed raw material, and prevented price fluctuations. This improvement was followed by a lasting prosperity, if we leave out of consideration a temporary reaction in 1775. With the increase of the turnover the bonuses could gradually be reduced again. In 1785, 2,935 looms in Berlin and Potsdam earned a gross profit of two million dollars and about a third of the goods were sold abroad. More than one-seventh of the raw material was produced in the home country. This amounted in 1784 to 13,500 pounds, valued at 54,000 dollars; only suitable, however, for the manufacture of coarser tissues.

But in this training school of the silk industry, a farsighted, intelligent productive class of promoters, an industrious, skillful and ambitious

contingent of workmen was produced. This Berlin industry was prepared in the next decade, when the famous old Lyon business was suspended under the Jacobinical reign of terror, to serve the world's markets temporarily. The competition of the Saxon silk manufacturers was restricted and that of the Hamburg factories was stopped altogether.

The Berlin manufacturers were granted protection against the rivalry of the older native silk industry. Soon after the introduction of the monopoly, in 1768, the import of goods from the territories west of the Weser was prohibited in the central and eastern provinces of the monarchy. The cause for this was the impossibility of preventing in any other way the smuggling of French and Dutch silks, which passed for the Crefeld product. Moreover, this prohibition followed as the logical sequence of an economic system which regarded the geographically connected central provinces as a homogeneous customs district, to be treated under a uniform system, but on the other hand the detached foreland formed the outlying customs district.

The Crefeld silk industry was not declining, but was much surpassed by the rushing progress of that of the metropolis. The value of the Berlin production toward the end of Frederick's

reign was three times greater. Crefeld was essentially confined to foreign markets, especially to Holland, and through Holland to America, and in order not to give the neighbor cause to retaliate, the protective duty in this economic detached section of the western provinces was maintained upon a moderate scale as a matter of principle.

On the other hand, East Prussia, which had not yet developed an independent industry, was to consider itself as the market for the central provinces. When the Königsberg dealers refused to buy cloths and woolens from the manufacturers in the country, the king called it an "unkind" act and restricted more and more the buying of foreign products. He said of the East Prussians: "In city affairs, in manufacturing and industry, they are still like unpolished bears compared with well-ordered provinces."

The cloth factories in Wormditt and several other towns could make only the coarser goods; according to Mirabeau, the weaving of linen, which was a home industry, enabled the people to wear shirts, while in nearby Poland seventy-five per cent. of the population went shirtless. An example was set to this province by the high president Domhardt who erected a paper mill upon his estates after the Dutch model, also iron works. The king directed his

attention in 1781 to the necessity of increasing the brick kilns and building sailcloth factories, in the interest of the shipbuilding industry.

The latter was still insignificant in this province. In Königsberg, Memel and Pillau, about twenty ships were launched annually toward the close of the reign. The center of this industry was Stettin. Foreign shipbuilders began to build larger seagoing vessels here at the beginning of the fifties, after the rules of Dutch art. When the war was over the industry was resumed. In 1765, twenty-one ships were on the slips, among them some large ones for the East India trade, to be delivered to Holland and France. The yard of the shipbuilder Quantin, on the "Lastadie," soon received numerous orders for foreign accounts; and by and by large merchant frigates also were constructed at the state's expense for sale abroad. After 1772 the newly founded Maritime Society occupied the Stettin shipyards with their orders. This business reached its climax during the great naval war of 1780-82, which paralyzed the seagoing trade of the West European states. In those days a lively activity also prevailed in the smaller Pomeranian shipyards, especially in Rügenwalde. Ninety-nine ships, with a total value of a million dollars, were built in twenty-one places in Pomerania in 1782.

Within six years, 113 seagoing vessels were sold abroad for 872,970 dollars.

In an industrial-statistical record, prepared for the entire monarchy with the exception of Silesia, which Heinitz presented in 1783 to the king, the silk factories figured with 5,055 workmen, a domestic turnover of 1,356,702 dollars and an export of 531,026. The woolen industry occupied 39,367 workmen, had an inland output of 3,344,166, and a foreign one of 1,691,305 dollars. Linen weaving, with 22,523 workmen, showed the proportionate figures of 373,506 and 897,757 dollars; the leather factories, with 3,595 workmen, 996,614 and 399,986 dollars; the cotton industry, with 4,503 workmen, 540,056 and 106,765 dollars; the glass and hardware industry, with 8,373 workmen, 2,126,675 and 1,053,844 dollars. All these industries, with their 83,416 workmen and their turnover of thirteen and a half millions, used native raw material to the value of 4,729,660, and imported raw material to the value of 3,470,479 dollars.

When Minister Hertzberg, in the academy of sciences in 1785 on the king's birthday, gave the annual total proceeds of the Prussian manufactures as sixteen million dollars, his estimate was too low. The figure of thirty millions which he named in the same place the following year was believed to be a gross exaggeration,

but closer examination did not differ very much from the result at which Heinitz arrived with thirteen and a half millions, excluding Silesia, for of Hertzberg's amount, eleven millions fell to Silesia and a further four and a half millions to various smaller industries which were left out of Heinitz's calculation, viz., tobacco, sugar, porcelain, paper, gold wares, soap, tallow and oil.

The Prussian industries, as Hertzberg boasted in 1786, took their place immediately behind those of France, England and Holland, the powers which had held almost the monopoly in manufacturing and shipping for two centuries. "We possessed nearly every conceivable factory, both for articles of necessity and for those of luxury." The speaker mentioned the cloth and linen industry as the branches which had reached the highest perfection; the majority of others were only mediocre for the time, but they would be able to improve in the future if they received such assistance, attention and protection as the government had hitherto given with a lavish hand.

Both Hertzberg and Heinitz did not take into consideration the mining and smelting industry, a domain which had been conquered only by the latter for Prussia.

Baron von Heinitz was one of the many emi-

nent men whom the Prussian state, thanks to its power of attraction for great talents and strong characters, won from outside. Born in 1725 in electoral Saxony, he had laid the foundation of his versatile education which recommended him eventually for the post of a curator of the Berlin Academy, at Schulpforta. Subsequently he trained himself in Brunswick and in his native town, where he became the creator of the Freiberg Mining Academy, as a practical miner. He proved to be a good administrative official, and visited the mines of Sweden and Hungary on his official travels. After his resignation from the Saxon state service, he made use of a longer abode in France for the study of national economy, and through a visit to England acquired an intimate knowledge of the English principles and institutions of the mining and smelting industry.

The king of Prussia seems to have had his attention directed to him by the ministers Waitz von Eschen and Valentin von Massow, both of whom had held personal relations with Heinitz since his Brunswick days. After the death of the Hessian Waitz, he transferred the mining department in September, 1777, to this electoral Saxon. Heinitz belonged to the independent natures among the advisers of Frederick the Great. Young Baron von Stein, who

under him, as the non-Prussian under the non-Prussian, went through his school as a Prussian official and mining man and saw his fate guided by Heinitz with "love, earnestness and wisdom," gratefully praised him as one of the most excellent men of his period, and the reverse of a mediocre, stiff superior, bound by formalities: "Deep religious sentiment, earnest indomitable endeavor to ennoble his mentality, aloof from all selfishness, receptive to everything that is dignified and beautiful, unlimited benevolence and gentleness, constant endeavor, meritorious in appointing clever men, to appreciate their merits, and train young people,—those were the chief traits of his excellent character which brought the greatest prosperity to the affairs intrusted to him in his administration."

However, Heinitz could not please the king as deputy manager of the manufacturing department, with his independent ideas; he had a wider scope in the mining administration and there full confidence was reposed in him. The preëminent scene of his activity for this administration, which according to Stein's expression he raised out of a nothing, became Silesia, the province in which no less than twenty-four different minerals were waiting to be utilized and for which the king, in an instruction of June 15, 1779, when Heinitz was about to make his first

visit there, made "all possible improvements" a duty to the new minister.

The cause for the erection of the first state smelting furnaces in Silesia was given in 1753 not only as the wish to secure the replenishment of gun material in the province, but as the necessity of assuming the competition against the old iron industry of the neighboring empire, in view of the Austrian prohibitive system. "The works were not erected for the eternal casting of bombs," declared the king. In the beginning he expressed the hope that the profits would increase considerably with the making of castings and forgings, with steel, wire and tin plate.

The war, with the increased demand for ammunition, meant big orders for these works, but on the whole hampered their development. Throughout the Seven Years' War the furnaces at Malapane and the Kreuzberger smelting works, repeatedly destroyed by the enemy, could work only 180 weeks. For a long time it was difficult to engage suitable foremen and to get raw material, until more productive ore mines were discovered after 1768. The government felt strong enough soon after the war to prohibit the importation of pig iron and raw steel from Austria, and in 1767 an import duty of 30 per cent. *ad valorem* was imposed upon

Styrian scythes and straw knives. It was not practicable to attempt to exclude them altogether, since the scythe factory, erected in 1764 by Count Posadowsky in Preiskretcham near Tost, did not prosper.

Without doubt the Silesian works lacked suitable management in the beginning. Ranger Rehdantz, who had to leap into the breach, afterward complained that he had to be an architect and engineer, artillerist and mechanic, smelter and farmer, miner and coal burner,—all in one person. A radical change came about only when the smelting works, at the instigation of Heinitz, were taken out of the Silesian financial administration and transferred to the mining and smelting department, and when Baron von Reden was placed at the head of the Breslau mining authorities. Heinitz represented to the king, on the strength of Reden's expert opinion, that the iron ores of Upper Silesia were productive enough to supply the whole of the works of the monarchy with smelting material for an unlimited time, and the king consented that the March and Pomerania were to be exclusively supplied with iron from Silesia and the Harz mountains, out of a chief iron magazine which was to be established in Berlin.

The importation of Swedish iron was pro-

hibited in November, 1779. The province of Prussia alone remained open to it, since iron could be got only with difficulty from Silesia on account of the distance. Moreover, the export of corn and wood gave a favorable balance of trade with Sweden. The old prejudice about the ductility of the Silesian iron was finally overcome. Tests in the presence of artillery officers showed that the Silesian ingots were harder to tear than the famous Swedish ones, but the Potsdam and Spandau rifle factories had hitherto used Swedish steel exclusively.

Presently the king requested the seniors of the Breslau board of trade to erect a steel factory, with a view "to spare the country the disadvantages resulting from the importation of foreign steel and iron wares." Thus the factory of Königsfeld originated in 1785 on the Malapane, with its great future from small beginnings; for the king warned the promoters "not to undertake this matter on a large scale at once, and perhaps have to face a failure, but to start small and see how the thing would succeed."

Heinitz calculated the profit in the trade balance sheet, in 1785, since the importation prohibit of Swedish iron, at a total of 507,786 dollars, although import passports were issued for this material in order to counteract the attempts

on the part of the private smelting works to raise the price of iron. In long-despised Upper Silesia there were in those days 47 smelting furnaces and 185 foundries; their calculated total output was 532,000 dollars, with 21,819 German hundredweight of cast iron, 123,840 of wrought iron, 2,000 steel, 200 wire and 1,200 tin plate.

A splendid success followed the resumption of the lead production in the Friedrichsgrube near Tarnowitz, in 1784. Here the king granted the working capital at the state's expense to reclaim a branch of mining which had been out of business altogether since 1754, after the Silberberg lead mines had been exhausted. The richness of the deposit proved to be so great that Heinitz hoped not only to be able to meet the whole inland demand, but also expected a profitable export. Sufficiently informed about the significance of the great invention of a James Watt, through the reports of his engineers who had been sent to England, the king on this occasion gave his assent to the Tarnowitz works for the construction of a "fire engine" and another one was finished in August, 1785, in the King Frederick mine near Hettstätt, in the Mansfeld district. More steam engines were installed at the Berlin porcelain works and at the salt works at Schönebeck and Unna.

If the crucial point in the new Silesian iron

industry was the getting of raw material, the value of the manufactured goods in the Brandenburg district exceeded that of the production of raw stuffs by a considerable margin. Heinitz complained of the monopoly of the Splitgerber steel ware factories at Eberswalde, because the manufacture was much inferior in quality to the Westphalian.

The richly developed Westphalian industrial districts claimed, in the highest degree, the interest and attention of the minister who in the general directorate was at the same time presiding in the provincial department for this part of the monarchy. He estimated the annual value of the Westphalian iron industry at 600,000 dollars and thought he was justified in comparing the Sauerland with the great examples of Sheffield and Birmingham, whose industrial works he had inspected by his mining engineers.

Conforming to the often and urgently pronounced desire of the king, Heinitz endeavored everywhere to promote the coal production. With great alarm the monarch and his minister contemplated the decrease in forests and the rise in the price of wood, especially after devastation of the former in the Seven Years' War. Even before that the king had recommended coal for the heating of the barracks in Silesia. In the county of March the production of this

coal in the half century following 1737 had increased annually from 467,874 to 1,707,461 bushels. In the remaining Prussian Westphalia 172,940 bushels were yearly produced after 1785, part of which was supplied to the adjoining ecclesiastical districts. In the Saale district, with very primitive works, the yield was not much over 100,000 bushels, which were just sufficient for the supply of the salt works in the duchy of Magdeburg.

Heinitz accurately predicted the great future of the brown coal which was sporadically found in this province, but scarcely exploited. Upper Silesia was no market for the rich coal yield, since the want of wood was not exceptionally felt as yet and the means of traffic were inadequate for the transportation of it. Accordingly Heinitz thought of no better use of it than to make soot for the blackening of oiled linen, but he had already in mind to send it to Magdeburg, assuming that in spite of the distance the price would not prove higher there than that of wood.

In contrast to this the consumption of coal produced in the principality of Schweidnitz jumped threefold within three years; that is, to no less than 415,742 bushels in 1785, for numerous works appreciated this fuel. This was more than ten times the amount of the coal production in the whole of Silesia in 1740. In 1786 the con-

sumption in the Schweidnitz territory was estimated at 500,000 and in the Glatz territory at 100,000, and in Upper Silesia at 50,000 bushels.

If the Silesian mining authorities, according to the judgment of the Breslau director of finance, Von Klöber, in his book *Silesia Before and Since 1740,* which appeared while Frederick was alive, had no other problem but that of procuring cheap fuel through the production of coal, "they would benefit the country through this more than by the mining of gold and silver."

What coal did for Silesia and Westphalia led to a more sensible method of cutting turf which was substituted in other provinces. Experts were sent for this purpose from East Friesland to Pomerania. The turf cutting of the Magdeburg and Halberstadt territories had expanded fourfold by the end of Frederick's reign, and in East Prussia and in the Marches a proportionate result was effected.

With the rapid progress of the mining and smelting industry the development of an old business, that of salt production, failed to keep abreast. The king had reforms carried out from 1769 to 1774 through the Cleves financial president Von Derschau, who was appointed for this administration to the general directorate, both of that and the Salian treasury, and of the principles of leasehold and the technical man-

agement of the works. Those of Schönebeck were finished toward the end of the reign after repeated reconstructions, with a production of 175,000 loads and a contingent of about 840 workmen, as the largest in Germany. However, the complaint of the quality of the mineral was not without reason. The leaseholders of the great salt works, two aristocratic ladies, were looking only for their personal advantage, and the entire management was by no means a model. Improvement was made by Heinitz when he took charge of the Salian department under Frederick's successor.

Heinitz calculated in 1785 that one-sixth of the population of the monarchy was actively engaged in the mineral industries. This did not suffice him when he saw that in England one-third, and in Sweden, Saxony and Austria three-eighths of the inhabitants lived by such labor.

In the dispositions which the king issued in trade matters to the ministers and financial presidents, we see time and again the exhortation to an enhanced zeal, a certain impatience for success which did not come rapidly enough, often sharp blame and even ominous threats. When, however, the stern master inspected the total result of a decade of labor in this domain, he declared himself satisfied with the progress

and admitted that everything in his state was a system of nerves, and all were working to perfection. He regarded his reign as the epoch of prosperity for the Prussian industry; through the founding of factories he had builded a memorial of his forty-two-year reign, and had converted the liabilities in the trade balance sheet of the preceding government into very considerable assets. Voltaire's words, *Le siècle de la Prusse est à la fin venu*—the self-variation of a verse out of Mohamed—were applicable to the Prussian industries.

Thus also judged the Hamburger Büsch, whose writings concerning national economy, which appeared in 1759-1800, have been described in our days as probably the most instructive contemporaneous criticisms of the Prussian administration.

"The masterpiece of Frederick the Great was that he has given to his states, which were hitherto lacking in factories, such a great industry through the manufacturing centers created by him."

Not every manufacture can be introduced everywhere, but it remained a truism: "There are manufactures which every nation must be able to get if they are wanted."

Büsch, as a Hamburger, knew all the complaints of his countrymen about the harm to

their interests through the Prussian national economy. Many of these political measures he regarded as failures, and others he blamed sharply; nevertheless he established the fact that, in spite of all prohibitions and aggravations, the transit trade of Hamburg with the Brandenburg-Prussian states had become far greater than before because of their economic prosperity, so that it would be foolish to wish the March Brandenburg back into its former "sad and miserable" state.

There is no question that the development of commerce remained behind that of the other industries.

"The Thirty Years' War," Frederick wrote on one occasion to Voltaire, "has done Germany more harm than the foreigners believe. At first one had to start afresh with agriculture, after this with the factories, and finally with a weak trade." The youngest sister stunted in growth was for the time being Cinderella, and her claims were almost unconditionally subservient to the needs of the protection of the industries, which was the hub of the economical policy of the state.

Added to this was the statement that where circumstances suggested a favoring of free trade, such as between Silesia and the Austrian countries, the system of industrial protection of

the neighboring power necessitated a defense, and retaliatory prohibitive measures.

The legal claim to maintain the old free trade at the Silesian frontier, which Prussia had won to a certain degree in the peace conclusions of 1742 and 1745, had been surrendered at the negotiations in Hubertusburg, as we have already seen. The thirteenth article of the Peace of 1763 contained the express clause that until the conclusion of a desirable trade agreement, each of the two states would institute everything connected with commerce *selon sa volonté*. Thus soon after the cessation of hostilities the customs war started afresh; still in Vienna one thought to be able to bear the harmful effect of the prohibitive duties with greater ease than did the opponent. The struggle which was renewed by the Austrian import prohibition of March, 1764, was particularly meant to affect the Prussian silk manufactures, wool materials, cloth, hats and stockings. For Prussia, in addition to the numerous import prohibitions issued subsequent to May, 1764, the most efficacious weapon was that against wool exportation, through which it was hoped to embarrass the struggling Austrian factories.

The situation on the Prussian-Saxon frontiers was in no wise different. A wool export prohibition, temporarily applied as a check in 1755

and renewed in 1761, was extended by a blockade against the transit of Polish wool. A complete break was effected by the Dresden edict of March, 1765, which excluded all Prussian manufacturers from Saxony. A Prussian order of May, 1766, retaliated in like manner with regard to all silk, woolen, cotton and linen goods, gold and silver ware, and porcelain. After a repeated exchange of complaints and accusations, Princess-elect Maria Antonia toward the end of the year used the personal correspondence which she had maintained with the king of Prussia since the war as a help toward a personal peace mediation.

A most remarkable discussion began. With a statement of the necessity of healing the wounds inflicted by the war through industry and commerce, the princess-elect joined her regret over the trade-political discord: "You are so enlightened, Sire, you are cognizant of the sound principles; I am compelled to assume that wrongly based reports or malicious insinuations have reached Your Majesty. Believe me, Sire, I know a little of our business affairs although I am not at the helm myself. Our great principle is the freedom of commerce and reciprocity. If Your Majesty wishes to adopt this system with the restrictions which the inner exigencies of every state may necessitate, you

will find us prepared for everything that can contribute to the mutual welfare of both states."

The king replied with reference to the Saxon edict through which he had first been prompted to retaliate, and then remarked evasively that all these quarrels, these paltry banalities, could only be traced to the ministers, the big wigs, who were always and everywhere of the same ilk, in Saxony as well as in Prussia. "Suppose that these gentlemen do not inhibit the relation which you, madam, are pleased to entertain with me; I forgive you the rest."

But this did not satisfy the princess; she now asked, as it were, the confidential question,— that was for a direct discussion, in which one would come far more quickly to an advantageous commercial agreement than if one placed the big wigs, pen in hand, all in battle array; she repeated the watchword, *Liberté et reciprocité.* Frederick confessed with admiration that the princess-elect would be as well in her place on a board of trade, or attached to a Richelieu, as in that of a judge of art on Parnassus. He was too well aware of his weakness not to know how poorly he would be able to hold his own against her as a negotiator. In a more serious strain he continued: "Half a century ago Europe began to clear the situation in regard to her trade interests; there is no state in which a perfect

freedom of commerce exists, and what can happen between neighbors confines itself to an agreement about certain points equally advantageous to both parties, which always presupposes a restriction of the imports."

He then proposed the appointment of commissioners, for only they, with full knowledge of the infinite detail, were equal to such negotiations. The princess-elect rendered her thanks for the favor and the king concluded: "So we shall oppose big wigs by big wigs and they will do wonders. But an inner voice tells me: 'Don't betray the interests of the people who are your charge,' and just according to this inner voice my big wigs are going to get their instructions."

And so it happened. Frederick told his ministers that the only point which might come to a debate in the conferences was an agreement for the mess traffic in Frankfort, Oder and Leipzig: "There cannot be any more question about all the other matters which I have already settled on a firm basis." Thus the result of the deliberation was kept within a very modest limit.

The strongest weapon for this economic struggle in the hands of the Prussian ruler was his system of transit customs. Unfortunately for the contemporaries, the Hamburger Büsch complained in his *The Procedure Described,* which

appeared six years after the death of the king, that the geographical position of his state had made the monarch master of five of the largest rivers, and of the finest trade routes, in Europe. But this weapon was a two-edged one; a certain harm to the native commerce had to be taken into the bargain. In the beginning, after the introduction of the transit duty, the trade of Magdeburg had greatly increased, so that the king in 1765 thought he might without any hesitancy add an additional impost.

The success did not vindicate the measure. The revenue from the transit duties decreased in the fiscal year 1766-67 from 118,000 to 40,000 dollars. Between Hamburg and Leipzig traffic avoided the Prussian routes and did not mind the detour through the Hanover territory in a westerly direction, around the Harz mountains. The king was convinced that he had attempted too much, and late in January, 1768, he issued a new customs tariff which returned to the lower taxes and was much simplified. With the addition of some subsequent provisions it remained in force during the next two decades. Presently the tax revenues began to increase again and gradually exceeded the amount which had been returned down to 1765. The last aim, that of playing the transit trade into the hands of the Magdeburgers, was not achieved, although the

taxes were much lower when the goods destined for Central Germany were not simply carried through, but unloaded in the freight yards of Magdeburg or Halle.

This Magdeburg system of transit duty, primarily directed against the Hamburg-Saxon trade, was after 1765 extended also to Silesia and the Saxon-Polish commerce, with several alterations. The duty was finally made high enough to restrain the competition of the Saxon manufacturers, and low enough not to deflect the Saxon-Polish trade in cloths, wax, yarn, cattle and corn to the detour through Austrian territory.

The Magdeburg merchants, in their complaints of the transit duty, described as the most troublesome fact "that so many formalities had been introduced; the transport of goods was delayed through so many items and regulations, and the outside driver, who could neither read nor write, was confused by the great number of different bills." Gradually, however, they grew accustomed to the innovations, especially when subsequent to 1773, after the many fluctuations, a state of affairs prevailed in which nothing essential was changed further. When later, after the succession to the throne, the alteration of the customs was taken into consideration, the Magdeburg merchants who had predicted with

the introduction of the duties the total ruin of the Elbe traffic voted that no further change should be made in important matters.

The revenue from the still existing inland duties was insignificant. The king regarded them primarily as a check against smuggling, not as financial resources. The scientific critics had long opposed them.

The great political remoldings of the map intruded their disturbing influence again and again by severing old trade routes and shutting off old markets. For the Silesian trade, especially the cattle trade to the lower Danube, it was a hard blow when Galicia became Austrian and surrounded herself with customs barriers. And no sooner had Russia taken possession of her share of Poland than she imposed difficulties upon the corn exportation to Prussia which caused grave anxiety to the Königsberg merchants.

The king sought to counteract the harmful effect which these customs wars, waged for the protection of the native industry, had upon commerce by paving the way to commercial treaties and by favoring capitalistic enterprises.

One of his ministers pointed out to him that in trade politics it was as necessary to preserve neighbors as it was to hold colonies. The English had just lost theirs on the North American



Emperor Francis.
Woodcut by H. Benedikt, after a painting by Fr. Amerling.

continent. It was excellent advice, but in the epoch of rigid commercialism when every state surrounded itself with customs barriers it was difficult to find the dispositions toward a treaty. Prussia would have liked to renew the agreement with France which had been made after great effort before the war, but the wind, which in 1753 had swelled the sails of negotiations, blew no more. With the continually strained relations between the two courts, the trade conferences of 1768 and 1769 did not lead to any result.

All the more was negotiation favored with Poland by the political and commercial leaders. When this neighboring country was cut off from the sea through the events of 1722, De Launay declared to the king: "Your Majesty only need hold down the barrier to secure the whole transit trade with Poland for your states." After some opposition only the Prussian proposals were accepted, as it was said, in order to have something certain, and not to be quite dependent upon the arbitrariness of the neighbor. The agreement of March, 1775, established differential duties on the Prussian-Polish frontiers for the goods of both subjects and for those of every third party. Upon the former a tax of only two per cent. was imposed, and upon the latter twelve per cent. Thus Prussia hoped to con-

quer the Polish market for her manufactures, to check the foreign competition, and at the same time to draw the Polish corn trade to Königsberg, Pillau, Elbing and Stettin, at the expense of Danzig, which still being Polish was treated as an outlying customs district and included in the increased tax of twelve per cent. The treaty, regarded by the king as a great gain, was looked at askance by a part of the Prussian merchants, especially the Silesians. One complained that the Silesian transit trade had now received its deathblow and repudiated the consolation that soon the staple and forwarding trade would flourish all the more. Heinitz too had his doubts, but De Launay thought he was able to refute them. Frederick appointed a commission to investigate; it agreed with Heinitz, but the king decided for De Launay to maintain the tariff of 1775.

An important success was the commercial treaty of 1782 with Spain. The Silesian linen, in future not taxed with higher import duties than the French article, was able in spite of the greater distance to undersell the goods on the Spanish market. When at that time a new republic was born beyond the ocean, King Frederick hastened to form commercial bonds with it, to exchange cloths, wool stuffs, linen, hardware and porcelain for rice, indigo and Virginian

tobacco. The treaty of September 10, 1785, between Prussia and the United States, did not meet the expectations of either party, since for a long time the English, being stronger in capital and more modern in shipping methods, were the masters of the commerce between these revolting colonies and the Old World.

Nothing in the economic policy of Frederick the Great seemed to the fanatics of a new national-economical dogma to be so objectionable, so incomprehensible, and so deserving of condemnation, as his monopolies. Mirabeau declared that he had not been able to discover the cause of this proclivity for exclusive privileges, nor the reason for the self-delusion of Frederick regarding their pernicious effect; he surmised that besides the purely fiscal point of view—for apparently those monopolies were brought from the state at great cost—the hope to prevent smuggling had played a part, as naturally the fear of having their charters revoked had induced the holders to a more strict observance of the customs law.

Such a surmise was a mistake. The monarch had his own theory about the monopoly system. He regarded it as a necessary evil, a makeshift, a transition stage in the economic process. Consequently, exclusive privileges were only granted to manufacturers on principle, to facilitate the

introduction of a new article, particularly whenever it was important to erect a large factory and to do it quickly; it was like a patent to secure a start for the promoter on account of the risk and expense. Thus they were given only for limited terms and not renewed when the promoters were strong enough to stand on their feet.

It goes without saying that it was sometimes difficult to select the decisive moment correctly. The king could not favor the new West Prussian factories for the military cloth supplies at the expense of the Berlin manufacturers: "One must not take Paul's clothes to dress Peter"; thus he decided in a personally written decree. It was unavoidable that continuous prerogatives should lose their justification in a theoretical sense and could thereafter have only a harmful effect, such as was the privilege of the Splitgerber steelware factory, according to Heinitz's conception. The king himself did not deny these bad experiences and for that reason held aloof in giving preference to single concerns, since this was, on the other hand, the logical sequence of the increase of national wealth and of the greater productive capacity.

"I should not like to have a monopoly, for they are always accompanied by evil consequences," he declared in the last year of his life

to the Silesian provincial minister, when the question arose as to founding a steelware factory. "The monopolist does not spend the right effort and zeal upon his cause, as he has nobody besides him as a rival, and from this the result is that he neglects his work and manufactures inferior goods." So well did Frederick know how to appreciate the importance of competition to industrial progress. When Daniel Itzig, in 1781, wished, on account of his newly founded fancy leather factory, that the butchers should be compelled annually to supply him with raw cowhides at a fixed tax, the ruler replied: "This won't do. Of course they may sell him as many as they like, but there must not be any coercion in it."

So also he finally became more reserved with subsidies for new factories. When he was asked in 1781 for an advance of 6,000 dollars, for the erection of a sailcloth factory in East Prussia, he replied very abruptly to the high president Domhardt: "What is the matter with you? I will have nothing of this. These people must do it on their own money, for they are reaping the profits. Why should I give the money? This only is spent, and afterward nothing becomes of the factory. If the people do such things on their own account they are also more industrious and spend more efforts."

In the proportion that trade ventures, especially those over sea, were exposed to greater risks than industrial enterprises, they required a stronger and above all a longer support through monopolies. The formation of large, financially strong trading companies had already been advocated by the tutor of Crown Prince Frederick and the financial director Hille, in his memoirs of 1725, but the king now complained that the merchant, grown rich, preferred to give up trade and acquire real estate. "Instead of the citizens embarking upon such undertakings and investing their money," wrote the grim old monarch in 1780, "they want to buy estates."

Thus also his endeavor to promote the Magdeburg local trade at the expense of the neighbors found little sanction from the merchants, and in Breslau the board of trade complained time and again of the lackadaisical methods of the merchants, who, "after their well-known genius," had the goods brought by the strangers instead of bringing them to the outside markets themselves. Finally an expert, the most enterprising merchant of Silesia in those days, Peter Hasenclever, hailing from Westphalia, reproached his countrymen for never having any money for institutions for the common good, and declared that they never thought of sending

experts abroad at the expense of the community "to investigate factories and trade secrets"; that the Landshut merchants' guild had not collected, in the course of eleven decades, a single dime for a mercantile fund, and in this respect it was no better in Hirschberg.

Thus we can understand that the king, despite his distrust of schemers who happened along, adhered to the maxim that with the founding of trade societies or new industries he should call the assistance of experts from those countries in which these branches or manufactures were already prospering. If once in a while he encountered an impostor he was neither vexed nor discouraged. A trifolium of these parasites,—Messieur les Ecornifleurs,—he had perpetuated in verses full of caustic satire.

Originally the Prussian bank was considered to be a trading society on the grandest scale and with many-sided tasks. Besides the actual bank business it was to handle the entire outside wood trade, the Silesian linen trade, the business with Russia, Poland and Scandinavia, to the Mediterranean and China, and finally also to function as a company for marine insurance. Now if such a grand foundation had proved at once impossible, the remnants of the shattered gigantic scheme were carefully preserved and utilized singly in turn.

The Marine Insurance Society, founded on January 31, 1765, in Berlin, with a stock capital of one million dollars divided into 4,000 shares, had in the beginning, like the bank, to combat the most stubborn distrust; the Stettiner merchants refused to use it, for they were able to insure their ships better and cheaper in Amsterdam or Hamburg. Only by degrees did the native institution gain ground in the Prussian harbor towns. A wood fuel concern which supplied the residential cities of Berlin and Potsdam was not allowed to exceed a certain price limit, so that exorbitant charges were prevented. A timber company that was pledged to organize the Elbe trade to Hamburg in a uniform manner was given the exclusive privilege for the exportation of timber for shipbuilding, staff timber and mercantile timber, from the state forests of the electoral March and the duchy of Magdeburg, and the right of preëmption on all timber destined for export from private forests. Both companies, founded in 1766, subsequently transferred their business to a state administration.

Partly because of improper management, the Levantine Company was unsuccessfully founded in 1765. It was a joint stock concern with the monopoly of importing by sea route the goods which heretofore had been imported by land, via

Triest and Vienna,—Macedonian cotton, Turkish yarn, camel's-hair, oil and fruit. They chartered foreign boats, since the Prussian ships lacked the Turkish passports indispensable for protection against the pirates of the Barbary states. Already, in 1769, they had to suspend payments when the chief promoter, the court banker Clement, a Dutchman, saw himself affected by the bankruptcy of an Amsterdam firm.

For the business with Russia the banking house of Schweigger was in 1766 granted an important privilege, against the obligation to sell annually 15,000 dollars' worth of porcelain from the royal manufacture: all merchandise from Russia which did not go to the account of its St. Petersburg branch was subject to a two per cent. *ad valorem* increase of duty in Stettin, and at the same time an additional tax of five per cent. on all Russian exports which did not go to the account of Prussian subjects was imposed in Stettin, while on the Elbe it was made eight per cent. By this means the king intended to take the Russian transit through Prussian territory away from foreign middlemen and to divert it more and more from Hamburg to Stettin; he therefore maintained the new order both against the diplomatic representations of the czarina and in face of the touching complaints of the Breslau board of trade.

For the time his wish to see the direct trade communication with East Asia resumed remained unfulfilled. Only in the last years of his reign did the Emden merchants send ships again to Bengal, Batavia and China, after their profitable "cabotage" trade during the naval war between England and France had inspired them with a new enterprising courage.

The Herring Company at Emden had been formidable rivals of the Danes, Swedes, and especially of the Dutch since 1769. Beginning with six ships they had thirty-two in 1782 sailing over the sea, and in proportion to the extension of their business, new provinces could be given to them for the exclusive supply, but with the restriction that the prices, as compared with those of the Dutch goods at the time of their foundation, should not be raised.

All these enterprises were surpassed and survived by the Maritime Society of 1772, which after the acquisition of a new province had to thank its foundation for reasons of which we shall speak later.

The trade statistics introduced in 1747 were carefully continued. Mirabeau, who from his standpoint as a free trader declared the preparation of a trade balance sheet to be "useless and illusory," sharply criticised the items of the official Prussian trade statistics. He repudiated

the conclusion which Hertzberg thought himself justified in deducing from them as "absolutely wrong, without foundation, without reality, without semblance, without possibility." According to the correct figures Mirabeau claimed that the Prussian commercial balance sheet would have assumed such an aspect as to leave only the deduction that Prussia was hurrying to her doom with giant steps.

In truth, these tables could not claim any unconditional value for themselves. A test for the Silesian lists proved that of the three lists, "goods manufactured, sold in the country and exported," not every one deserved equal credit, and Heinitz had investigated the sources from which the errors resulted in these compilations of the provincial excise revenue office. He had also, after a visit to the Frankfort mess, subjected the mess reports of the war and the domain treasury to a sharp expert, and calculated that instead of the officially assumed turnover of two and a half millions for a single mess there had been only a total of three millions for three messes. In the position as a resort minister of strictly investigating the statistical foundations, rigidly striving as a reform minister (which he wished to become for the fifth department), to test them keenly, Heinitz was entitled to special attention for the records which he gave as

rectifications of the official statistics,—more indeed than was Hertzberg for his which, as an outside official, he was not able to gain from the highest sources.

Heinitz credited for 1781-82 the value of exports for the "vegetable kingdom" with 8,586,223, and that of the imports with 3,069,328 dollars; for the "animal kingdom" the same balance, with 4,648,178 against 3,648,868; for the mineral realm with 843,495 against 709,447; for the products belonging to these three realms with 519,098 against 1,759,791 dollars; while for the actual articles of luxury,—wine, tea, coffee, chocolate, sugar, etc.,—a considerable deficit was found in the export value of 270,872 against an import of 2,675,011 dollars. According to this calculation, the total value of the exports (14,867,516) exceeded that of the imports (11,834,691) by 3,032,825 dollars, so the whole turnover of import and export together amounted to twenty-six or twenty-seven million dollars, while the exports and imports of Great Britain in 1786 were calculated as nearly thirty-two million pounds sterling, and those of France in 1780 as 377 2-3 million livres.

Among the provinces, East Prussia and Pomerania had with their favorable coast position, according to the official statistics, a credit balance of nearly 500,000 and 400,000 dollars re-

spectively; the new province of West Prussia had gained in trade 150,000 dollars; the Neumark, thanks to its cloth export, 180,000; Silesia over 1,700,000, particularly through its wool and linen goods; Magdeburg and Halberstadt 168,000, Cleves, Moers and Geldern together 110,000; the county of March through its metal ware export, nearly 500,000; Minden, Ravensburg and Lingen 356,000; and East Friesland 316,000 dollars. The only province with a debit balance was the East March; in the trade exchange it lost nearly half a million dollars with foodstuffs for the great demand of the residential towns of Berlin and Potsdam, and in raw material with the factories and in articles of luxury.

The number of seagoing vessels, according to the calculation of Heinitz in 1782 in Prussia and Lithuania was 90 with 816 sailors, in Pomerania 303 with 2,235 sailors, in East Friesland 892 with 5,395 sailors. No less than 25 of the Prussian and Pomeranian ships were built in the former and 89 in the latter province during 1781-82, for Prussia, through joining the international system of armed sea neutrality, in the great naval war between England and France, Spain and Holland, had secured for herself the inviolability of her trade flag, and through this gained a strongly increasing traffic to and between the

ports of England's opponents. Thus the Stettin shipowners who in 1751 counted only 79 ships with 3,899 loads had increased in 1784 to 165 ships with 21,791 loads. If the total number of the incoming and outgoing vessels had diminished during the period before the Seven Years' War, the craft were now disproportionately larger. In 1751 Stettin possessed only two, and in 1786 seventy-eight boats of over 100 loads. The imports and exports of Stettin amounted in 1739 to a total of 300,000, and in 1786 to 4½ million dollars.

The universal complaints of the merchants that commerce was stifled under the double pressure of protective duties and monopolies prompted Heinitz, in his computations for Silesia, to compare the years 1768 and 1782 with each other. He established the fact that the transit value of 1,766,875 dollars had dropped to 1,239,875, and that of the imports had fallen less heavily from 2,231,279 to 2,177,040 dollars; but that, on the other hand, the value of exports had increased by nearly a million, that is, from 2,819,730 to 3,746,813 dollars.

Under these circumstances he deemed it unjustifiable to speak of a decay of the Silesian trade, and saw the truth of the maxim confirmed that one must have an absolutely accurate knowledge of the whole before he can

decide against reason or no reason for a complaint.

At the time of Heinitz's report of the Silesian trade, a calculation made in private quarters arrived concerning the Prussian Baltic trade.

If the final results of Heinitz's official investigations remained favorable in the sense of a strong "credit," he could hope to convince the king of the misleading embellishment of the usual statistics. Frederick actually admitted to the minister, at the joint checking of the trade balance sheet for 1781-82, that it contained obvious mistakes, mixups and double items, and to the satisfaction of Heinitz crossed out nearly two millions in the two categories of wool and silk alone. After this Heinitz explained to him in detail with the next year's balance, which was especially favorable, the reasons for which one could not rely upon the stated profit of 5,423,010 dollars. He particularly emphasized that a considerable part of the calculated credit surplus was lost through contraband. The king on account of this report declared: "I reckon upon four millions." He himself made large deductions from the official statistics and once remarked to Heinitz that there was no harm in having such brilliant tables if only those who had to make use of them were able to distinguish between the right and the wrong.

But it is undeniable that the ruler was always inclined to believe and to assume that which was apt to please him, and Heinitz deceived himself when he thought that the king calculated the "national profit" at only three millions annually. His personal notes of 1777 and 1782 showed, on the contrary, that he placed it for the former year at 4,400,000, and for the latter at 4,430,000 dollars. On the other hand, he preferred to examine the statistics of foreign countries through a diminishing lens. One of his dinner guests often noticed, to his surprise, how the old king "had purposely set up for himself such small notions about the population revenues and similar matters in foreign countries, to which he was clinging persistently."

When the king listened to justifiable or unjustifiable complaints about retrogression in trade, he sometimes declared that the merchants were like the farmers to whom God in heaven could never make matters right.

Before the forum of the new theory the ruler's agrarian policy found less leniency than his system of industrial protection and trade balance. "He always has," scolded Mirabeau, "crushed agriculture to raise the factories." Now we have learned with what considerable expenditures Frederick had come to the help

and support of agriculture for ameliorating purposes and for the regulation of the debt relations. That he had placed the corn trade under state supervision, and prohibited the exportation of wool, were in the eyes of these doctrinaires his two great crimes against the farmer.

Of the Prussian provinces the duchy of Magdeburg and the principality of Halberstadt, much in advance of the others with their fertile soil, reached a surplus and therefore had in former times a profitable export trade in wheat and rye to Hamburg. The Marches, Pomerania and Silesia, on the whole, produced only that which was generally demanded, while the duchy of Prussia earned a little more. The countries with a corn export in the Europe of those days were England, whose grain cultivation had received fresh inducement through high exportation premiums in the first half of the century, and Poland, which poured tremendous masses of wheat and rye into that continent. The East European corn was cheaper, heavier and more suitable for shipping than the German; it ruled the world's market for grain, the center of which in those days was still Amsterdam; temporarily it had even threatened the inland grain market of the Brandenburg-Prussian state, until Frederick William I interdicted the import from Poland to the corn merchants, and only allowed

the transit through Königsberg and Stettin for commerce abroad.

But the state kept the Polish market open for its own purchases, and for the replenishment of its magazines, and it was for this reason that the opponents of his economic policy spoke of a monopoly of the corn trade and of the corn monopoly of the king of Prussia, the largest grain dealer in the empire.

Here, too, the accusations were mostly based upon ignorance of the actual conditions and of the unerring points of view. Frederick's corn trade policy proved itself, as recent investigations have convincingly shown, the most successful attempt at an adjustment between the claims of agriculture and those of industry, between those of the farming population who wished for high corn prices and of the smaller people in the towns who needed cheap bread. "It is the business of the prince," so the monarch wrote in the *Testament* of 1768, "to draw the line sharply in the corn prices, and choose the happy medium between the interests of the nobleman, of the leaseholder and of the farmer, on the one hand, and of the soldier and laborer, on the other hand."

It was the aim of all the ruler's endeavors to keep the corn prices at an average, and it was the fundamental idea of a system which was

fully developed after the Seven Years' War. The price was not to fall below the cost of production, and for this there was a fixed standard in the revenue tax; that is, the tax set up by the war and domain exchequer for the purpose of official leasehold, for which one had to fix a figure for the approximate proceeds from the corn harvested on the leasehold estates,—a tax which was higher in the western provinces and lower in the eastern ones, and which was also usually exceeded by the market price. In the year 1752 this tax amounted in the electoral March to sixteen groschen for a bushel of rye, in Pomerania fourteen and in East Prussia twelve groschen.

The double purpose of this policy could be attained with the help of the large state grain warehouses, which were capable at all times both of receiving and giving out large quantities and made it possible for the state to maintain the price in peace times at an approximately equal standard for buyer or seller,—in prosperous years by its demand, and in bad ones by its supply. Such great warehouses Frederick William I had erected in the capital and in the fortresses of Spandau, Küstrin, Peitz, Magdeburg, Stettin, Colberg, Minden and Wesel. They were especially numerous in East Prussia, at Königsberg, Pillau, Memel, Ragnit, Insterburg,

Preussisch-Holland, Johannesburg and Marienwerder. Frederick the Great in Silesia added the old Austrian "corn houses" at Brieg and Glogau to the Prussian system, and built new stores in Schweidnitz, Glatz, Neisse, Kosel and Hirschberg; besides these, in the March at Zehdenick, Havelberg, Tangermünde and Frankfort. Finally, after the Seven Years' War the two so-called peace or town magazines in Berlin and Breslau were built.

The fundamental principle of all the further measures of the state in this domain remained the instruction which the king had given in 1748 to Minister Katte, for the administration of these magazines. Rye was not to be sold in the electoral March under eighteen groschen and not over a dollar; thus the price fluctuation was kept within the limit of six groschen. As soon as the market price in any province exceeded the dollar limit, the storehouses were to be opened and to offer rye at twenty groschen; if the price dropped below the fixed tax, the magazine administrations were to restore it to its former rate, through purchases on the spot, "so that the corn prices are constantly balanced in such a way that the citizen, the peasant, the official and the nobleman can all find their reckoning."

After two years the rich harvest of the sum-

mer of 1750 gave the king cause "for the assistance of the farmer" to make extensive purchases in all the eastern provinces. In the following good years the surplus crop would not have found buyers if the state had not continued its purchases for the maintenance of the crown quota. Immediately after this Pomerania had several bad harvests and the magazines could again intervene as a leveling agency of their stock.

The great famine year of the eighteenth century was 1771, the climax of a famine which began in 1770 and continued after the repeated crop failure of the summer of 1772 until 1774. Amid the great distress in the adjoining German districts, where many died of starvation, the Prussian provinces were enjoying the beneficent effects of state protection. The magazine system on that occasion stood the test in the most satisfactory manner and won for the state those thousands of new settlers whom hunger drove across the frontiers from Saxony and Bohemia.

What the king wished to accomplish, however, could not be realized,—to keep the price of rye at a limit of one and a half dollars,—for the distress was so universal that it was necessary to reckon with a depletion of the state corn stores, and therefore the sales had to be held within certain boundaries. Thus, in 1771, the

price rose sporadically in Prussia to two dollars and over; but in reply to a complaint from Lower Pomerania about this unprecedented increase, the king pointed to the fact that rye was then at two and a half in Saxony, at three and one-sixth in Moravia and seven in the district around Augsburg.

These years of famine directed the attention of foreigners to the protective institutions in Prussia, and a Saxon author recommended their emulation. Frederick himself, however, judged according to the experiences of those years: "Every sovereign who has the common weal at heart has the duty to supply himself with well-filled magazines in order to equalize a failure in crops and to prevent a famine." The question was to have at hand an accurate calculation of the yield in the different kinds of grain in good, medium and bad years, in order to compare it with the consumption and thus fix the extent of outgoing or additional quantities.

In consequence of the four good crops from 1777-80, the market changed in such a way that the farmers were sure they could not exist with such abnormally low prices, and again the state brought up the price through its large purchases.

There were no financial purposes connected with these buyings and sellings of the state,—only social ones. When, as a matter of fact, the

stored corn was sold for a trifle more in years of famine than had been paid for it in times of abundance, the margin was just sufficient to cover the loss of interest. "I do not want," said the king to Minister Katte in 1748, "to make the slightest profit for myself, but through this scheme only relieve poverty and assist the poor man with a reasonable corn price."

Advantages to the state in the buying of corn resulted from dealings only with Poland. The Prussian magazine administration was able to purchase the Polish corn very cheaply, sometimes at only six or eight groschen per rye bushel, and therefore the purchases were preferably made there so long as no slump in prices in the inland markets necessitated other measures for the aid of domestic farmers.

The total effect of this corn trade policy is shown in a table which was worked out in the general directorate, containing the average price of rye in the March, in Pomerania, and in the Magdeburg country, for the twenty-three years from 1763 to 1787. The fluctuations were, apart from the above-mentioned famine years, very slight. In Berlin rye had stood at thirty to thirty-one groschen in sixteen of these twenty-three years; within a space of five years it went either up or down in a scope of eight or nine groschen, and only in 1771 and 1772 did it leap

up by twenty-two to twenty-four groschen. Still less were the fluctuations in Stettin, but they were greater in Halle, where no corn storehouse had been erected.

Apart from its general effect upon the regulation of the market price, the magazine system gave the possibility of an immediate assistance to the farmers in great distress. Seed corn in 1772 was given out free of charge in many places, and in numerous instances the king supplied some individual farmer, or a whole community, from the public stores for a nominal charge only.

There was always some scope for the corn trade of private individuals. The importation of Polish corn, as during the preceding reign, was prohibited on the Pomeranian and March frontiers, and on the Silesian border was subject to a duty tax. A still higher tariff was here imposed upon the imports from Austria. According to the state of the market, the traffic with the neighboring countries in Silesia was either facilitated or hindered, or possibly suspended altogether. The exportation of corn from the Magdeburg district and from Pomerania was permitted after the Seven Years' War only on passports which were personally issued by the king.

East Prussia retained its free export and the

privilege of buying the corn that was destined for export from Poland; there the farmer in consequence complained that he had no market for domestic corn, and the king admitted that he was not able to help with magazine purchases alone if the dealers of the inland places did not wish to buy. Despite the new competition of the Russian Baltic ports, Königsberg exported 48,000 bushels in 1784, and in 1785 some 42,000. The Magdeburg corn trade, in the face of all handicaps through export and transit, always remained of great importance, since there was a compensation for the shortage for the turnover abroad in the supply to Berlin.

With a view of promoting the corn trade on the Elbe and Oder, the king again recommended the formation of joint stock companies. When, in December, 1769, he saw all the ministers of the general directorate assembled around his table, he developed in great detail, during the meal, his ideas of the best way in which manorial lords and experienced merchants could ply the corn and wool trade on the Elbe as well as on the Oder, especially in taking away the transit traffic from Hamburg. There would not be any "derogation in this" for the noblemen who were able to raise the revenue of their estates through such a scheme, as there was no reason why they should not make the best use of their

rights. The plan rapidly assumed concrete form. In February, 1770, the Magdeburg companies received their charters for the privilege of exporting corn (inasmuch as the price for rye in the markets of Berlin and Magdeburg would remain under a certain limit), and the exclusive prerogative of the transit of foreign corn from Anhalt and Saxony. The company planned for the Oder trade, however, had not as yet been formed.

The case concerning the prohibition of the wool export was in no way different from the restriction of the corn trade. In both instances the farmer was compensated for the loss of outside markets by the growing purchasing power of the inland markets.

The lamentations of the sheep farmers of 1719 in consequence of the export prohibition of Frederick William I, found a reëcho in Silesia, when in 1754 the prohibition was extended upon this province in connection with the duty restrictions against the neighbors. Sheep raising flourished highly in Silesia. It was treated there with a care unknown elsewhere in the choice of breeding animals, pastures, winter fodder and stabling. The Silesian wool from the district around Namslau and Oels was estimated in the European market to be equal to the Spanish product. At the beginning of the previous cen-

tury, when the Austrian government imposed a duty on the exports to Holland, Silesian wool to the amount of half a million dollars was sold, while the native cloth makers preferred the medium qualities for their coarser materials.

About 1750, before the beginning of the customs war, Silesian wool went annually to Austria, at an average value of 99,000 dollars, while the Saxon cloth factories bought a great part of their raw material from Silesia, at a value of annually 120,000 dollars. Still the wool prices in Silesia, with the large animal stock, were lower than those of the March. They fell still more in 1755, in consequence of the new prohibition policy, and the interdiction of export to Saxony in 1757 was soon replaced by a moderate export duty. Immediately after this the war broke out and the wool prices rose to an unprecedented height, for terrible devastations were wrought among the sheep farms in Silesia, Saxony and the March. The lack was rapidly made good in Silesia, and in 1765 the stock of 1763 was again reached. In the meantime, the same authorities who before the war had opposed the export prohibition, in the interest of farming, demanded this exclusion in order to aid the industry and thus, in October, 1761, the exportation of wool from Silesia was forbidden.

The consequence was that with the prosperity of the cloth industry wool prices, in spite of the export prohibition, maintained a height at which, according to a statement afterward of the Prussian minister Strumsee, both the farmer and the manufacturer secured a good margin. The "noblesse," the class of landed estates, as had been predicted in 1755, had to make a sacrifice which was only temporary. In 1756 there were over 5,612,362 sheep in the eastern and central provinces, with about a million in the electoral March, half a million in the Neumark and the Magdeburg district, and 2,200,000 in Silesia alone. A census in December, 1783, disclosed for the whole monarchy 6,808,089 sheep, while the number in England in those days was reckoned at about twelve millions. This was the climax attained in Prussia. The following years brought with them a great dying out of sheep, and the owners of flocks diminished their stock in spite of high prices.

Under no circumstances could the Prussian sheep farmers, who feared ruin from the export prohibition, cover the demand toward the end of the reign. According to a calculation by Heinitz, about 350,000 dollars' worth of wool had to be imported annually from Spain, Poland and Mecklenburg. This foreign raw material, however, was partly indispensable to the

factories on account of its peculiar quality; the Silesian cloth makers bought single shorn wool from Poland for their carding work, since the Silesian double shorn wool could be used only for cloth of another kind, but for the finest sorts dependence had to be placed upon the Spanish wool. That Spain had interdicted the exportation of her best breeding animals, under penalty of death, was a great grief for the king of Prussia. Not until 1785 was this severe provision suspended, and now as in 1748 a flock of mother sheep and rams was bought "deep down in Andalusia."

What was still possible in the improvement of the breed was seen from a comparison with the results of the model farmer in England. There one hundredweight of wool was gathered from thirty sheep, which was sold at one hundred and ten to one hundred and seventy dollars. In Prussia, however, it required fifty sheep to supply a hundredweight of wool, and the hundredweight of wool from the March and Pomerania cost only twenty-seven and a half dollars, and that of the finest Silesian wool was worth sixty-four dollars.

The critics, who were quick with their condemnation of the Prussian economic policy when the king had hardly closed his eyes, held themselves in reserve during the lifetime of Frederick.

It is true he had not infrequently encountered the objections of his ministers to his institutions and schemes, and at least in one case the opposition had assumed an outright challenging aspect.

This was in the autumn of 1766. The king had just called his new creations into being,—the French rule of duties and excise, the stricter transit duty system, the tobacco administration, the bank and the trading societies. The general economic situation showed no sign of improvement, and the chancellor Jariges therefore recommended an investigation into the causes of the decay of trade and industry. The king retorted that the causes were well known to him; he pointed, above all, to the "caprice" of the merchants against his new institutions; meanwhile, however, he requested the general directorate to prepare a detailed report in accordance with the wish of the chancellor.

This commission was used by the ministers for an unsparing attack upon the entire organization of the new institutions. The king was indignant over their "impertinent relation," and suspected bribery. He declared scornfully that the ministers who had signed the report would be excused for "their ignorance," but the "corruption and malice" had to be punished with exemplary rigor, "otherwise I will never

be able to get subordination into these canailles." The author, Privy Councilor Ursinus, had formerly been influential with the king, but he received no pardon, and was sentenced to one year's imprisonment in a fortress, as several irregularities were discovered in his official duties. After that the ministers were very cautious whenever they chose to express their doubts.

Whether expressed in a pointed or guarded manner, however, these objections applied always to the inordinate use of the system, not to the system itself. Ursinus and Heinitz were moderate commercialists, hence they held the same viewpoint as the king himself. Advocates of free trade on principle, such, for instance, as the war councilor Bertram in Königsberg, who would have liked to see the excise tariff applied to his province in his own sense, were not numerous in Prussia in those days. While, therefore, the contrast of principles, that of an old and a new system, could not make itself felt in the exchange of opinions between the king and his advisers, the ruler was inclined always to regard himself as the reformer and the representative of progress, whenever he was combating contradiction. "The people," he complained in the *Testament* of 1768, "move when they are driven and stand still as soon as one stops for one moment in goading them on.

Everybody thinks that only the customs and habits of his forefathers were good ones. People read little and they do not feel inclined to gather information how things can be managed in a different manner, and of me, who have always done nothing but good, they think that I am going to point my knife at their throats as soon as the question comes up to introduce a useful improvement or an alteration of some sort. In such cases I have relied upon my honest intentions and upon my good conscience, and upon the knowledge which I have acquired for myself and then went my way calmly and undisturbed."

A few years later he must have become aware that a quarrel had begun about the first suppositions, that beyond the state borders a new conception of the conditions and of the claims of official, social and economic life was coming to the front. But he relied upon the fact that his old practice was worth more than the new theory. "The encyclopedists," so he wrote in September, 1777, to Voltaire, "will perhaps not always be of the same opinion with me; everyone has his own. Always when of all the guides experience is the safest, I venture to say, that my maxims are only based upon that which I have seen and upon which I have reflected."

CHAPTER VI

STATE FINANCES AND ARMY ADMINISTRATION

THE acquisition of West Prussia brought the state such a considerable increase in population and especially in revenue that the king at last saw himself at the goal of a long-cherished wish. He was now able to augment his army to the strength which he had declared in 1752 was a necessity for the safety of the frontiers.

The financial profits from the new province remained largely behind the sanguine estimates. In the beginning Frederick had hoped for a revenue of six millions. In a second calculation he reckoned more conservatively upon not quite three and a half millions, and in the budget of the general directorate for 1775-76,—the first which included the new country in the estimates,—a revenue of 1,636,595 dollars was entered for West Prussia, including the Netze district, and of 140,364 dollars for the Ermland. As a matter of fact, the account soon

closed somewhat higher than this. In 1777-79 the revenue could be estimated at 2,111,000 dollars.

The West Prussian revenue of the fiscal year 1775-76 was largely incorporated in the budget of the general domain treasury and amounted to 922,354 dollars, of which a little over one-tenth (96,060) was left for administration purposes in the province. As revenue of the general war treasury from West Prussia, 714,240 dollars were entered; of this 365,514 dollars were provided for the support of the newly established regiments which were garrisoned in that province. If another 133,682 dollars were actually paid for these troops out of the general war treasury, under a different heading, the net revenue of the two great state treasuries from West Prussia still amounted to 1,041,339 dollars. Of the West Prussian income 400,000 dollars could be immediately reserved by the general domain treasury for the disposition fund of the king, either to be transferred to the crown treasury for enterprises for the public benefit, or to meet extraordinary military expenses.

Thus a great part of the expenditures which were paid for restorations in the new province had been covered from its own resources. So much was a well-ordered, thrifty and clean household able to perform at its very beginning.

In the above-mentioned fiscal year the regular gross revenue of the general domain treasury amounted to 8,095,661 dollars, that of the general war treasury, without the extra contribution from the former, to 4,992,145 dollars, the revenue of the Silesian provincial treasury to something over three and a half millions. Thus, to this total revenue of about sixteen and a half millions, apart from several other incomes not incorporated in the budget of the financial authorities, West Prussia contributed more than one-tenth with its one and three-fourths millions.

Moreover, through the fact that simultaneously with the opening up of the West Prussian financial resources the crown treasury reached an amount which was for the time considered adequate, the king gained a wider scope in his state finances.

With the coming of peace the king had transferred to the treasury no less than 14,158,880 dollars from the large sums which were held in reserve for the continuation of the war after refunding the war loan and expending seventy-one and a half millions for new uniforms and for replacements in the artillery and baggage trains.

This mass of metal had for the time being to be deposited in the coins stamped during the

war, which were below value. Every year part of these coins were taken out to be melted and replaced by full-value gold. In consequence of this the face value of the treasury money did not rise so rapidly as it should have done in proportion to the actual additions. At the end of May, 1769, on the closing of the annual accounts there were in the treasury 19,157,203 dollars, and among them nearly six millions of inferior coins. In 1770 the treasury had increased by 224,000 dollars and the stock of coins under value had diminished by two millions. In 1771 no more money below par was in existence, but the total amount had diminished by 960,000 dollars after this removal. Increasing a little in 1772, the treasury reached in the following year, after another small addition, the sum of 19,249,920 dollars. For a time the king kept it at this level after he had named twenty millions in his second *Political Testament,* of 1768, as he had done in the first of 1752, as the sum which the treasure was supposed to reach.

Moreover, the small treasure, the mobilization fund, whose first endowment of 640,000 dollars consisted of full-face value gold, had from 1763 to 1776 been brought to 4,266,863 dollars.

After the fulfillment of his economic programmes the king was confronted by the question as to how he was to use the annual surplus

which was considerable in proportion to the total revenue of the state; in other words, how should he regulate the extraordinary finances of the state?

There were at his disposal, in the first place, an annual treasury fund of 1,800,000 dollars; namely, 700,000 dollars from each of the old provinces and from Silesia, and 400,000 from West Prussia. In addition to this, certain incomes were transferred to the disposition fund direct from the domain treasuries of the different provinces: 50,000 dollars from the Königsberg and the Lithuanian financial department, 21,000 from the Marches, and 100,000 from East Friesland; the revenue that was gained over and beyond the budget of the forest and domain administration, which in the year before the war had amounted to 705,000 dollars and was still increasing in peace times; the revenue of the Magdeburg transit duty, which after the decrease in 1766 had by 1786 again risen to 102,454 dollars; finally, the surplus of the administrations newly instituted after the war and which had been taken out of the financial collegiate.

The king calculated in 1779 the resources opened since 1763 apart from the West Prussian revenue at about three millions, and the sum at the disposal of the extraordinary account in 1768 at 4,700,000, in 1777 at 5,700,000, and in

1783 with 7,120,000 dollars, and a state revenue total of 21,730,000 dollars.

The accounts of the large disposition fund, which was exempt from all supervision by the financial authorities and from the control of the chief accountancy department, have not been preserved. However, for a single year we have the already named personal estimate of the king of the "Depensé," which he thought to cover from these surplus funds. In it appear 600,000 dollars for the Netze Canal; 40,000 indemnification for the owners of the Polish "Starostei" estates; 340,000 for ameliorations on the Rhin, in Pomerania, in the Neumark and in the Magdeburg district; 56,000 for the Silesian towns; 80,000 for the building of thirty villages in Upper Silesia; 40,000 for the town of Königsberg, to cover fire damages; 200,000 each for Berlin and Potsdam, probably for factories and other buildings; and 160,000 for building the Berlin library. For military purposes were set apart 300,000 dollars for the Silesian and 200,000 for the West Prussian fortresses; 23,000 for barracks; 170,000 for alteration in the infantry rifle; and 140,000 for the artillery. Finally 480,000 was appropriated for the payment of subsidies to Russia.

According to this the extraordinary expenses for civil improvements reached a total of

1,716,000 dollars, the addition to the army administration (inclusive of subsidies paid as redemption for auxiliary troops) amounted to 1,520,000 dollars. The compilations of the four last years of the reign, which Minister Hertzberg had published with the moneys expended on behalf of agriculture and industry, and for the welfare of the country in general, have been treated elsewhere in another connection.

A comparison of these figures with the total amount of the annual surplus shows that the king, after the fulfillment of his original programme, continued to save and hoard money.

The treasury was filled, but one addition after another followed. To the general treasury and the small treasury came three subtreasuries and finally still another, the fourth subtreasury.

A treasury depot at Breslau, in a cellar under the war treasury which the king ordered in 1770 to be established, held moneys up to 3,269,000 dollars in 1774—a sum that made the annual quota for the field support of an army of 70,000 men to be mobilized in Silesia. A proportionate amount for an army corps to be assembled on the Elbe was represented by the so-called Magdeburger forage moneys, which were deposited in the bank in 1776, with 900,000 dollars. An iron fund at the general war treasury was meant to secure the payment of wages in

war times; fixed before 1756 only at 680,000 dollars, the amount of one month's wages, it amounted in 1777 to four millions, and the king intended to bring it up to eleven millions within three years. In the last year of his reign further additions of the treasury were made to a special account kept under the heading of "subsidy moneys"; this he soon endowed with three millions.

There were good reasons for this persistent hoarding. The king, after the last war, calculated the cost of a campaign at eleven to twelve millions, besides the amounts which had already been set apart for the army in peace times. If he had formerly believed it to be necessary to make provisions only for four campaigns, he thought it advisable after seven years of conflict to prepare for an eight-year one. In the year 1768, when the treasure was only fixed upon a basis of twenty millions, Frederick saw himself under the necessity of again reckoning upon the seizure of the neighboring country with the resources of Saxony.

Five millions from Saxony, 4,700,000 surplus over their own state revenue, including the various treasure quotas, and 2,300,000 from the crown treasury, made the annual requirement of twelve million dollars.

Still, in 1776, he did not think he could do

without the Saxon addition in case of war. The calculation was based this time—for new estimates made a saving appear feasible—upon the annual amount of income. The surplus of the yearly revenue, put at 5,700,000 dollars, needed an addition of 5,300,000 to cover this amount. At his disposal there were at that time in savings, besides the mobilization fund, 19,300,000 dollars in the crown treasury, 3,200,000 in the Breslau treasury depot, 90,000 Magdeburg forage moneys, and four millions as a balance in the general war treasury,—a grand total of 27,400,000 dollars, a sum which reduced annually by those 5,300,000 dollars would be exhausted in five campaigns, perhaps in four, as in war times a deficit in the regular state revenue and consequently a decrease in the annual surplus had to be reckoned with. Accordingly the eyes of the royal field marshal and state financier, who wanted his treasure to last twice as long, were in those days again turned to Saxony.

It so happened that in Frederick's last war the Saxons did not fight against him but on his side, hence no money could come from that source; so he left Saxony out of consideration in his future financial estimates. The one campaign of 1778 and the preparations for a second had cost seventeen millions; according to this it seemed to be sufficient to fix an amount of

twelve millions for every campaign. An estimate of 1784 supposed that the annual surplus of 7,120,000 dollars would be diminished in war times to six millions; the king intended to cover the large deficit for campaign funds for three years out of the moneys accumulated in the branch depots of the crown treasury, and for three more years from the old treasury. In an estimate of 1786, the cost of a campaign was fixed more liberally at 14,856,259 dollars.

At the end of this reign, with an annual total revenue of not quite twenty-two millions, there were in the old treasury 22,638,339 dollars, inclusive of three million "subsidy moneys"; in the small treasury for the mobilization, 4,454,411; in the Silesian treasury 9,330,000; of Magdeburg forage moneys 8,800,000 in the bank, which had (since 1785) kept the full deposit that had been promised to it upon the founding of the institution. In the general war treasury there was as an iron fund 6,052,250 dollars,—a grand total of 51,302,010 dollars, instead of the round ten millions which Frederick had taken over from his father.

For the support of the army in peace times the revenues of the excise administration and the so-called "adjutum" of the general domain treasury were set apart in the usual way. This

addition between 1740 and 1786 increased from one and a half millions to double that sum. The peace budget of the army amounted in 1740 to not quite five and a half millions; in the last fiscal year before the Seven Years' War it reached 8,300,000 dollars; after the war, until the death of Frederick II, it rose from nine millions to over twelve and a quarter millions. However, this advance for 1740-86 remained considerably behind the growth of the state revenue, which had in the meantime increased threefold.

When peace came, the army was nearly at its full strength. Frederick had said that he held 219,000 men in readiness for a new campaign, among whom were 188,000 field troops. After the disbandment of eight garrison battalions, of all voluntary corps established during the war, of recruit battalions, and of the state militia, and the last remnants of the former Saxon troops, and after reducing the old regiments to the complements which were required before the war, the army numbered a little over 150,000 men, the same as at the beginning of hostilities.

The decrease in the number of troops was not only necessitated by financial considerations, but still more by the shrinking of the population. The various contingents had to be given time to recover after the extensive enlistments

of recent years, in which the farmer lads were put into the army while they were still but half children. The king gave the order that not more than 70,000 natives were to serve in the ranks. With the surplus above this number the cantonments in the extreme war need remained as a last resource for the army, which Frederick declared he would guard like "the apple of his eye." With the steadily increasing population in the first years of peace, the total number of "enrolled" men, that is, all the able young men registered for the service in the army, was considerably higher in 1773 than in 1756, the West Prussian cantonments not included.

Previous to the acquisition of West Prussia the king, in 1768, at the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War, provided for a first new army increase to the extent of ten thousand. Twelve musketeer regiments from the March were raised, with 40 men to each company; the hussars had 300 to the regiment, and Silesia received a new field battalion. In 1772 followed the establishing of five West Prussian musketeer regiments, of four new battalions in the East Prussian garrison troops, of a regiment of hussars and two battalions of artillery. At the same time the companies in 36 old infantry regiments were strengthened by 20 men each.

With this increase the army reached a

strength of 186,000 men, and it numbered: 110 battalions of field infantry, whose grenadier companies in war time had to be formed in 25 separate battalions; seven permanent grenadier battalions, one battalion of infantry sharpshooters; 36 garrison battalions; 63 squadrons of cuirassiers; 70 of dragoons; 90 of hussars; 10 of Bosniaks; one of mounted sharpshooters; eight battalions of field artillery and 11 companies of fortress artillery. In case of war, provisions were made for the enlistment of 23 volunteer battalions, numbering 18,768 men, for the establishing of five squadrons of dragoons, two garrison battalions, and a reënforcement of the complements in the cavalry and in the field battalions. A plan of mobilization, worked out to the minutest detail in 1772, fixed the number of the whole force at 226,777 men; the field troops ready for marching at 197,256 men, in addition to which a state militia of 3,832 men was to be formed.

The Prussian soldier of those days was no more the *miles invictus,* as his war lord had praised him after the Second Silesian War, but to him also the maxim *proeliis ambiguus, bello non victus* applied; he had been vanquished only in battles, not in the whole war. The soldier had gained not only great fame but

popularity with young and old. This was borne out by a Nürnberg industry which flourished through the Seven Years' War and which had been decadent ever since. The little people of the nurseries knew of no better toy than the tin soldiers. And the older folks could not see enough in the drama of the martial figures whom Lessing and his emulators had created for the stage.

"Minna von Barnhelm," according to Goethe, "a true product of the Seven Years' War, of perfect North German national tendency," remained an incomparable monument for the Prussian army of those days, which also proved its "soldier's fortune" by the fact that it had found such an advocate. Lessing had as secretary of the heroic General Tauentzien in Breslau, and the beleaguering lines before Schweidnitz, experienced and learned how to appreciate the *esprit de corps* of the Prussian officers, of whom one of the best had formerly been attached to him by strong bonds of friendship.

The character traits of Ewald von Kleist he gave to his Tellheim, the embodiment of the Prussian officers' honor. The soldier types of Minna von Barnhelm were taken from life, and even if embellished were drawn without any exaggeration. As old acquaintances a reviewer greeted the blunt and devoted packer Just and

the "merry, jocular, honest sergeant" Paul Werner, who after having for a long time hoped in vain "that trouble should start afresh" praised God that somewhere in the world there was yet war. The comrades whom the new "mobilization of the army for the theater" sent to a Tellheim and his faithfuls could not reach up to the great prototypes. To the actors, however, the uniformed parts were agreeable without distinction, for the audience of the pit was delighted with them.

But one man's enjoyment of the army had been spoiled,—the royal leader's. The instrument of his fame as a field marshal had in his opinion not performed enough. He was angry with the army, and many a one in it was angry with him.

The question after returning to peace quarters was to raise to their former plane the regiments that were out of all bounds, and besides having to be scantily patched up time and again after each campaign, were badly trained and still worse disciplined. The same was to be said of their depleted corps of officers, interspersed with some rather dubious aftergrowths who were by no means any more homogeneous. Here the king resorted to new means differing from the old traditions and thereby caused great dissension, especially among the officers, who

partly accepted them as a direct punishment, which to a certain extent was true. With keen irony the duke of Bevern, hero of Lobositz and Reichenbach, wrote in his essay of an army history: "As the army had held its own against the entire Austrian, Russian, Swedish and part of the German and French empire forces, the public had thought his royal majesty would be pleased with the services dutifully rendered; however, his eyes had been keen enough to see that only a few persons, and but a few regiments, had accomplished the good which had happened in the course of the war by themselves; the adversities, however, were caused by the larger rest which consequently had no claim to a reward."

Thus accusations and recriminations arose and passed from one to another. These, at a later period, were perpetuated in the writings of a younger generation of Prussian officers, grown up during the Seven Years' War, in the "letters" of a Kaltenborn, and in the "reflections" of Berenhorst: that chiefs and commanders had always been in jeopardy of dismissal for some very trivial reason or incident upon a bad mood, that the king had always mentally held the review before he had ever seen a single soldier, that the fate of every regiment had already been decided upon at the mo-

ment when the king entered his carriage in Potsdam, that courage, *esprit de corps,* and intrinsic worth in the army had been neglected, that Frederick had gradually started his magnificent war stallion in abrupt and sharp curvetings until the animal did not know how to trot or to walk.

While peace negotiations were going on in Hubertusburg the king divided the army into a number of inspections according to provinces, and in the latter according to the principal weapons, the artillery remaining outside this organization. It was the first step to the later corps division. The inspections became the forerunners of the general commands of today. The inspectors were responsible for the carrying out of the orders, for the uniformity of discipline and training in the different regiments, for the observance of the correct medium between leniency and severity of the commanders, for the conduct of the officers, and for quiet and order at the recruitings. They had to make suggestions concerning distinctions and promotions.

The reason given by the king for this innovation was simple and forceful: the impossibility of seeing everything with his own eyes. The measure spoke for itself, but it had at once an effect that was painful and odious, especially since Frederick did not adhere to the army list in his choice of inspectors. In Silesia a Seydlitz was

appointed for the cavalry and a Tauentzien for the infantry, but in the remaining provinces mostly younger major generals were selected as his representatives. The rough Ramin at the head of the Berlin inspection was as much esteemed and ostentatiously distinguished by the king as he was hated by the army for "really belonging to the period of the Huns and the Vandals." To subordinate himself to some one from the rear ranks was all the harder when a regimental chief was higher in rank or in years of service, because the hitherto position in which they had been under no one else except the king, through the new order of things, lost considerably in importance, prestige and influence.

As was correctly said in those days, the patriarchical constitution of the old Prussian army went into decline and disappeared, according to which in each regiment "the general, so to say, represented the emir of the tribe, and the eleven other company commanders the first chiefs of the branch tribes." The duke of Bevern in Stettin who, as one of the oldest infantry generals, had Major General Steinkeller for his inspector, complained bitterly that there was almost nothing more to do for the chiefs and captains than to be assistants to the inspectors and see to the requisitions of small

equipments. The most disagreeable aspect of the whole thing was that the inspectors remained regimental chiefs themselves, and through this, as Bevern complained again, were in a position to "favor their own regiments as they liked."

Into disproportionately wider circles dissatisfaction was carried by a second innovation—the reform of the company household—for through it the encouraging prospect of a future adequate pension was spoiled for the starving subaltern officer. We remember that hitherto the company chief had kept in hand the wages for the native sons, who in peace times were on an annual leave of from nine to ten months; from this saving he defrayed the cost of the foreign enlistments and retained a surplus for himself. Thenceforward the king put the enlistment moneys into a central treasure from which the savings of the men on leave were requisitioned up to a small amount. Mainly introduced for economic reasons this reorganization, apart from the material loss to the captains, received an objectionable aspect through the fact that a few regiments, in recognition of their excellent conduct before the enemy, were allowed to manage in the old way. Even among themselves the outclassed regiments were not measured equitably: in some cases the fraction of his

old perquisites left to the captain was larger than in others, according to how a regiment was judged in regard to its general conduct. To the segregation of the guards from the line regiments, and of field regiments from garrison troops, this discrimination among the field officers themselves, according to conduct and performances, was added. The admirable principle of equal class honor and of equal personal worth, upon which the Prussian officer corps was founded, had been obscured by displacing entire regiments into a low conduct class.

The worst consequence, however, was that the cutting down of their incomes induced some captains, in order to compensate themselves, to embezzle and falsify the list of their subordinates, after the manner of the dishonest officers of the seventeenth century. With reference to "frequent denunciations and to the surprising number of unsavory processes in various regiments," a general order of Frederick's successor after the accession asserted in sharp words that by men of honor "truth was banished from the lists for the sake of shameful gain."

And yet Frederick William I and Frederick II had worked indomitably to inculcate into their officers' corps a strict sense of honor and integrity; the latter monarch thought to demand no-

ble birth of his officers as a greater assurance of noble sentiments. Frederick William I promoted ordinary citizens to lieutenants, but not to captains; later, General Stollhofen, the son of a clergyman, had to wait until the accession to the throne in 1740 before he became a staff captain.

Frederick afterward, as a rule, did not receive old noncommissioned officers into the officers' corps, for from such the bourgeois lieutenants of his father had largely been recruited, because the sons of the educated middle class did not as yet hold aloof from the army. Now, however, during the long war, numerous middle class sons of good families had voluntarily entered the service,—students from the Prussian universities and scholars from the gymnasiums. It even happened that for several years the Berlin gymnasium did not have a first class. These native sons of citizens had acquired the silver *portepée,* as did at the same time those vagrant adventurers who spoiled the reputation of the officer corps of the volunteer battalions. After the conclusion of peace the king rejected them all, the just with the unjust. The notorious elements were dismissed; whoever was blameless and fit was put into a garrison regiment. Five years after the war there were only four bourgeois officers in the field regiments under

the inspection of General Möllendorf, and them the king intended to transfer somewhere else. Not without justification was such a procedure called cruel. Many a brave soldier was filled with bitterness, and the entire citizenship complained with the offended victims.

Soon the reaction came. The descendants of the nobility no more responded to the demand. Not every son of a country squire had a liking for the military service; a heritage or an advantageous marriage prompted many a young officer to discard his uniform; the middle class, which had been held in contempt for decades, began again to rise in prestige. On the other hand, the king was not specially fond of seeing very wealthy and distinguished noblemen in his regiments. Berenhorst spoke of his "idiosyncrasies against counts" and especially the sons of the Silesian magnates whom he looked upon with distrust, since so many of them had quickly quit the service.

Even in 1783 Frederick announced to his earl court marshal that he had already issued an order not to accept any counts in the army. "Young counts who do not learn anything are ignoramuses in all countries. But if a miracle should happen and something useful should be made of a count, he is not to plume himself upon his title and birth, for those are only tri-

fles; what matters is only his *mérite personnel.*" Of the sons of his generals and his ministers he said these people were too rich, and all they wanted was to serve a few years for the sake of sport. And when General Tauentzien wanted to let a son enter the service of the gendarmes, the king declared he did not like for distinguished people all to join the gendarmes; after two or three years pretexts of chest complaints, sight trouble or rupture would be heard. "That has been done by twenty prominent people in the gendarmes; I want officers and no shirkers."

With a view of finding a remedy for the lack of officers which already began to make itself felt, the regiments in 1779 were generally directed to draw noblemen "of common sense, ambition and real zest" from foreign countries. It was sought to attract certain strata of the hitherto disdained *roture.* By a public edict of May, 1768, the prospect was opened, although in the very remote future, to the sons of bourgeois country squires. These landed property owners were admitted as an unwelcome exception, and promised that they would be made peers of the realm whenever they had been promoted to company commanders in the garrison regiments or in the artillery, and had served ten years as captains,—for only to such were these honors made accessible.

On the other hand, the hussars maintained their preferred position. In 1779 the king complained that the "real hussar service" had gone into decay, and thought to discern the cause for this in the fact that so many "young windbags" had been accepted as officers. He therefore decided that in future more sergeants of long service were to be promoted to lieutenants.

With the newly entered cadets, however, he did not make any issue of their pedigree. When General Lossow, in a report, described the youngest cornet of his Black Hussars as a Mecklenburg Junker the king wrote to him: "So much I would like to tell you that his father was not a nobleman but a forester, and also a paramour of the old duchess of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, so that you may know his whole genealogy." The ennobled hussar generals Moehrin, Günther, Salenmon and Hohenstock were of bourgeois descent, as were the generals Holtzendorf, Moller and Tempelhoff in the artillery.

To all the other causes of discord were added complaints of the increasing drilling and the pettifogging methods. There was much scolding under Frederick William I about the lassitude in drill which had gained ground. Now the army sighed that the drill confined under the preceding reign essentially to the camp weeks, and at all events endurable before the Great

War, was practiced intolerably in peace, to the utter exhaustion of those soldiers who remained with the colors beyond the term of the spring exercises.

"Nowhere was renunciation more required," scoffed Berenhorst, "than with the badly compensated victors of the Seven Years' War, when the punctilious elaboration of tactics and its innumerable combinations in feet, inches and seconds of execution demanded no slight study." When the war lord incessantly pointed to his great aim,—the restoration of the old discipline, mobility and readiness to strike,—his colonels, as was natural, devised ways and means of reaching the goal as quickly and as safely as possible.

There can be no doubt that in this respect many an inspector or regimental chief overdid it in "inventive rigor." However, not everything that had been thought out and tested came to the knowledge of the king. General von Saldern, the greatest genius among the Prussian tacticians, had to act cautiously, it was said, with his inventions, and he introduced many things in a clandestine manner. The king, as the unprejudiced Kaltenborn testified, was not at all fond of a lot of regulations and of "time wasting playing about."

He did not inundate his army with orders in which he repeated himself a hundred times, or

countermand a once given order. He steered shy of all innovations; alterations in the equipment and other little formalities were far below his dignity and the one which he endeavored to impart to his army. He called the pedants among his officers the "ballroom majors." If he insisted with sternness upon the regulations concerning dress, it was not done for the sake of pedantry but with the idea of not encouraging any excesses of fashion, of checking extravagance, and of getting the officers out of their *petitmaitre* ways. The satirist asserted that in all dubious cases the ruler assumed the reverse of the actual fashion as the regulation for his army.

Kaltenborn further acknowledged that the king's critical eyes on maneuvering days were only directed upon the entirety. "From the moment when he had his troops maneuver he treated them as in the hour of battle, and was satisfied if only the chief object was well carried out. He maneuvered with exceeding agility and ease and did not harass the men with pages of dispositions; one was nearly always able to write them on a piece of paper the size of a playing card."

Thus the ruler was always in good humor the day after the review, "glad, as it were, to get off his mind the unpleasant things he had had to

say." Nothing was more instructive than his words on such occasions, "as if he was not in a bad mood." It was then a treat to hear him lecture, as it were, in a military college. He knew exactly who it was that had made a mistake, the cause of such error, and how it would and should have been possible to remedy it. His voice was gentle and insinuating, he looked pleased, and seemed anxious to give good advice rather than commands. Frederick said of the great autumn maneuvers which were held before the war that the whole practice was for the officers and the generals, without giving any attention to the private soldiers.

A sequence of new arrangements aimed at the better training and the theoretical instruction of the officers. The cadet corps was joined by the "Académie des Nobles," founded in 1765 as a sort of select institution, with fifteen regular members and as many outside ones, while as preparatory institutes the cadet school at Stolp was founded in 1764 for the sons of the nobility of Lower Pomerania, and one at Kulm in 1775 for the West Prussian Junkers, who were still in need of more training and education.

Instruction courses in the science of fortification and geography were established at the seats of the new army inspections, in such a way that an engineer officer taught for four winter

months a number of talented comrades who were selected after nominations of the respective regiments. The most gifted of these pupils, —generally about twelve altogether,—were taken by the king into his military retinue. Before the Seven Years' War he created for himself a personal general staff and he now further promoted this institution. As when he was crown prince in Rheinsberg he had shared the scientific instruction of the youngest palace inmate, with his companions so now he sat in his armchair, holding discourses to his twelve military disciples about the art of war, with a view of afterward testing them in the saddle as to how far these budding quartermasters had acquired judgment and precision in exploiting the various topographical features of the landscape.

For the use of the inspectors, he had printed in 1771 a few copies of *Principles of the Art of Siege and Tactics*, a revised reissue of individual sections of the old *General Principles of Warfare*. The older as well as the recent instructions, and a short compendium of the *Rules according to which a good Commander of a Battalion was to Act in Time of War*, were made accessible to the generals and staff officers under the seal of military secrets, "for perusal only, not for copying purposes."

The afterward famous Frenchman Du-

mouriez, who gained a knowledge of the Prussian army on his journey to Poland, judged that in Prussia a great number of "evolutionary officers" had developed in those days without having accomplished the bringing up of generals. Eagerly seizing upon this remark, Berenhorst added that already, after the type of the scientific officer had been carried from the French over to the Prussians in the years from 1746 to 1756, a part of the clever brains had gradually discovered the light of the maneuvering art. "They discovered the ways and tricks of it on the drawing boards."

One has to admit that the scientific overrating of topographical knowledge subsequently became harmful to the Prussian army, and that the much vaunted Massenbach who had in Prussia's darkest period become an outright deterrent example of a scientifically trained general staff officer, enjoyed his first education under the eyes of Frederick the Great. But the fundamental idea of the pedagogic aspirations of the great field marshal was undoubtedly correct, as it was in regard to this awakening and fostering of the scientific spirit in the officer corps. Kaltenborn's work indicates that Frederick introduced into the army a totally different tone and ways from those which he found at the commencement of his reign.

Those *Rules for a good Battalion Commander* culminate in the maxim: "One knows from experience that the excellence of the troops is based upon that of the officers; a brave colonel means a brave battalion, and one has seen in all our wars that whenever the commander was a particularly able man that battalion has never been defeated, except the commander had previously been wounded or killed."

Still more plainly and harshly Frederick's contempt for the private is expressed in the *Testament* of 1768: "Ambition has no influence upon the common soldier. All that is possible to be made out of him confines itself to inculcating into him the *esprit de corps,* that is, a higher opinion of his own regiment than of all the troops in the world; and as on certain occasions the officers have to lead him right through the midst of the greatest dangers, he must fear his officers more than the dangers to which one exposes him." How gratefully had the young king, the victor of Hohenfriedberg and Sohr, once recognized the good will, the bravery and the devotion of the private! The days of his defeat, the gloomy hours in which he had seen his soldiers flee,—this school of misfortune had become to him a source of contempt for mankind, and the gray pupil had been only too docile.

They themselves, however, these poor warriors whom the old Frederick despised, loved him. The army loved its king "almost to idolatry," said Kaltenborn, after he had abused the monarch to his heart's content; and one of the Austrian guests at Neisse confirms this truth. "However much his surrounding company may fear the king and complain about his mood, which was often almost unbearable, the soldiers and especially the native sons were always enthused over him, for he cared for them and eased their lot as well as he could." The address "Fritz" or "Father," which the men had acquired the right to use, the hearty "Thou" which Fritz permitted them, and other little familiarities, perhaps also blunt replies that were not taken amiss,—all these compensated for their many hardships and sufferings.

Particularly the grenadiers of the First Battalion thought, as Kaltenborn said, to be real members and home companions, as it were, of the royal family, "and if through this they deemed themselves privileged sometimes to grumble about their father, which was by no means done in the choicest expressions, but in the worst possible blasphemies, nobody would have dared to use one objectionable word against the king in their presence. That battalion alone proved how far that almost super-

natural man had brought it in the art of being loved, . . . a glance, a word from Frederick's lips was sufficient to compensate them for everything." It was a look, our witness said on another occasion, "which nothing could resist. I have always believed one of the chief reasons of the unattainable height which Frederick reached was in his eyes."

How he made his peace at the review of 1773 with one of the East Prussian regiments which had fallen into disgrace after the battle of Zorndorf has been described by a lieutenant of this regiment in simple yet striking words, under the touching first impression: "Everybody was crowding around the king with expressions of gratitude and joy; presently he wanted to say something, but he was too overcome himself and he remained silent, and only wept. His majesty was then preparing to leave, but we did not let him go. 'It is all right,' said the king, 'now everything is all right again. Boys, leave me alone.' Then the general stepped forward and expressed his particular thanks in the name of the regiment. The king said: 'Now there, you have your grenadier march again,' and quickly rode away."

When the great war hero, in the spring of 1764, was exercising his Potsdam battalions for the first time, as was his habit in peace days,

he cherished anew the hope of seeing his excellent army, which had been ruined by the sanguinary war, rise like "a phœnix out of the ashes." But it was a long time before all the aftermath had been overcome. The cavalry recovered more easily than the infantry, for they had met with less serious losses and soon replaced them. As the king said, they had perfected themselves in the war, whereas the infantry had sunk from step to step with the dwindling of their veterans.

In the fourth year after the conclusion of peace, Frederick judged that another three years would elapse before the old *tone de solidité* would be again fully restored. As a matter of fact the year 1770 marked for him the epoch of complete recovery. In 1768 a general in the retinue of the emperor found the Prussian infantry at Neisse, if not perfectly recovered, still well adjusted and elastic in all their movements; one could barely recognize the Prussian troops who fifty years later always worked upon the same principles. Among the cavalry, the same observer gave the Seydlitz regiment by far the preference above all others. The hussars did not excite his admiration on account of their smart appearance, but seemed to him to be excellently trained for the small warfare, for reconnoitering on the march, and for skirmishes.

The king now directed more attention to the rapidity of the infantry fire, since experience had taught that the former bayonet attack at the beginning of a fight could be expected no more from the soldiers. With a ticker in his hand, test shootings were held at the reviews, for the platoons. The result was that the soldier learned to load and shoot four times each minute. The cylinder shaped ramrod introduced in 1773, at the suggestion of Frederick, prince of Brunswick, obviated the turning of the tapering rod then in use, and a facility for the filling in of the powder was secured in 1781 by the funnel-shaped touchhole, an invention of Lieutenant von Freytag which was rewarded with the order *Pour le Mérite*. Now the soldier succeeded after practice in shooting as much as six times a minute, whereas with sharp ammunition hardly more than four, or at the most five shots had been attained. The garrison battalions shot less rapidly, but in other respects they were, according to the king's judgment, brought to such a perfection in 1773 that no general had cause to be ashamed of them in his regiment.

In the fortresses, the protection of which was the duty of these garrison troops in time of war, there was much to be rebuilt and perfected. In the Eulengebirge (Owl Mountains) originated the Silesian Gibraltar of Silberberg, with its

chain of rock fortresses to cover the mountain passes to the Bohemian as well as to the Glatz side, and at the same time to give support to the famous key position of Landshut. In West Prussia, Graudenz was fortified as a bulwark confronting an attack from the direction of Poland, and serving as a fourth line of defense against an enemy advancing through East Prussia, after he had been successful in forcing the crossing of the Memel, the lines of the rivers Inster and Pregel, and a fortified camp in the pass of Lötzen. For the protection of the Baltic coast Colberg, whose strategical importance had been proven in the last war, was reconstructed as a military base of the first order.

King Frederick previously, in the *Political Testament* of 1752, after the acquisition of West Prussia with Danzig, considered the equipment of floating batteries, about thirty galleys and several frigates, but no battleships for the coast protection. In the end, however, he abandoned the modest plan for the founding of a navy.

"I do not think," he wrote in 1777, "that one should ever be persuaded in this country to build a navy. Here are the reasons. There are in Europe, of big fleets, the English, French, Spanish, Danish and Russian navies. We shall never be able to equal them; so if we always remain behind the other nations with several ships, the

expense would be useless. To this must be added that the money which a fleet costs would compel us to diminish our land forces, that the country is not populous enough to supply recruits for the army and sailors for the fleet, and finally that naval battles are rarely decisive. From this I conclude that it is better to have the best army in Europe than the worst fleet among the naval powers."

Thus completely was the conqueror of Silesia bound up in the political situation created by himself, and in the tasks of the moment which none the less were yet to demand another century for their final solution. The relations with Austria remained lastingly the basis of his political and military calculations.

Time and again he discussed the means and possibilities of striking some heavy blows against this adversary, if it again came to a struggle; in 1764, in the preamble to his discourse upon the recently finished war; again in 1768 in the new *Political Testament;* in 1770 in the *Principles of the Art of Siege and Tactics;* in 1775 in the *Reflections about Campaign Plans;* and in 1777 in the condensed *Exposé du gouvernement Prussien,* which emphasized the close connection between the conduct of war and politics.

The practical application formerly concluded from the particular conditions of the Prussian

state was,—"Our wars must be short and sharp." He generalized the maxim, "War is only waged to force the enemy as quickly as possible to sign a peace which is advantageous for us." Thus he expected from a war with the French that an invading army would not waste seven or eight years in the siege of the frontier fortresses, and fight one battle a year, but would penetrate into the heart of France and threaten the capital.

"Broad schemes" was the watchword of the old king for future campaigns. Prince Eugene, "the greatest warrior of his century," with his three most brilliant campaigns, with Höchstädt, Turin and Belgrade, was the model which he set up for himself and his generals. "The great plans of campaign," he admitted, "do not all succeed, but there is always more accomplished with them than with these small schemes, in which one is content with the taking of one little place on the frontier. . . . The man who was successful in all his schemes is not born yet, but if you are only meddling with limited ones, then you will remain a mediocre man, and if of ten great schemes which you undertake only two succeed, you have made your name immortal."

But did his art of war know of some means for insuring success? Formerly he had recommended the battle itself to his generals as the

most decisive way to force the fortunes of war, and in proud retrospection recalled Hohenfriedberg, Sohr and Kesselsdorf, proudly believing the Prussian troops had proved that the supposed impregnable positions were not too strong for them. Now painful disappointments and terrible experiences lay behind him; murderous defeats and no less murderous victories; those battles with which the admirers of Prince Henry's tame conduct of war had given him the reputation "to know no other remedy but the battle."

"War," he said to himself, "has become more and more cunning, more difficult, more daring, as we have no more to fight alone against men, but with the strong positions and the artillery." It did not seem probable that the Austrian generals would abandon the method of General Daun which Frederick had to acknowledge as an undisputably good one for them; thus they would direct their attention in the next war to strong positions, as they had done in the last war. Here the king was disposed to blame the field marshal, who acted rashly and attacked the enemy on mountain ridges or in a broken country. He excused himself, when he had done this on several occasions, with his case of extreme need. "The attack upon a strongly fortified post is an undertaking much too difficult; one can easily be thrown or defeated, and if it is

Frederick William von Steuben.



forced, it is done with a loss of fifteen thousands and twenty thousands, which tears too cruelly a gap into the army."

In the face of such a position it was impossible in the beginning of a battle to use cavalry, which in Frederick's previous battles had as a rule opened the fight. If a commander chose to let the infantry advance, he might as well let loose a crowd of peasants armed with sticks. And so the king, contrary to his former views that skirmishes are more costly than a battle, admitted in his history of the Seven Years' War, written immediately after the conclusion of peace, and likewise in the military testament of 1768, that he knew of no better advice than to amass many little successes: "Their total makes great ones; multiply little successes, that is, heap up a treasure little by little; in time one gets rich without knowing how it was done."

The *Réflexions* of 1775 repeated this maxim, that the accumulation of small successes affords a substitute for a victorious battle, and in the long run decides the superiority. But here we meet this rule in the advice for the defensive. The sections treating the offensive warfare show that it was by no means the intention of the king to renounce battles altogether. If he could take up the offensive against Austria with a superior force, then he contemplated, according to his old

standard plan, to choose Moravia as the seat of war, and to fight a decisive battle on the ground which was more favorable for a struggle, that would compel the opponent to evacuate Bohemia, open to victory the way to the Danube, and threaten the hostile capital. For the tactical arrangement of the campaign, he adhered to the old rule that only one wing should engage in the fight.

Meanwhile, however, the old war hero was glad to look upon foreign wars without being forced to intervene; he compared himself to the German comedians who during their vacation used to visit the performances of the French to educate themselves after their model. When Voltaire, during the Russo-Turkish War, uttered the wish to the ruler that he should descend upon Mustapha and drive the barbarians out of Europe, Frederick replied to the peace apostle who was forgetting his part: "What! My dear saint, you are surprised that there is a war in Europe, and I am not in it?" We have seen how in those days he succeeded in preserving the peace for his states; but some day another fight would have to come.

CHAPTER VII

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND CHURCH POLICY; STATUTE LAW AND STATE SYSTEM.

AS King Frederick, on his return from his second war, immediately made the carrying out of the reform of the administration of justice his watchword, so the task, only half accomplished a generation before, received a fresh impetus soon after the conclusion of peace in 1779, through which it was still to be guided to its completion in the old century by the general statute law.

For a long time the sovereign had lost sight of the great work of codification, or rather he deemed it already solved. Not alone was the perfected criminal law his pride. Without having abolished the sanguinary laws of Emperor Charles V, he had mitigated them by the setting up of humane principles to which the Prussian criminal judge now had to adhere.

"We have modified our laws and fared well with it." Thus he boasted when, in 1764, under

the profound impression of Beccaria's famous work, *Dei delitti e pene,* torturing and bloodthirstiness fell into disrepute in other countries. The civil law according to which the Prussian courts pronounced judgment seemed to him to rest upon a sufficiently secure basis. Still in 1777 he wrote in his *Exposé du gouvernement Prussien:* "The laws in this country are wisely enough ordered. I do not think it is necessary to revise them." Thus highly did he esteem the legislative performance of his celebrated Tribonian, the *Corpus juris Fridericianum.*

The king was not alone in his ardent estimation of the judicial reform of Cocceji. Grand Chancellor Jariges in 1765 praised the work of his official predecessor as "this happy revolution," thanks to which in no other country on earth was justice handled with the same precision as in Prussia. The entire supreme court, the stronghold of Cocceji's disciples, judged much the same, as did Baron von Fürst, the former president of this court, who in 1770, after the death of Jariges, received the dignity of a grand chancellorship.

Von Carmer, the minister of justice for Silesia and chief president of the three Silesian high courts, however, went his own way. Once Cocceji's assistant, like Fürst, whom he opposed increasingly with the advancing years, Carmer

had gained a vigorous self-consciousness in his independent provincial sphere of activity, and finally demanded a new reform in a direction which materially deviated from Cocceji's foundations.

To the principle of written proceedings upon which the process of law was hitherto based, he opposed the official or inquisition maxim, in which he intended to assign the task to the judge to establish the facts in an official manner by a verbal examination of the parties concerned. With this, attorneyship, according to Carmer the root of all evil, was made absolutely dispensable.

It was Carmer's great merit that in the evolution of Prussian justice he went to work with courage and vigor, that he did away with a plethora of prejudices, and possessed keenness and enough independence to brush aside the opponents of his person and of his work,—clever, self-conscious and implacable adversaries as they were. That in this task he had in Svarez a most capable collaborator of indomitable activity, deep erudition, and the perfect art of form impartation for the expert part of his task was Carmer's good fortune, and at the same time his great merit. Certainly Svarez was the father of the Prussian general statute law, who melted, as it were, the castings supplied by the rest of

the men in the workshop into one whole, and impressed it with the stamp of his own individuality and intellect. But as little as Svarez, can we imagine Carmer outside the second Prussian reform of justice.

Carmer's appointment meant a programme. The grand chancellor obtained the formal consent of the crown to his plans through the decree which received the royal signature on April 14, 1780. In this the reform was given two tasks: the reorganization of court procedure in the sense of the inquisition maxims, with the obligation of the judge to hear the parties himself, and the compilation of a general law book with subsidiary validity, and in addition the collection of the provincial laws.

In his organization of procedure, the scheme of which appeared in 1781 as *Corpus juris Fridericianum, Book I,* and which in the general law proceedings received their final shape, Carmer had to renounce, to the malicious joy of his opponents, his Utopian idea of the total abolishment of attorneyship. In other respects, however, this reform indicated a considerable progress, and a permanent gain was the scope which it afforded the judge in gathering proof material, especially in the taking of oaths.

In the work of codification the great work succeeded, according to a recent competent

critic, in having "for the first time in Germany, removed the dualism of the Roman law material, and also that of the Germans and other modern ones, and to have amalgamated these elements into one organized whole, into one uniform system of law." Pütter, the most distinguished law historian of Germany in those days, greeted the first part of the scheme, put into print with the wish that out of it might grow a similar law book for every other German state, "and why not even for the whole of Germany?"

King Frederick received this first part in 1784 with gracious words of appreciation for Carmer's "indomitable zeal." Concerning the second section, laid before him in the following year, he exercised the personally written criticism: "But it is very thick, and laws ought to be short, not prolix." Thus he adhered to his old conception that a good law book had to endeavor to reach the highest degree of common understanding, to afford the layman a guide through the labyrinth of the traditional laws, and "if possible, to prevent every cause for a quarrel through clearness and sharply defined regulations." That the authors of the statute law had made wide concessions to this view point, that they had even shared the opinions of the king to a great extent, is a fact from which the later often criticised weak points in their work partly re-

sulted. For instance, the expurgation of Latin expressions without replacing them with clear German explanations, and the too subtly ramified casuistry of the paragraphs, with their pronounced endeavor "not only to regulate the conceptions of the judicial objects and actions, but also the consequences to be derived therefrom as much as possible by positive laws, with a view to prevent a fluctuating and arbitrary division."

The *General Prussian Statute Law*, which came into force in 1794, after the death of Frederick, was not exclusively a civil law book. It contained paragraphs from the criminal law, and from the state law; it comprised the law for the various social strata, according to the different vocations and social ranks, and it also extended to the relation between the Church and the State.

The eleventh title of the second part, "Of the rights and duties of the churches and ecclesiastical societies," may be described as the abstract of the Frederician Church policy, of which we shall have to treat again in this connection.

The relation of the Prussian state authority to the Catholic Church had become strained during the Seven Years' War, both through proofs of disloyalty in the ranks of the Silesian Catholics, and through the offending attitude of the see.

However, the king did not make the disloyal Catholics feel his disfavor permanently. The abolition of the compulsory incumbency which Catholic clergymen had exercised over members of the Protestant congregation, ordered after the battle of Leuthen, was freed of its penal aspect by the fact that now, according to the principle of reciprocity, Catholics who were parishioned in a Protestant diocese were exempt from all parochial tithes and other taxes to the parson and the sexton.

The Catholics saw a further concession in the fact that the king, in 1772, made a decision in favor of their churches under Protestant patronage, according to which the owner of a landed estate could not renounce the church patronage and the duty connected with it, in order to maintain the church, except beyond the amount of the customary burden. And the possessions of ecclesiastical buildings were, according to the decree of 1742, so strictly upheld for the Catholics that even if there was only one inhabitant of that faith in existence, the church was not placed at the disposal of the Protestants. The king even decreed that in case a Catholic congregation was defunct the church was to be kept open for the Catholics who might in the future settle in the community.

In the border domains disputed over by the

temporal and the ecclesiastical authorities, upon which he had set foot by virtue of his sovereign power, Frederick endeavored to spare the idiosyncrasies and susceptibilities of his Catholic subjects. When, after the event of 1744, he insisted as a matter of principle upon his right of nomination in the case of vacancies in ecclesiastical prebends, he did not like it "when without any cause difficulties were raised and the matter was driven to the utmost."

He showed himself inexorable and unbendable after the war against the demand that, in the oath of allegiance to be renewed by the Silesian clergy, the ecclesiastics had expressly to admit that with an infringement of this oath they had forfeited forgiveness in this as well as in the next life. Here he did not uphold the objection of the Breslau prebendaries that this clause was encroaching upon the sacrament of penance and upon the priestly absolution, but compelled these distinguished clergymen also to take the oath which had been sworn to by the majority of the Silesian clergy.

A measure of the extent to which the claims of the state authority could be enforced without restraint of conscience was always given by the example of the Catholic states. The king provided the Silesian high president Schlabrendorff with the general instruction that every prohibi-

tion or onus imposed upon the clergy in France or in any other Catholic empire would also apply in Silesia. In consequence of this Schlabrendorff made the motion in March, 1765, that in future, according to a law just recently put in force in France, neither bulls nor breves of the pope should be published without royal consent. The king agreed with this proposal and subsequently refused his assent repeatedly to papal mandates.

Pope Clement XIII, who during the war had joyfully praised the union of the Catholic powers against the heretical king, was silent after the fresh Church-political claim of the Prussian crown. Had it depended upon him alone he would have liked to restore the friendly relations between the see and this crown which existed before his election but was not yet officially recognized in Rome. The nuncio in Warsaw had assured the Prussian ambassador, long after the peace of Hubertusburg, of the friendly sentiments of the pope toward the king, and on this occasion emphatically denied the rumor of the donation of a consecrated sword to Field Marshal Daun. The king replied that with all respect for the Roman chair he would not have anything to do with its present occupant.

This, however, did not affect the conduct of

Clement XIII a year later, for through his fair attitude in a vexatious incident in Silesia he preserved the peace between State and Church.

Once more that unworthy prelate caused a conflict, the rousing of which more than twenty years before had encountered great opposition in the see. Prince Bishop Schaffgotsch, since 1757 a traitor in the eyes of the king, had asked to be included in the amnesty provided in the peace agreement, as his conduct, though not free from rashness, was free from malice. He had in a characteristic manner connected his request with an act of simony by offering to Minister Schlabrendorff, in case of his reinstatement, an annual pension of 1,000 ducats. The king let the bribery attempt pass, and commissioned Schlabrendorff to announce his pardon to the penitent sinner, but specified that the latter must never write again to the king or stay with him in the same place. To make this certain, the town of Oppeln was assigned to him as his steady residence and as a decent place for interment.

The administration of the bishopric was left as heretofore to the consecration bishop and vicar general Strachwitz. The pardoned man, however, could not endure the stay in the little place of Oppeln. In the spring of 1766 he fled into Austrian Silesia, to his castle Johannesburg.

The king withdrew the authority given to the vicar general, but forbade the chapter to have any connection with the fugitive bishop, who was not to be regarded otherwise "but as though he had died." Here the see was unhesitatingly on the side of the sovereign, as it proved by appointing Strachwitz the apostolic vicar in the Prussian part of the bishopric of Breslau, according to his motion and with reference to the royal prohibition issued to the chapter.

In those days the attitude of the Catholic Church regarding marriages between Catholics and Protestants was a lenient one. In districts where, in the parlance of the see, heresy was rampant with impunity, few difficulties were placed in the way of such unions. The bishops of Breslau issued the dispensation for the marriage between people of different religion without asking the see and without insisting upon the promise that the children would be brought up as Catholics; one yielded to the principle established by the state that the sons of mixed marriages had to follow the creed of the father, and the daughters that of the mother. Only when there was the special obstacle of canonically prohibited consanguinity did objections arise between the ecclesiastical and state authorities.

Benedict XIV had in this respect given a cer-

tain scope to the episcopal decision; Clement XIV and Pius VI, however, insisted that a *dispensation a gradibus* could only be granted by the pope himself, and only then when the non-Catholic party declared its willingness before the conclusion of the marriage to change.

In this the Prussian government saw an attempt at proselyting and an impairment of religious freedom. After protracted negotiations the threat of the king prevailed that in such cases, with the repeated refusal of the ecclesiastical authority, he would have the bridal couple married by a Protestant parson. The pope agreed in 1777 to give the Breslau consecration bishop a conditional authority for dispensations which he himself, as he explained, could suffer in a tolerant although unwilling spirit, but would never sanction by an act of his authority. Pius VI on this occasion particularly appreciated, with warm words, the generous privileges granted to the Prussian Catholics.

Soon this pope was to see himself under still greater obligations of gratitude to the Prussian king. To him came the days of visitation, as they had come for his two predecessors. In Austria, Joseph II was extending the borders of state authority far into the ecclesiastical domain, and began his work of secularization which greatly limited the number of monasteries

and the possessions of those that had hitherto been spared. In vain did the pope, "the abbot from the South," as one scoffed in Vienna, determine upon a supplicatory journey to Vienna, —the emperor did not deviate from the once chosen path. "If Braschi would be infallible," King Frederick had predicted, "he would not commit the foolishness to undertake such a step, which is as useless as it is unseemly." One should, he said,—to avenge Frederick II and Henry IV,—prepare a reception for the pope in Vienna like that once given to the emperor in Canossa: "Rome, the domineering Rome, succumbs to her revolting children who refuse to obey her, who demonize the cowl bearers, take possession of her estates, and impudently shake off the yoke of purgatory, and everywhere the heretics cry, 'we have always said it, the Babylonian hussy is not infallible.'"

Satisfied in his capacity as a heretic, which he was fond of emphasizing, with the decay of the papacy, with the humiliation of the "deputy deity of the seven mountains," he soon knew how, as a politician, to gain from these events an advantage in the reverse direction. For the final consolidation of the Prussian rule in Silesia, nothing could be more welcome to him than the oppressions of the clergy in the Catholic neighboring empire, over whose frontiers

many of the Silesian Catholics had sent longing glances. Now at last, after forty years, they had been won wholly for Prussia when, on the 26th of August, 1782, the king announced to the entire clergy through the consecration bishop, on his visit to Breslau, that no chapter or monastery should have to fear an increase of burdens or even a dissolution, "so long as they conducted themselves as loyal and honest subjects." With deep joy the consecration bishop confessed, in his pastoral letter issued soon afterward: "If ever my episcopal office has appeared to me sweet and easy, it certainly was at that moment when I was able to announce to all the chapters and monasteries these paternal sentiments of his royal majesty." Thus the confessional injustices in Silesia were removed at the conclusion of the reign of the first Prussian sovereign. All Silesians, whether Protestant or Catholics, had become stanch Prussians.

CHAPTER VIII

THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION OF PRINCES OF 1785

FREDERICK was industrious to the last. The tired, aged monarch made one more grand and successful throw. Who would have believed that after the brilliant beginnings of the youthful conqueror of Silesia, the signs and miracles which the hero of the Seven Years' War had shown to friend and foe in the struggle against a world in arms, the convincing proofs of foresight and judgment, of determination and moderation, which in 1772 the master of statecraft displayed on the reacquisition of West Prussia and more recently at the rescue of Bavaria,—that after this accumulation of achievements the sympathy of the world for the grim old hero would be still capable of a wider expansion? And yet so it was.

The beginnings of the new decade, the first years of the eighties, did not forecast such a turn. The Prussian policy lost the fulcrum which had supported it since 1764,—the alliance

with Russia. Furthermore, the king had returned home from the last war with the disturbing fear that with the death of the empress-queen her son would press his schemes of aggrandizement. For this reason everyone in Berlin wished the queen a long evening of life, whereas in Vienna the demise of the king was awaited with a certain impatience. Not that it was intended to crush the successor of Frederick the Great by war. The tactics of Prince Kaunitz were different. The question was, so he informed the ambassador in Berlin during an illness of the king in 1776, to disabuse the mind of the prince of Prussia "of all apprehensions about adverse intentions which could perhaps be carried out after the death of his uncle.

"Through such personal assurances the hitherto hankering of the crown prince after pomp and lavishness could be fostered in the easiest way, and in such a manner the Prussian machine could be more surely undermined and gradually led to its decay." King Frederick said the only task of the imperial ambassador in Berlin was to watch his state of health. The tacit thought which filled the Austrian hearts had been ingenuously expressed by the young French queen Marie Antoinette in a letter to her mother: "It was not permitted to her to wish for the death of the king of Prussia, but it

would be a great fortune if he through his bad health would be unable to stir."

Five years younger than the "wicked man in Sans Souci," as she called the king, the great empress departed from the scene of action; five years before him who had been filled with their quarrel for more than a generation. She died as she had lived, in the castle of her forefathers in Vienna, on the 29th of November, 1780, her heart full of care for her country, of love and kindness for her children and for her entire surroundings, of devoutness and gratitude toward her God,—religious, brave, without fear of the illness and without fear of death.

When Frederick received news of the passing away of Maria Theresa, he wrote to his ambassador Riedesel at Vienna: "The excellent merits of this great princess are universally recognized. The whole of Europe has admired the distinguished qualities of her soul and her heart. There was only one voice about the rank which she occupied among the sovereigns. One can say without exaggeration that she will be unanimously mourned." He was indignant with the ingratitude of the Vienna mob, which complained of the pressure of taxation, and whose insolent attitude at the funeral sounded a discordant note amid the mourning ceremonies of the capital.

To D'Alembert Frederick wrote that, in spite of the unconcern about deaths and births which comes with advancing age, he had lamented the death of the empress. "She has done honor to the throne and to her sex. I have conducted war against her and have never been her enemy,"—words which, when repeated on a solemn occasion in the French Academy, were stormily applauded. But the most exquisite praise which Frederick bestowed upon his great adversary was when he, to his own danger, referred to the example of steadfastness and heroic bravery which the young queen of Hungary gave to the astonished world in the struggle for the heritage of her forefathers.

The new Austrian emperor, Joseph II, soon broke decisively with Frederick, and the aged king found himself without a single remaining European ally. From this painful isolation the king looked out again upon the German sovereign princes, after he had declared to the duke of Brunswick that it was time to establish a league after the example of the Schmalkalden Federation.

"One must," he wrote in February to Finckenstein, "unite the German princes in a confederation solely for the avowed purpose of upholding the empire system as it is at present, and I confess that should matters shape them-

selves to a war, one has to prepare to let these people participate in the game and to pay them subsidies, which would not be impossible."

A confederation of the empire states, which formerly he had imagined as an adjunct to a union with Russia, or with France or England, was now to become of itself the support of the Prussian policy and its last refuge, for the king declared he could find no other ally to be trusted among the European powers.

In the first place he thought of Hanover, Brunswick and Hesse, his allies in the Seven Years' War, and also of the ecclesiastical princes, Bamberg-Würzburg, Paderborn, Fulda and Hildesheim. On March 6, 1784, the order was issued to the ministers to take the initial steps required. The king remarked that not between today and tomorrow could so many heads be brought under one hat; the work in question was not one of a fortnight, but of one and a half or two years; he only wished to see the union realized before his death.

He could not think he was exposed to imminent danger. He felt that it was not as in 1756, when an attack upon him had been agreed upon and had been made ready. It was significant of the situation that Austria was diverted for the time from aggressive plans against Prussia by her alliance with Russia, directed

toward the southeast, and that Russia for this alliance only endeavored to dismember Turkey, not, however, as in Elizabeth and Bestuschew's times,—by the overthrow of Prussia.

Frederick was certain that if it did come to a breach with the two imperial courts, he would in no circumstances see the French among his opponents, as they were in the Seven Years' War. If an alliance could not be had with them, the relations between the two would remain friendly at all events. When Prince Henry, in the summer of 1784, made a journey to the south of France, his royal brother gladly gave his consent to an invitation to come to Paris which reached the prince in Geneva. On August 17, Count von Oels, the incognito of Henry, arrived there, and on the 22nd he greeted the king and queen in Versailles.

Meanwhile the negotiations progressed slowly. Not that the smaller courts had been non-receptive to the association idea; the ecclesiastical courts especially were filled with apprehension over the restless, far-reaching policy of the emperor. Would Joseph some day extend the secularization system prevailing in his patrimonial dominions to the chapters of the empire?

His quarrels with the neighboring ecclesiastical princes of Salzburg and Passau made all think seriously. The House of Austria lost its

most loyal faction in the diet with these bishops. Through the liberal bishop of Würzburg and Bamberg, Franz Ludwig von Erthal, relations were established with the Protestant courts of Weimar, Gotha, Dessau and Carlsruhe.

Quite in the manner of expression of the princely opponents of Joseph's great ancestor Emperor Charles V, one spoke in these courts of the yoke which was threatening the German princes, of the fetters that were being forged with great eagerness. In his zeal for German liberty, that is, for the old autonomy of the empire states, Duke Ernst of Gotha even referred to the American contenders for independence. Their example had shown that the rights of mankind brook no opposition.

Already these small princes were thinking of establishing an empire army for protection against the emperor, the supreme command of which one from among themselves, Duke Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand of Brunswick, would have to assume.

Not only the emperor, but Prussia, was feared; the Prussian arrogance, of which much was heard, seemed likely to become as dangerous to German freedom as the imperialism of Joseph. Therefore the Protestant prince bishop of Osnabrück, the second son of the English king, thought the continuation of the empire au-

thority depended wholly upon the balance between Austria and Prussia. For the moment, however, a more imminent peril threatened from Vienna. It rested upon the attempt to bind Prussia by a conservative tendency which definitely fixed this power in a union for the maintenance of German liberty, with the king of Prussia in the rôle of a protector of the empire constitution. In this sense the grandchild of the old Dessauer, Prince Leopold Friedrich Franz, and with him the duke of Brunswick, used their efforts to win the Prussian successor to the throne and Minister Hertzberg for the idea of an empire association.

In this instance of the Prussian policy, acted with resolution, something might have been achieved, but the king's own ministers held back. As often as the question concerned empire affairs which, according to his repeated admission, were "quite beyond his sphere," their master gave them, willingly or unwillingly, a wide scope for negotiations. The older of them, Count Finckenstein, thirty-five years before, had become a minister at a time when the advisers of the youthful monarch regarded it as their duty to check and to warn more than to urge and to plan. Frederick reposed unlimited confidence in this statesman, the friend and playmate of his boyhood; there were times when he wrote daily

letters to discuss the political situation and its requirements with this experienced and sensible, tactful and modest, confidant.

Of quite a different nature was the second minister, Ewald Friedrich von Hertzberg, eleven years younger than Finckenstein and thirteen years younger than King Frederick. Not infrequently he sought to push himself before the older colleague, who looked upon his fidgeting restlessness and caviling doctrinarianism with dislike. In a self-assertive manner (Junker Plump from Pomerania, a foreign diplomat had called him), he did not hold back his opinion when it was not asked. "Hertzberg," wrote Prince Karl of Hesse after his observations in the Breslau winter quarters in 1778-79, "was always quibbling with the king, who often bluntly gave him a piece of his mind; he was practically what is called a bookworm; he had studied at the university; however, he was no politician." Others would only admit him to be the author of nearly all the deductions and abstracts of his department which were to be published, to the merit of a good master of the rolls. As such he had begun his career in the government service and at all times he plumed himself not a little upon his historical knowledge and what might be termed his ubiquitous wisdom. One of his favorite theories was that the state, after

the striking example of 1772, ought to make acquisitions without a stroke of the sword, that is, by virtue of the art of diplomacy, to which he attributed an exaggerated value. He always regarded the declarations of war of 1756 and 1778 as utterly useless. Convinced of the superiority of his political methods and of his higher intelligence in relation to the old king, dissatisfied with his subordinate sphere of activity and ever inclined to complain about slights, Hertzberg now essayed the task set before the ministers with the greatest reluctance.

What he had in mind was further acquisitions in Poland; for this, however, an appeal to the imperial courts was required, and the incumbents in the empire must not hear anything. To them he advocated the view that this work should begin only in one of three "epochs,"—in the event of a Turkish war, on the death of the prince-elect of Palatinate-Bavaria, and "yet in a third epoch." He meant the death of the king of Prussia, which was at last to give the ambitious and confident minister a free hand for his own assertive policy.

Hertzberg went so far as to write in confidence to the minister of the palsgrave of Zweibrücken, as if the king had suddenly conceived this idea and one had at least to satisfy him *par manière d'acquit*. This was his watchword.

Thus month after month passed without anything substantial being done. Frederick was silent, believing from many signs that the empress of Russia would not drive matters to an open breach with him.

In the autumn of 1784, new schemes of Emperor Joseph caused excitement in the political world. He could not get over the fact that at the last drawing in of nets which made a good catch of his ally he had been left empty-handed. So he came forward with his programme later on. This was a "free and voluntary exchange" of Bavaria and Upper Palatinate, together with the archbishopric of Salzburg, for the Austrian Netherlands. Thus he lauded his "idea" to the czarina as being in the Russian interest, since Austria, removed from the neighboring touch with France, would be able to devote herself with all her might to the great Oriental plan. Catherine expressed her approval, but pointed to the obstacles which the exchange scheme would meet in the German empire and in the two imperial powers who were interested in its frustration.

Joseph did not heed the warning, so confident was he that he was about to encumber his political vehicle with a second dead weight. On the verge of getting rid of his Netherlands, he caused a quarrel on Belgian soil with the

Dutch neighbors, the last struggle of the House of Hapsburg with the old adversaries of Philip II.

The Westphalian peace closed the mouth of the Scheldt in order to protect Amsterdam and Rotterdam from the rivalry of Antwerp. It was unbearable to the emperor to recognize this undignified state of affairs any longer, and he resolved to force through the opening of the Scheldt.

Into the quarrel which was at first conducted with the pen, other claims were soon drawn from both sides. It came to pass that in October, 1784, the Dutch guard ship in the Scheldt fired upon an Austrian merchantman sailing to Antwerp. France, in an alliance with both parties, endeavored to mediate. Joseph, who had engaged himself in these affairs altogether too recklessly, now sought with some skill to combine the Bavarian barter scheme with the Scheldt quarrel by letting the Dutch hope he would probably yield, so that he could win France all the easier for the transplantation of the Wittelsbachers in Belgium.

It was very evident that France, as in 1778, was looking askance and with strong disapproval on the plan of exchange. Again was seen in Versailles, after a short interval, the friendship with Austria put to a hard test, as

a year previous in the Turkish question and a decade before in the Polish affair. Again the minister and the queen, Vergennes and Marie Antoinette, were fighting for the weak king. Again the minister began seriously to reckon with Prussia. Prince Henry, whose presence in Paris took on an unforeseen significance, saw things on the banks of the Seine more through French spectacles than his Rheinsberg ones, and believed he could already grasp the French alliance for which he had ardently wished through the last thirty years.

For such a change from the Austrian to the Prussian camp, as it had been seriously regarded during the previous year, was considered the means of saving Turkey, and France would hardly have prepared for the sake of Bavaria only. But Vergennes, supported by the other ministers, succeeded in carrying through so much against the queen that Louis XVI made the fate of Bavaria dependent upon an understanding with the king of Prussia, in a letter to his imperial brother-in-law written on January 6, 1785, upon which, however, after the experiences of 1778, one could never reckon with Frederick.

The Prussian king, who was in the dark concerning the further plans of the two imperial courts after the agreement of Ainali-Kawak, re-

garded the European situation in the autumn of 1784 as a chaos. But it was not incumbent upon the Prussians to disperse this fog,—he might have been thinking of his initiative of 1740 or 1756,—but presumably an attack of the imperial courts upon the Turks, or a declaration of war by the emperor against the Dutch, would give the other powers the signal to rally.

After the arrival of the alarming news from the Netherlands, he gave a new impetus to the lagging negotiations over a confederation of princes. With his own hands he drafted, on October 24, "the project of a league between the princes of Germany, after the example of the Schmalkalden Federation," a guide for Hertzberg for the working out of the confederation charter. And when a few days afterward tidings came from Zweibrücken of new intrigues by which the palsgrave was to be won for the exchange, he called to his ministers an impatient *"Du feu! du feu! Messieurs!* There you see clearly that I am talking myself to death to you, that the emperor with his alertness will at the last gain the victory over our indolence."

Once more the ministers dared to hold back. They warned against a popular rising at a moment when the emperor, as could be deduced from his abrupt attitude toward the chief states,

seemed to be sure of the assistance of France and Russia. The king invited Hertzberg to Potsdam for a few days, in order to discuss the pros and cons of the question. Hertzberg's counter arguments seemed to have made an impression upon the king; at any rate the work was again at a standstill for several weeks.

Only a fortnight after New Year's, 1785, the scene changed. From Zweibrücken was sounded a new warning, a call for help against grave imminent danger. The representative of the czarina in the German diet, Runianzoff, had appeared in Zweibrücken and peremptorily demanded from the palsgrave the consent to the exchange of Bavaria for Belgium, concerning which the emperor and the Bavarian prince-elect, in concert with France and Russia, had agreed, though the palsgrave refused. Now, however, Finckenstein and Hertzberg became alarmed. Through this exchange, they declared to the king, the emperor would place himself in a position to reconquer Alsace and his hereditary country Lorraine, and then to subjugate the whole of Germany.

In these critical hours Frederick was the more composed party. He declined to believe that France would have bound herself, and his doubt was, as we have seen, a well-founded one.

Moreover, the French ambassador Esterno assured Count Finckenstein that the matter had been dropped.

In the beginning of February, however, the newspapers announced the Bavarian-Belgium exchange as an accomplished fact, and only left open the question whether the new Wittelsbach kingdom in the Netherlands was to be called Belgium, Burgundy or Austrasia. France was to have a voice in the deal for her consent to the acquisition of Luxemburg and Namur.

Frederick's letters from February 8 showed that his excitement was growing from day to day. "After all that you have reported to me about your conversation with Mr. Esterno," he wrote on the 10th to Finckenstein, "I begin to be suspicious even against France. . . . It could very well be that the Cæsar Joseph had intended to bribe his brother-in-law with this bait (Luxemburg). I even know through similar rumors that one has also indulged in the practical joke to fix for us, I don't know what share, and the phlegmatic tone in which Mr. Esterno has been talking to you about these intentions of the devilish Joseph makes me believe that France in this moment decisive for her honor will lack the energy, and in the end she might get her nose bleeding. O Gods! with what an infamous lot do we have to deal! And how are we, sur-

rounded by cowardly and venal 'canaille,' to maintain the German constitution by ourselves alone and resist the boundless rapacity of this cursed Vienna tyrant? I confess to you that all this throws me off my feet, for in such a universal confusion as this there are not even sufficient points of support for fluctuations."

To Prince Henry he confessed three days later that his old age was not at all adapted to these continuous tribulations with which the turbulent Joseph was oppressing the political situation of Europe. "Already more than half beyond this world, I have to redouble my activity and prudence, and constantly carry these hateful projects in my mind which this cursed Joseph originates afresh every day. So I am condemned not to enjoy a little rest even, until the earth covers my remains."

The following days did not bring him the longed-for rest, but his fears were greatly relieved. He received a declaration from Paris in the most definite terms that the emperor, as he had actually done on January 18, in his answer to the letter of Ludwig XIV of the 6th, renounced the exchange scheme. From the bottom of his heart he praised heaven, so Frederick wrote on February 21 to Finckenstein; the plan had failed and war against the two imperial courts, in which it would have been difficult to

wrest Bavaria again from the Austrians, was avoided.

At the same time he thought, not without justification, that the plan of the emperor had been laid aside to await a more favorable hour; that it had been postponed only until the death of the prince-elect of Bavaria, the "unworthy Theodor," or perhaps only until his own demise. For this reason the negotiations with the German princes had to be continued.

With the representatives of the courts of Dresden and Hanover, the charter of the confederation of princes was signed in Berlin on July 23, 1785. It was for the purpose of safeguarding to all the empire and ecclesiastical states the possession of their lands and their rights. Separate articles gave the agreement the character of the old electoral unions by the three princes-elect of Brandenburg, Saxony and Hanover, promising one another to act in agreement in all electoral affairs, as at the election of a Roman king; in the fixation of the election capitulation; and in the establishment of a new electorate. A "most secret" article pledged the three courts to resist with armed force all attempts at an exchange or taking away of empire lands.

Through the joining of the archbishop of Mainz, who, however, did not sign the secret

article, the confederation received half the votes in the electoral council. Of other empire states, the main agreement was signed by the palsgrave of Zweibrücken, who had directly participated from the outset of the negotiations, the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, the Ernestinians of Gotha and Weimar, and the Mecklenburg dukes of Schwerin and Strelitz, the margraves of Ansbach and of Baden, the Anhalt princes of Bernburg, Dessau and Köthen, and finally, the Protestant bishop of Osnabrück.

The result of the German Confederation of Princes of 1785 was not the rescue of the territorial independence of Bavaria, for Bavaria had been already saved at the moment when France made her consent to the exchange plan of Joseph II dependent upon the decision of the king of Prussia. The paramount result of the confederation was a moral gain for Prussian prestige,—a mighty enhancement of the same in the German empire and in Europe, with the dark background of a great political defeat of the emperor.

Not without reason did Frederick express his astonishment at the readiness with which the emperor designed vast plans only to drop them before the slightest difficulty. Joseph expressed his anger in a letter to his Russian ally declaring that the gathering was of so many fools, to form

a so-called confederation on the foundation of absurd fables. And Catherine in her reply could only give him the dry advice to treat this confederation, after they had failed to nip it in the bud, with absolute indifference and without betraying any irritation.

The defeat of the emperor was all the more exasperating since he, informed of the aspirations of Prussia, in a circular letter to the imperial ambassadors had requested the empire states to join him, the head of the empire, in a "formal and solemn union" for the maintenance of the empire constitution. Such a union in the empire had been at the disposal of the House of Austria before in the association of the outer circles of the empire of 1697 and 1702, and in the time of the Suabian Federation of Maximilian I, the Wittelsbach empire of Charles VII, and the Frankfort Union of 1744.

A confederation in the empire which would have militated against the emperor had not been known since the Rhine Confederation of 1658. King Frederick had found in 1785, in his Confederation of Princes against the emperor, far more members than in 1744 for the union for his protection.

This new confederation differed essentially from its predecessors in the absence of the con-

fessional tendency that had always manifested itself from the Schmalkalden Federation down to the union attempts of 1757, and in the intrinsically German character of the union. It was not the work, organ or adjunct of a foreign power, like the Rhine Confederation of Mazarin, the Heilbronn Union of Oxenstierna in the Thirty Years' War, to a certain degree the Alliance of the German Protestants of 1609, and the Confederation of Princes of 1552 against the victor of Mühlberg.

Hertzberg, who had a pronounced opinion, would have liked to give the confederation a broader scope and more European "backbone," by drawing in Holland and England. But the king well knew why he had renounced this extension. With iron persistence he kept himself aloof from all interference in the domestic conflicts of the Netherland Free States. As little as he once had granted his support to his sister in Sweden against the opposition party, so little could his niece in The Hague, the wife of the Orange hereditary lord lieutenant, expect Prussian assistance. Through this reserve he gained the great advantage that now, as a matter of fact, none of the great European powers was in alliance with him, but the two leading western powers, still in strained relations to one another after their last conclusion of peace, were both

benevolently inclined toward Prussia's creation, the Confederation of Princes, and formed as it were a reserve force for him.

Like England, from specific dynastic considerations of her dependency upon Hanover, so did France sanction the confederation according to all traditions of her policy interested in the preservation of the liberty of the sovereign princes. In former times, especially before and after the Dresden Peace of 1745, it had been Frederick's endeavor to be on equally good terms if possible with both France and England. If, in 1756, his statesmanship had failed in the attempt to reach the medium between the two, he had now operated with better fortune. Out of the perilous state of political isolation in which he saw himself after the dissolution of his relations with Russia, he had opened a way with a strong hand. He now held a position at the head of his confederation in which he could reckon upon the assistance of France and England for the conservative and defensive purposes of the union, for the preservation of the constitution, and for the maintenance of property relations in the empire, whereas Russia and Austria in the following years lost more and more of their prestige in Europe, the deeper they entangled themselves in the Oriental complications.

In this conservative and defensive tendency lay the strength and the weakness of the confederation. While it commanded the political situation of the moment, it was yet by virtue of its essential nature unable to fulfill the requirements of the national future. Germany's salvation could only come through a reform, a revolution, a new creation.

This was better known to no one than to the head of the union founded on the principle of preservation, the king of Prussia, who had formerly raised the question as to how long this "bizarre and senile" organism which one called the German empire would hold together, and who, as a young prince, had for one moment thought to "turn the empire from the bottom upward." A vital new creation would have required above all the strengthening of the central power. The imperial ambitions of the empire head of those days, borne by the new territorial endeavors of the House of Austria, were striving for such a strengthening just as determinedly as the self-consciousness and the impulse of self-preservation of the young Prussian power was laboring against it. Prussia would subordinate her power to Austrian imperialism still less than the other German princes in their weakness, and so all of them swore to the principle of preserving the old conditions. Only in

this purely negative programme were Prussia and her German allies of 1785 one.

The question had already been mooted by Prussians in their own camp, who would have had only their specific interest count. It was a rôle worthy of the king of Prussia artificially to preserve something that had outlived itself: the ungainly edifice of the German empire, with its ecclesiastical and worldly conglomeration of little states, with its stunted empire cities, with its slow and partial administration of justice of the supreme courts, and with the empty and ridiculous quibbling of its diet. Had not the king, by virtue of his new title of a protector of German freedom, bound himself by foregoing the extension and the rounding out of his state so necessary to it? Would not good statesmanship demand at an opportune time the attempt to use to one's own advantage what the emperor, at the expense of the German neighbors, had given as an example? Even recently King Frederick had scoffed at those who were now his allies, with Machiavelli as *principi di Germania bisognosi di scudi*, and in former times he had repeatedly redrawn the map of Germany through land barter and the secularization of ecclesiastical states emphatically rejected by the confederation, but included them in the sphere of his political combinations. Now, as in 1778,

he strongly repudiated the idea of dividing "fifty-fifty" with Austria. We know that Kaunitz had suggested to the emperor a direct understanding with Prussia over the Bavarian question. When the rumor of such an intention reached Berlin, Frederick declared to his ministers that he would not lend his ear to any offers or insinuations giving his coöperation in the destructive plans of the emperor against the empire constitution because of greed for gain.

In the long run this policy has not been adhered to. By the side of Austria, Prussia adopted the course which she had made impossible to the emperor in 1785. In the main decree of the empire deputation of 1803, both states cast their lot with other worldly estates of the realm over the ecclesiastical principalities and over so many barons, knights and cities. And when, two generations later, it came to the decisive struggle between the two great powers for the leadership in Germany, it had claimed new victims from the number of the German sovereign princes.

But from the struggle for dominance in Germany, from the fight to oust Austria, Prussia was yet far distant in the epoch of the German Confederation of Princes. Frederick wished only to preserve the balance between his new creation and the old Austrian power—the balance

which he had established by the conquest of Silesia and which Emperor Joseph would have neutralized by the acquisition of Bavaria.

This limited purpose was fully achieved through the policy of 1785. The indisputable diplomatic victory of Prussia, the new success after that of 1779 and after so many earlier master strokes of the old hero, already wrapped in historical semiobscurity for the generation of 1785, wrought upon the minds like a magical charm in the glory of the national deed. His "superiority in everything," to repeat Goethe's expression, had been confirmed once more and, "resting upon his strength," Frederick remained to the growing generation, according to Goethe's simile, "the Polar Star around which seemed to oscillate Germany, Europe; yes, the whole world."

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